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Abstract
Over the past two deeades, hundreds of studies have been published on issues related 
to implicit attitudes. However, there is a strong debate in the literature eoneeming the 
nature and properties of implicit attitudes, including how malleable they are. Are 
they malleable momentary constructs or inflexible stored summary evaluations? One 
of the key issues in the research on attitudinal malleability is the context-sensitivity 
of implicit attitudes. Do implicit attitudes towards the same object differ in various 
contexts? Is such context-sensitivity a property of implicit attitudes or some of its 
measures?
The context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes has attracted considerable research 
attention, but so far no consensus has been reached. Some models suggest that 
implicit attitudes are highly insensitive to contextual manipulations, while others 
propose the opposite. The disagreement can be partly attributed to differences in the 
understanding of context-sensitivity in relation to implicit attitudes. Certain contexts 
change the meaning and interpretation of an attitude object (interactive context) 
while others do not (independent context). For instance, an unfamiliar person in an 
office may be regarded as an office worker, whereas the same person in a family 
setting is interpreted as a father (interactive context). By contrast, a eat in a garden or 
in a room might be considered as a pet in both contexts (independent context). 
Research on the independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes has important 
implications for how these attitudes are represented and stored, yet most of the 
empirical research has been dedicated to examining the effect of interactive context 
on implicit attitudes. The present research therefore attempts to investigate whether 
implicit attitudes are sensitive to independent context, which does not alter the 
meaning of the attitude object.
The independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes is tested by manipulating the 
modality (picture, word) of test materials in implicit attitude tests. In four 
experiments it was investigated whether the modality (picture, word) of test stimuli 
leads to attitudinal evaluations in line with the valence of within-modality association 
only. More specifically, we tested whether pictorial associations have more impact 
than verbal associations in a pictorial attitude test, and vice versa in a verbal attitude
test. The results of these experiments reveal mixed findings. Two experiments 
utilising the Implicit Association Test reveal that implicit attitudinal scores can be 
sensitive to test modality. However, two further studies that used the evaluative 
priming task as an implicit attitude measure did not find similar modality-specificity. 
The implications for the independent context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes and 
implicit attitude measures of these findings are discussed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A pianist does not consciously think about which keys he has to push in which order 
when playing a wcll-lcamt piece on his piano. The answer to ‘2 + 2 = ? ’ comes to one’s 
mind almost immediately without much conscious effort. A pedestrian usually 
accurately and without much deliberation can judge whether it is safe to cross the street 
before the approaching car or not. Our minds can not only make seemingly effortless 
and quick responses, judgements and access information, but can also process the 
meaning of information without much deliberation, automatically, sometimes even when 
the information is not directly attended to. For instance, when we are engaged in a 
conversation in a crowded place, we are able to focus on the person talking, but may 
automatically turn our attention when our name is mentioned by someone. This cocktail 
party phenomenon (Conway, Cowan, & Bunting, 2001; Moray, 1959) demonstrates that 
the meaning of presumably unattended information can sometimes be extracted 
automatically. Several experiments (e.g. Brown & Besner, 2001; Neely, 1977; Shaffer & 
LaBerge, 1979) with the Stroop-task (Stroop, 1935), the flanker-task (Eriksen & 
Eriksen, 1974) and particularly the semantic priming task (Meyer & Schvaneveldt,1971) 
also indicate that the meaning of stimuli can still be processed automatically, even when 
one is supposed to ignore them. Other research on subliminal semantic priming shows 
that the meaning o f stimuli can be processed even if  they are not attended to or one is 
supposedly unaware of the stimulus being presented (Draine & Greenwald, 1998; 
Klinger, Burton, & Pitts, 2000; Reynvoet, Gevers, & Caessens, 2005).
Positive and negative attitudinal evaluations can also be made in a seemingly 
effortless and quick fashion. If 1 am a fan of a band 1 probably do not have to think much 
about whether 1 like them if asked this question. More importantly, my liking of the 
band may come to my mind automatically when coming across a record of the band in a 
shop. Indeed, a large number of experiments indicated that the attitude towards an object
can be activated quickly and automatically, even when one is told to ignore the object 
(e.g. Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992; Fazio, Sanbomatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 
1986) or when the object is supposedly not being attended to or at least one is unaware 
of it (e.g. Abrams & Greenwald, 2000; Hermans, Spruyt, De Houwer, & Eelen, 2003). 
Research on these so-called implicit attitudes provides evidence that attitudinal 
evaluations may not require conscious, controlled processing and can be activated by 
mere exposure to an attitude object (for review see, Fazio, 2001).
The fact that implicit attitudes can be activated automatically and possibly 
without conscious awareness has an important further implication. These findings 
suggest that attitudes sometimes may beeome activated inevitably. For instance, seeing 
an orange may inevitably activate an attitude towards oranges (i.e. whether you like 
them or not). Similarly, seeing a person you know on the street inevitably activates a 
negative or positive evaluation or feeling towards the person. The idea of inevitability 
appeared very early in research on implicit attitudes (Fazio et al., 1986; Fazio, Jackson, 
Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Lepore & Brown, 1997). Indeed, it was suggested that as 
long as an attitudinal evaluation is strongly linked to an attitude object, the evaluation of 
an attitude object automatically and inevitably activates upon encountering that object. 
Later research, however, has fundamentally questioned this notion.
Contrary to previous assumptions, the activation of attitudes was shown to be a 
conditional phenomenon (Blair & Banaji, 1996) and so it would imply that these 
evaluations’ activation may not be inevitable. That is a positive or negative attitude 
towards a certain object may become activated sometimes, but other times may not. In 
the latter cases, the lack of automatic evaluation activation should lead to neutral 
attitudinal stance towards the object. Wittenbrink, Judd and Park (2001) put forth an 
even stronger claim: attitudinal and specifically, implicit attitudinal evaluation of an 
object is context-specific. In one context the same attitude object can be evaluated 
positively, while in another negatively. For instance, a person who is a rather demanding 
senior manager at a company but also a very nice father at home, might be viewed very 
differently in the two contexts (i.e. home, work) by someone. Therefore, this may lead to 
the activation of very different implicit attitudes in the two contexts from the same 
person. The claim that automatically activated attitudes can vary across context, was
clearly at odds with the assumption that strong implicit attitudes are activated rather 
inevitably. After all, if  they are activated in an automatic and inevitable fashion then 
they also ought to be largely inflexible and in particular, be context-independent. A 
number of further experiments demonstrated that implicit attitudes are indeed context- 
sensitive (for a review see Blair, 2002; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001). The findings on 
context-sensitivity have influenced our theoretical view of implicit attitudes as they 
support the notion that contextual influence need to be incorporated into attitude models 
and in particular attitude representation models. Furthermore, it questioned what implicit 
attitudinal findings really reflect on. Are they merely momentary evaluations in a given 
context or are they stored evaluative knowledge about an attitude object that is activated 
inevitably in the presence of the object?
Given the theoretical and potential practical implications o f context-sensitivity, 
the issue became a hotly debated topic in implicit social cognition. However, the debate 
largely avoided recognizing that at least two types of context should be taken into 
account; one that affects the encoding of the attitude object (see Fazio, 2007) and one 
that does not. The former is termed interactive, the latter independent context (Baddeley, 
1982, 1997). For example, in a classic experiment (Barclay, Bransford, Franks, 
McCarrell, & Nitsch, 1974) it was shown that the encoding and thus the 
conceptualization of a piano is fundamentally altered when the word appeared in the 
sentence of ‘the man tuned the piano’ compared to when it was in the sentence of ‘the 
man lifted the piano’. The former led to the encoding of the piano as a musical 
instrument while the latter as something heavy. Similar to the encoding of the piano, if 
an orange is conceptualized as something sugary as opposed to something healthy, 
implicit attitudes toward the object (i.e. orange) can be considerably different. 
Nevertheless, in this case the difference in implicit attitudes could be due to the 
encoding of the object in different contexts and not to the context-sensitivity o f the 
implicit evaluation itself. Furthermore, most of the empirical research examined context 
that could change the encoding of the object. That is most of the findings may not be 
demonstrations of context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes, but the context-sensitivity of 
the encoding of an object. Such context cannot contribute to empirical findings on the 
representation and storage of implicit attitudes, as there is virtually no model that would
assume inflexible implicit attitudes when the context promotes different encoding of an 
object. ,
Context, which does not affect the encoding of the attitude object (i.e. 
independent context), has received very little attention in empirical research on implicit 
attitudes and even less in theoretical models. An example of independent context can be 
the environmental setting in which attitudinal information is learnt. For instance, if we 
learn in a library room that solar power plants provide relatively environmentally- 
firiendly energy, the environment (i.e. library room) in which the information is learnt is 
not likely to influence the encoding of evaluations of solar power plants. Similarly, 
particular features of the object may not affect its categorization. For instance, if we saw 
a man robbing a bank, the colour of the man’s shirt should not affect the encoding of the 
person (i.e. bank robber). Finally, perceptual details o f the information learnt about an 
object that is the font style, the colour o f the page or the letter should also leave the 
encoding of the object unaffected.
It may have received little attention so far, but the possibility of independent 
context having impact on implicit attitudes could be viewed very differently according 
to various attitude models. That is whereas examinations of interactive context have 
relatively few implications for attitude models, independent context may have very 
significant ones. In the area of independent context the different attitude models and 
especially representational and memory system accounts of implicit attitudes could lead 
to markedly different predictions. This is because representation models that envisage 
summary-evaluation based implicit attitudes (e.g. Fazio, 2007) provide very limited 
scope for independent context sensitivity. By contrast, models that assume the 
recruitment of a set of information for making implicit attitudinal judgements (e.g. 
Schwarz, 2007) may attribute high sensitivity to independent context. In the former set 
of representational accounts, the summary evaluation (e.g. very positive) o f an orange is 
activated across all contexts. According to the latter models, the implieit attitude towards 
an orange can be highly context-specific and therefore can be very positive in one 
context, but very negative in another context.
The independent context also has a significant role in the argument about how 
many memory-systems are involved in implicit attitudes. Certain theorists hypothesise
only a single system is involved (e.g. Bower, 1991), while others multiple memory 
systems (Amodio & Ratner, 2011) are involved in attitudes and in implicit attitudes. 
Naturally, if  implicit attitudes are rooted in one single memory system, the context 
cannot lead to the activation of different types of memories. However, according to the 
suggestions for multiple memory system underlying implicit attitudes, certain cues, 
including the kind of test used for assessing implicit attitudes, may have an impact on 
which type of association (semantic or affective) is tapped into. Conventional implicit 
attitude tests may assess primarily semantic associations. That is these tests may act as a 
context that leads to the preferential activation of semantic associations, therefore 
implicit attitudes in this context may be based primarily on semantic memories. To 
assess affective associations, the implicit attitude tests may be needed to be modified in 
a way such that they rely more on affective associations and less on semantic 
associations. This argument further implies that even though implicit attitudes are most 
often originated in the activation of both types of memories, sometimes the independent 
context may lead to the preferential activation of only one type.
The current research project aims to see whether independent context can 
influence implicit attitude activation. The independent context in most of the studies will 
be introduced in the form of the modality of testing. The term modality will be used to 
refer to the distinction between visually presented and verbally presented stimuli (see 
McCarthy & Warrington, 1988, 1994). A pictorial test in this research means that stimuli 
referring to the attitude object are presented together with positive and negative pictures, 
while the same attitude object stimuli are presented with positive and negative words in 
a verbal test. Context-effect is assumed to be manifested in modality-specificity; that is 
when a certain modality of test leads to attitudinal judgements in line with the valence 
(positive, negative) of associations learnt only in the same modality. That is 1 will ask 
whether a pictorial test context leads to the preferential activation o f pictorial 
associations learnt about an attitude object while a verbal test context preferentially 
activates verbal associations. If independent context has any effect on implicit attitudes 
then when two affectively incongruent associations (e.g. pictorial association is positive 
and the verbal association is negative) are learnt about an object, we may obtain 
different attitude results for the attitude object in the pictorial and verbal test.
Alternatively, no contextual effect could indicate that independent context has no 
influence on implicit attitudes.
By examining implicit attitudes rooted in affectively incongruent associations, 
this research also touches upon the issue of attitudinal ambivalence at the implicit level. 
Considerable research effort has been directed in the last two decades to examine 
attitudinal ambivalence and so to understand whether attitudes towards an object could 
be both positive and negative at the same time (Conner & Armitage^ 2008). However, 
this research has almost exclusively relied on using explicit attitude measures. In the 
current research project, attitude objects are often associated with both positive and 
negative information, which could form the foundations of both negative and positive 
evaluations in implicit attitude measures. The possibility of shifts o f implicit attitudes of 
these attitude objects in different independent contexts will be examined.
The present research is thus an attempt to understand the context-sensitivity of 
implicit attitudes and in particular the somewhat neglected issue of independent context 
sensitivity. The method adopted for studying the issue, the modality o f test, could enable 
us to provide data relevant to representational and implicit memory models of implicit 
attitudes and should have implications for existing attitude models. Nevertheless, the 
issue is not merely theoretical, but it should also have important practical implications. 
More empirical findings on the inflexibility versus contextual flexibility of implicit 
attitudes should also contribute to our understanding o f various topics in social 
psychology, ftom racial prejudice to political attitudes.
Chapter 2
The concept of implicit attitude
The present research attempts to examine whether implicit attitudes are sensitive to 
independent contextual features, specifically to the verbal or pictorial nature of the 
implicit test. Since implicit attitudes are the focus of this research, I will begin by 
discussing what the concept implicit attitude means and what makes it different from 
explicit attitudes. The answers to these questions are not quite straightforward. On the 
one hand, according to some authors, attitudes cannot be implicit or explicit and thus it 
does not make sense using the concept of implicit attitudes. Others, on the other hand, 
think that the concept refers to a construct, which is represented separately from explicit 
attitudes and has distinctive processing features. To answer to the two questions and at 
the same time to define the object of the present research, I will start the chapter by 
discussing not the concept of implicit attitude itself, but the implicit measures of 
attitudes.
A new class of attitude measures
The last thirty years saw the development of a series of implicit measures to examine 
attitudes and other social psychological constructs without the respondents’ direct 
assessment of target objects (for review see Bassili & Brown, 2005; De Houwer, 2006; 
Fazio & Olson, 2003). A large number of experiments have been conducted with these 
measures since the introduction of the most popular paradigms, like the evaluative 
priming task (Fazio et al., 1986), the Implicit Association Test (lAT; Greenwald, 
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), the Extrinsic Affective Simon Task (EAST; De Houwer, 
2003a), the Implicit Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, Govorun, & 
Stewart, 2005), and the Go/No-Go Association Task (GNAT; Nosek & Banaji, 2001).
The strong scholarly interest in the development and use o f implicit measures of 
attitudes is often attributed to two shortcomings of conventional, usually questionnaire- 
based explicit attitude measures (see e.g. Gawronski, 2009; Gawronski, LeBel, & Peters, 
2007). First, self-reported (i.e. explicit) measures of attitudes rely on people’s conscious 
effort to reflect on their attitudes towards an object. However, following developments 
in cognitive psychology, neuropsychology and in particular implicit memory research 
(e.g. Graf & Schacter, 1985) social psychological research turned to the question of 
whether part of social cognition was possibly beyond the reach of conscious access (see 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Gawronski, Hofmann, & Wilbur, 2006). In attitude research, 
it means that certain attitudes may be inaccessible and/or influence one’s responses 
without awareness. Second, even if people are fully aware of their attitude, in certain 
circumstances they may feel that it is undesirable to express them. Explicit attitude 
measures are largely dependent on people’s willingness to express their attitude. They 
are also known to be prone to social-desirability and self-presentation effects, especially 
when the attitude object in question is sensitive (e.g. Jones & Sigall, 1971; Tourangeau 
& Yan, 2007). It would be therefore highly desirable to be able to measure attitudes 
without these effects potentially contaminating measurements. Based on an information- 
processing theory in cognitive psychology (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shifftin & 
Schneider, 1977), attitude research began to examine whether attitudes can be activated 
in an automatic fashion and measured indirectly (Fazio et al., 1986; for a historical 
review see Payne & Gawronski, 2008). This line of research aimed at obtaining attitudes 
processed automatically and therefore potentially without the effect o f social-desirability 
and self-presentation.
The implicit measures developed were thought to overcome these shortcomings 
of explicit measures and possibly provide an alternative way to measure attitudes 
without relying on people’s awareness of them or willingness to express them. Empirical 
research to assess these properties of the implicit measures was directed mainly towards 
examining the most widely-used tasks; the lAT and the evaluative priming task. Self- 
presentation and awareness effects were examined predominantly through investigations 
o f the automaticity and unconsciousness aspects of these tasks. The findings indicated 
that both tasks have indeed some of the features that in theory should make them
immune to the effect of social desirability, self-presentation and certain aspects of 
awareness (for review, see De Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009a).
Arguably therefore they perform better on these dimensions than conventional 
explicit attitude measures. However, implicit measures also have a number of 
shortcomings. Certain psychometric properties of these tasks, especially test-retest 
reliability and correlation among implicit measures, are often found problematic (e.g. 
Fazio & Olson, 2003; LeBel & Paunonen, 2011). Furthermore, since they usually 
employ response latency as dependent measure, they are sensitive to changes in the 
environment (e.g. noise) and to other theoretically irrelevant factors (e.g. age). Some of 
the measures (e.g. lAT) are strictly relative and results relating to a specific attitude 
object can be interpreted only compared to another objects examined during the same 
task. Moreover, the number of attitude objects that can be examined within a task is 
limited and it takes longer to assess them than with typical self-reported measures. In 
addition, unlike explicit measures, they normally involve the use of electronic 
equipment, (computer, monitor, etc.), which makes their use somewhat more 
cumbersome than of explicit measures. The list goes on, but this set of issues is enough 
to illustrate the point that while implicit measures do perform better on certain criteria, 
they also have their own shortcomings compared to explicit measures of attitudes. Thus 
they cannot be considered to be trouble-free alternatives of explicit measures. In fact, as 
we will see next, they may not be considered as alternatives at all.
From explicit and implicit attitude measures to explicit and implicit 
attitudes
The question of what implicit and explicit attitude measures assess invited a great deal 
of research interest, leading to various theoretical assumptions and to a series of 
empirical studies. Theory-driven answers to this question have been a function of views 
on attitude representation and processing. The postulated representational assumptions 
range from hypothesizing one single (Fazio, 1995, 2007; see also Fazio, Chen, 
McDonel, & Sherman, 1982), through dual (Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) to 
practically an infinite number of attitude representations (Smith & Conrey, 2007).
Particularly the single versus dual representation models had significant implications. 
For instance, from the single-attitude perspective, implicit and explicit measures are 
meant to tap into the same attitude representation, while from the dual-attitude 
viewpoint, implicit measures access implicit attitude representations, whereas explicit 
measures can tap into explicit attitude representations. However, the question of what 
the two measures assess is not necessarily only a representational issue, but can also be 
approached from a processing point of view. This point is echoed in virtually every 
recent attitude model that addresses - implicit and explicit attitude measures 
(Cunningham, Zelazo, Packer, & Bavel, 2007; Fazio, 1990; Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen’s, 2007; Petty, Brinol, & DeMarree’s, 2007; Smith & Conrey, 2007; 
Wilson et al., 2000). These models differ considerably, but all suggest qualitatively 
different processes involved in implicit and explicit attitude measures\
As a consequence, one can argue that almost all o f these models imply that 
implicit and explicit measures of attitudes can potentially tap into the outcome of 
different processes. Thus, depending on several moderating factors, implicit and explicit 
measures can reflect on the product of identical, but also different processes. Hence, 
implicit measures are not necessarily alternatives of explicit measures. O f course, 
Wilson et al’s (2000) model suggests an even stronger claim, according to. which 
implicit and explicit measures can reflect on the outcome of different processes, but also 
on different representations of attitudes. On the basis of Wilson et al’s dual-attitude 
model, implicit measures cannot be regarded as alternatives to self-reported measures, 
because explicit measures have no access to implicit attitudes. The only model, which 
suggests an opposite claim, is Fazio’s (1990) MODE (Motivation and Opportunity as 
Determinants) model. In this model, implicit attitude measures tap into automatieally 
activated single-representations of attitudes, whereas explicit measures can reflect on 
automatically activated attitudes, but also on evaluations originating from extra- 
attitudinal deliberative processes and factors. Since the underlying to-be measured 
representational construct is identical and the difference in processes is thought to be not 
attitude-relevant, implicit measures could be considered as alternative measures of
' The most often mentioned distinctions are automatic versus deliberate and associative versus 
propositional, referring to processes underlying implicit and explicit tasks, respectively.
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attitudes to explicit measures. In sum, with the exception of the MODE model, implicit 
and explicit measures are most often believed to tap into different constructs (implicit 
and explicit attitudes), either because of accessing different representations and/or 
employing different processes. Nevertheless, I mentioned at the beginning of this section 
that the question is not merely a theoretical problem, but it also prompted a number of 
studies that examined the relationship between the results of implicit and explicit 
attitude measures.
Two sets of studies contributed most to examining this issue; studies on (1) the 
relation between the two types of measures and the behavioural outcome they predict 
(spontaneous - controlled, verbal - non-verbal), and (2) the correlation between attitude 
results obtained by implicit and explicit tasks^. First, a small set o f studies specifically 
examined and provided empirical support for the claim that implicit attitude measures 
are superior at predicting spontaneous, non-verbal, habitual behaviour, while explicit 
attitude measures are better at predicting deliberate, verbal behaviour (Conner, Perugini, 
O’Gorman, Ayres, & Prestwich, 2007; Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002; Dovidio, 
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Perugini, 2005). Second, empirical 
findings also revealed correlations between the results of two types of measures ranging 
ftom zero to 0.64 (for review see Fazio & Olson, 2003; Hofinann, Gawronski, 
Gschwender, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; Payne, Burkley, & Stokes, 2008). Further 
examinations pointed out that the relationship is moderated by a number o f  attitude- 
relevant factors (e.g. Hofinann, Gschwender, Castelli, & Schmitt, 2008; Nosek, 2005, 
2007). Moreover, Payne et al. argued that attitude-irrelevant variables that are the 
substantial procedural and thus structural differences between implicit and explicit 
measures, can reduce the correlation between them and so earlier reports may have 
considerably underestimated this relationship. Nevertheless, despite considerable 
variation in correlations among implicit and explicit measures, Nosek and Smyth (2007) 
concluded that a dual-attitude model fit best to their web-based study’s data, in an 
application of structural equation modelling. The authors argued that the best model was
 ^In addition, another interesting line o f research is the examination o f attitude change affecting 
explicit and implicit measures differently (for review see Petty et al., 2007).
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in which implicit and explicit measures assessed two distinct/but related constructs (see 
also Nosek, 2007).
Greenwald and Nosek (2008) stated: “even staunch adherents of the single­
representation view must concede that the implicit-explicit distinction has been 
established at the level of empirical constructs.” (p.80). They also argued that these 
constructs, implicit and explicit attitudes, can refer to difference in processes or in 
representations. Either way, as hypothetical, theoretical constructs “it appears 
unequivocally established that two constructs are needed” (p.80). As we saw, their 
conclusion is in concert with most of the models discussed and with the empirical 
results. The employment of the constructs of implicit and explicit attitudes is in line with 
the majority o f relevant models and it has also obtained empirical support. Nevertheless, 
there might be some agreement on the application of the concepts of implicit and 
explicit attitudes, but they are also interpreted and defined in various ways. In the next 
section, I will review the current conceptualization of implicit attitudes. I will 
concentrate on the definition of implicit attitudes only, as explicit attitudes are not the 
main focus o f the present research.
The concept of implicit attitudes
The various models of the representation and processes underlying implicit attitudes 
have a major impact on how the concept is defined. Representation models, which 
assume separate implicit and explicit representation of implicit and explicit attitudes, 
necessarily conceptualize implicit attitude as a separate construct. Therefore in this 
context the label implicit attitude refers to an actual construct stored in memory. 
Naturally, if one supposes one single representation for both kind of attitudes and 
equates attitudes with this representation, the implicit-explicit distinction will lose its 
purpose. Of course, the label implicit attitude - as opposed to explicit attitude - can also 
refer to a qualitatively different process, by which attitudinal information is recruited 
and dealt with. In this sense implicit attitude is understood as a kind of attitudinal 
process and not as a representational construct. As we will see in the next section, every 
relevant conceptualization of implicit attitude wears the sign of a particular
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representation model or has fundamental - and strongly contested - assumptions on the 
information recruitment process.
In studies, which employed the concept and also at least implied what way it was 
used, three main approaches can be distinguished by which implicit attitudes are viewed 
as: (I) unaware, automatic evaluations, influencing ‘implicit responses’, (2) 
automatically activated attitudes or (3) unaware traces of past experience mediating 
responses. ,
Firstly, Wilson et al. (2000) define implicit attitudes “as evaluations that (a) have 
unknown origin (i.e. people are unaware o f the basis o f  their evaluation); (b) are 
activated automatically; and (c) influence implicit responses . . .” (p. 104). These three 
features are only true for implicit attitudes, which, as we saw earlier, are thought to be 
stored separately from explicit attitudes. The defining features of implicit attitudes are an 
integral part of the authors’ dual attitude model, and comprise of some processing and 
representational assumptions. It must be mentioned, that especially the awareness 
feature in the definition has been strongly criticized. De Houwer (2006a) noted that 
respondents’ awareness of the tested attitude is very difficult to assess and is unlikely to 
be true for many attitudes examined in implicit measure studies. Besides, attitudes 
reported in explicit measures can also have unknown origin, because people may not 
remember why they like or dislike an object.
Secondly, implicit attitudes are sometimes used as a label for, or synonym of, 
automatically activated attitudes (e.g. Wittenbrink et al., 2001). De Houwer, Custers, 
and De Clercq (2006) specifically argued that “implicit attitudes can be defined as the 
immediate, automatic affective reactions that stimuli evoke” (p. 1274). De Houwer and 
Moors (2007) in relation to implicit measures defined automaticity as a set of properties: 
“uncontrolled, unintentional, autonomous, goal-independent, purely-stimulus-driven, 
unconscious, efficient, or fast” (p. 192). Presumably the same automaticity features can 
be applied to attitudes. These processing features of the concept, however, were at odds 
with Nosek and Banaji’s (2009) interpretation of implicit attitudes^. In their reply to De
 ^Payne and Gawronski (2010) argued that the automatic vs. unconscious (unaware) approaches 
to implicit attitudes are rooted in the different cognitive psychological routes the proponents’ theoretical
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Houwer, Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, and Moors’s (2009a) article, they argued that 
equating the term implicit with automatic is problematic. They drew this conclusion 
from their argument that certain features of implicit measures are not related to 
automaticity (e.g. inability to communicate the measured attribute, cf. De Houwer, 
Teige-Mocigemba, Spruyt, & Moors, 2009b). Nosek and Banaji (2009) emphasize the 
role of unconscious-unaware in the concept as opposed to automatic preferred by De 
Houwer et al. (2009a). Another interesting part of their definition is regarding attitudes 
as affective reactions. Placing affect in the centre of attitude definitions certainly has a 
great tradition in attitude research (e.g. Thurstone, 1931), but as reviewers have noted 
(e.g. Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) current conceptualizations tend to emphasize the 
evaluative component of attitudes. Hence, De Houwer and his colleagues’ definition is 
something of a departure from eurrent conventions.
Thirdly, probably the most popular definition (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995), 
suggests that implicit attitudes are “ ...introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately 
identified) traces of past experience that mediate favourable or unfavourable feeling, 
thought, or action toward social objects" (p. 8). Payne and Gawronski (2010; see also De 
Houwer, 2006a) argued that it should be read as unawareness of the effect o f these 
experiences and certainly not as an indication of dual-representation. That is people are 
unaware of the process by which their attitudinal thoughts, beliefs and actions are 
influenced by previous experiences. 1 believe, however, Greenwald and Banaji’s 
definition is more inclusive, than Payne and Gawronski suggest. The definition can 
incorporate both unconscious attitudes (as a separate construct) and an unawareness of 
the effect of these memories (as a separate process). This interpretation 1 believe fits 
better with the view that explains that Greenwald and Banaji’s terminology on implicit 
attitudes is meant to be descriptive (Nosek & Greenwald, 2009) and their view of the 
concept as a hypothetical construct, in which the explicit-implicit distinction can be 
explained by either process or representation differences (Greenwald & Nosek, 2008). 
Incidentally, the assumption that treats implicit as unconscious, was contested by De 
Houwer et al. (2009b). As we saw earlier they strongly argued for equating implicit with
assumptions followed: Schneider and Shiffrin’s (1977) information processing model or the implicit 
memory research.
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the concept automatic and as I already mentioned at Wilson et al’s (2000) definition, De 
Houwer (2006a) found awareness a particularly problematic issue.
Finally, whereas the above researchers debated the content o f the concept, but 
accepted its use in research, some authors entirely reject its use. The lack of clarity of 
the concept and controversies around it made Petty et al. (2007) abandon the concept of 
implicit attitudes and used ‘automatic attitudes’ instead, which they felt was less 
problematic. Fazio and Olson (2003; see also Olson & Fazio, 2008) also rejected the use 
of the concept, but they did it for theoretical reasons. According to Fazio and Olson 
(2008), the concept ‘implicit’ only makes sense if  it refers to a particular measure (e.g. 
evaluative priming, lAT, EAST, etc.), indicating that it is one of the indirect 
(unobtrusive) measures used in social cognition. As Fazio (2007) considers attitude as a 
single construct that is an evaluation-object association stored in memory, it leaves no 
room for implicit and explicit distinction at the construct level. O f course, this rejection 
of the implicit attitude concept is based on the above representational assumption and 
that attitudes are equated with these object-evaluation associations (attitude as a 
representational construct). Furthermore, Schwarz and Bohner (2001) not only 
questioned the use of the concept of implicit attitude, but more generally the concept of 
attitude. It is because they argued that implicit attitudes and attitudes in general can be 
viewed as online evaluations that are made on the spot. Put it differently, implicit 
attitudes are momentary evaluations and not the activations of stored evaluations. In 
fact, stored summary evaluations are unnecessary to attitudinal judgements, as in the 
most extreme version of this view, attitudes are always only constructed when they are 
needed from a set of available and/or relevant information in a given moment and 
context. As such, the concepts of attitude and implicit attitude are merely hypothetical 
and potentially unnecessary constructs. Again, however, Schwarz and Bohner’s 
argument originates from representational and processing assumptions, which are 
strongly debated (e.g. Fazio, 2007).
As a side note, it is worth mentioning, that some authors (Fazio, 2007; 
Cunningham et al., 2007) tend to use evaluations referring to explicit attitudes as 
opposed to the term attitude. Indirectly, it implies that only automatically activated 
attitudes can be considered as attitudes. As Fazio argued “verbally expressed judgments
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occur farther "downstream" than the automatic activation of any relevant attitude and 
may be influenced by motivational factors that can override the effect of the 
automatically activated attitude” (p.623). That is attitudes (i.e. object-evaluation 
associations) are only ‘starting points’ for verbal behaviour in explicit attitude measures 
and the results of these measures can be contaminated by various other factors. This 
view suggests that implicit measures may tap into attitudes more purely than explicit 
measures, in which results can be the product of attitudinal, but also non-attitudinal 
factors. As a consequence, attitudinal results of explicit measures should be viewed as 
reflections on evaluations in a broader sense and not only on attitudes. However, to the 
analogy of Gawronski’s (2009) argument on the ‘true self, one can argue the opposite 
and refer exclusively to explicit attitudes as attitudes and implicit attitudes as mere 
evaluative associations. After all explicit attitudes are under conscious control and 
implicit attitudes are not. In this case, the distinction is made on the basis o f the 
endorsement of the evaluation. Regarding implicit attitudes as attitudes is especially 
problematic, if one views explicit attitudes as validated and therefore endorsed attitudes 
- even if they are prone to self-presentation biases -, and implicit attitudes as mere 
unvalidated evaluative associations (e.g. Petty et al., 2007). This argument appeared 
primarily as a validity issue surrounding the lAT (e.g. Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Karpinski 
& Hilton, 2001), but its implications go beyond a particular measure. As these 
arguments show, the conceptualization o f -  implicit and explicit - attitudes in the 
existing literature is sometimes influenced by the attitude measures presumed ability to 
tap into attitudes, but also by the presumed endorsement of the activated evaluations.
In sum, the above conceptualizations (or rejection) of the term implicit attitudes 
are based on at least some fundamental and controversial assumptions. As a 
consequence, I will adopt an operational definition, which attempts to avoid 
controversies surrounding other definitions, but also suits the purposes of this research. 
Thus before turning to the discussion on theoretical models of implicit attitudes, I will be 
clear about what the concept of implicit attitude will mean in the present research 
project.
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A working definition of implicit attitudes
The operational definition of implicit attitude employed in this research ought to be very 
flexible, but also rather specific at the same time. The definition should be compatible 
with a wide range of theoretical models, since research on the context-sensitivity of 
implicit attitudes is strongly connected to various attitude models. Thus it cannot be built 
around one particular implicit attitude model. Furthermore, it also needs to be very 
specific, to exclude from the concept constructs and issues, which were beyond our topic 
of interest. Specifically, this research was meant to investigate evaluations made 
automatically or through unconscious processes in indirect attitude tasks. Thus, attitudes 
assessed by conventional self-reported measures are not of direct interest.
From the perspective of this research, all the above definitions have problematic 
points. For instance, both Fazio’s (2007) and Wilson et al’s (2000) conceptualizations 
are strongly connected to particular representational models and have controversial 
processing assumptions which make them largely incompatible with a theory-neutral 
approach. Moreover, Greenwald and Banaji’s (1995) and De Houwer et al’s (2006) 
definitions rest on processing assumptions, which at this point seem to be mutually 
incompatible. Therefore, I propose an operational definition, which should be inclusive 
enough to be compatible with most theoretical views on implicit attitudes, but also ought 
to be able to exclude attitudes assessed by direct measures.
I will follow a pragmatic approach and so simply operationalize implicit attitudes 
as attitudes assessed by implicit measures'^. This terminology refers to attitudes as 
psychological constructs, but the distinction from explicit attitudes is made on the level 
of measurement. Hence, this working definition can conceptually integrate Fazio’s view 
of implicit attitudes, but at the same time it is not incompatible with other views of the 
concept. It also adequately excludes attitudes based on self-reported measures.
Furthermore, within the implicit attitude concept, I consider attitudes as positive 
or negative evaluations of an object. In some of the processing models (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2007; Petty et ah, 2007), the endorsement of the evaluative associations is 
a critical issue. In fact, the endorsement of implicit attitudes (see e.g. Greenwald &
This definition is almost identical to Petty et al’s (2007), except that as I mentioned earlier, they 
rejected the use of the concept implicit and replaced it with automatic.
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Nosek, 2008; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Nosek & Hansen, 2008a) is one o f the currently 
highly debated topics. Hence, using the rather flexible term of evaluation referring to 
attitude enables us to stay away from this debate. I need to mention, that the term 
evaluation in this research will refer to the cognitive outcome of a cognitive and/or 
affective evaluative process, but not to its behavioural manifestation (cf. Eagly & 
Chaiken, 2007).
Finally, the other critical concept in the working definition is ‘implicit measures’. 
When, I previously reviewed the existing definitions of implicit attitudes, I mentioned 
the debate between De Houwer et al. (2009a) and Nosek and Greenwald (2009) on the 
conceptualization of implicit in the context of implicit measures. The debate suggests 
that the defining feature(s) of implicit measures is a somewhat controversial issue. 
Again, I will take a pragmatic approach and refer to implicit measures as a set of indirect 
measures that has supportive empirical data to suggest that at least one of the properties 
of automaticity and/or unconsciousness applies to them. These properties are amply 
discussed at Bargh (1994), Moors and De Houwer (2006a), De Houwer et al. (2009a, 
2009b) and Nosek and Greenwald (2009). The automaticity/unconsciousness aspects of 
some commonly used tasks have been examined and led to providing at least some 
empirical support. It is important to note, that by these criteria the two measures 
(evaluative priming task, lAT), which will be used in this project, fall under the label of 
implicit measures.
In this chapter, I started off the discussion from using a collection of indirect 
attitude measures to assess attitudes to arriving at a point where these measures possibly 
tap into a separate hypothetical construct from those assessed by self-reported measures. 
I also tried to demonstrate that it is not purely an empirical or terminological issue, but it 
is strongly linked to basic representational and processing assumptions. Furthermore, 
these assumptions fundamentally influence how one perceives and therefore defines the 
eonstruct of implieit attitudes. I also tried to elarify how the term will be used in this 
researeh. Next, I will continue with a review on eurrent theoretieal views about implicit 
attitudes and their relation to the issue of eontext-sensitivity.
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Chapter 3
Context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes in implicit attitude models
Context-sensitivity has a speeial place in the study of implieit attitudes. This is because 
understanding eontext-sensitivity and representation, as well as, eontext-sensitivity and 
memory-system(s) involvement in implieit attitudes are strongly interrelated areas. From 
a eertain viewpoint, implicit attitude is merely an umbrella term for highly flexible, 
momentary eonstruets, whereas from others implicit attitudes are highly inflexible and 
stable stored evaluative associations activated in memory. The examination of the 
context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes may thus eontribute to our understanding o f the 
representation and memory systems underlying implieit attitudes. Nevertheless, it is not 
only a theoretieal issue, but it may also have highly signifleant praetieal consequenees. 
For instanee, a large proportion of White Ameriean partieipants -  often over half the 
study participants - was shown to have negative raeial implieit attitudes towards Blaek 
Amerieans (Fazio et al., 1995; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002). Yet, sueh negative 
implieit attitudes may be mueh less harmful, if  they were highly context-sensitive, very 
flexible and ehanged easily, eompared to if  they were highly inflexible, unehangeable 
and likely to be activated automatically.
A key souree of potential implieit attitudinal flexibility and in particular context- 
sensitivity is rooted in the information assoeiated with an attitude objeet. Speeifieally, 
attitudinal flexibility may be based on that a single pieee of information learnt about an 
attitude object can be evaluated both positively and negatively, or on that some of the 
learnt pieees of information have predominantly positive whereas others have negative 
affeetive eonnotation. The former refers to the option that the learnt information about 
the attitude objeet may have both positive and negative aspects. For example, we may 
know about a eertain MP only that he is a strong supporter of genetically modified (GM) 
food. If one had mixed feelings and thoughts about such food, the evaluation of the MP
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would be based on a single pieee of information (i.e. supporter of GM food) whieh itself 
is presumably associated with affectively mixed information. Alternatively, we may 
learn about a city which has excellent publie transport (positive information), but often 
has high air pollution levels (negative information). As a result, the attitude object (i.e. 
the partieular city) becomes assoeiated with both positive and negative information. In 
real life, most objects are probably assoeiated with a mixture of affeetively ineongruent 
pieees of information, whieh themselves have both negative and positive aspeets.
This incongruence o f the information provides the foundation of attitudes, whieh 
has both a negative and a positive evaluative eomponent. To put it differently, as a result 
of the mixed assoeiated information, we “could evaluate something both positively and 
negatively” (Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995, p.364). These attitudes appear in the 
literature as ambivalent attitudes. As previous research on attitudes (for discussion see 
Conner & Armitage, 2008) demonstrated many of our attitude objeets ean indeed be 
evaluated both positively and negatively for the above reasons. However, the research 
on attitudinal ambivalence is mostly based on attitudes assessed by explicit attitude 
measures. As a eonsequenee, the assessment of the ambivalence of one’s attitudes 
towards an objeet most often relies on people’s awareness and direet evaluation of 
eertain aspeets of the objeet. Sinee the researeh on attitudinal ambivalenee is dominated 
by the use of explieit measures, it is unelear whether the eoneept of attitudinal 
ambivalenee ean be applied only to attitudes assessed by sueh explicit measures. That is 
it needs further researeh to understand whether attitudinal ambivalenee extends to 
attitudes assessed by implieit measures, for whieh neither awareness nor direct 
evaluations are necessary prerequisites. Nevertheless, the eoneept of ambivalenee of 
attitudes appears in conjunction with implicit attitudes for instanee in Petty et al’s (2007) 
account of their Meta-Cognitive Model. In this model the concept of ambivalent implicit 
attitude refers to implicit attitudes in whieh the attitude object is associated with a 
summary positive and a summary negative evaluation. Following Petty et al’s 
conceptualization in the present researeh, the eoneept of ambivalent attitudes will be
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used in a somewhat broad sense^ to refer to attitudes, in which the attitude object is 
associated with both positive and negative information.
However, it is very important to distinguish between two fundamentally different 
kinds of contexts. Baddeley (1982, 1997) introduced a distinction between interactive 
and independent contexts. This distinction was used to differentiate between context 
whieh affects the encoding o f a stimulus and context which does not. That is, as I 
mentioned earlier, interactive context alters how the target stimulus is encoded, while in 
the ease of independent context, the target and its context are processed and encoded 
separately. Baddeley and Woodhead’s (1982) example for interactive context is when 
the target word for the recollection ‘cold’ is learnt together with the retrieval cue 
‘ground’. According to Baddeley and Woodhead, in this case participants may combine 
the encoding of the two words for instanee into frozen earth. In this example of 
interactive context, the encoding of the target word (i.e. cold) is fundamentally 
influenced by the context (i.e. ground). The effect of interactive context on the encoding 
and on the meaning of stimuli is most apparent in the case of ambiguous words with 
potentially more than one meaning (Baddeley, 1997). For instance, the word ‘jam ’ 
acquires considerably different meaning, when it is in the context of strawberry versus 
traffic (Baddeley, 1982, 1997). A large number of similar words (e.g. flight, box, bank, 
ball, etc.) can be found^, in which case the encoding and thus the meaning of the word is 
largely determined by the context in which it appears. Furthermore, words with multiple 
meanings are particularly obvious cases, but in general many of our words and many of 
the observed stimuli around us are subject to ambiguity in some extent. For interactive 
context, this ambiguity of meaning makes the context an influential factor in encoding 
the stimulus in a particular way and eventually affecting the extracted meaning.
Nonetheless, as Baddeley (1997) pointed out what often becomes encoded is not 
necessarily the meaning of a word or other stimulus, but a eertain feature of them. For 
instanee, Barsalou (1982) suggests that the property of ‘it floats’ rarely enters our mind
 ^ In fact even broader and more flexible way than Petty et al. (2007), as in the current research I 
do not presume the formation and association o f summary evaluations.
 ^Multiple meaning is a feature o f homonyms, but also of polysemous words (see for example 
Klein & Murphy, 2001). The former refers to words with multiple, but unrelated meanings. That is the 
word may have identical spelling and pronunciation, but at least two unrelated meanings. Polysemous 
words are similar to homonyms, but the meaning is somewhat related.
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when we think about ‘a basketball’. However, when we read the sentence “Chris used [a 
basketball] as a life preserver when the boat sank” (p.82), the property ‘it floats’ 
beeomes a salient property of the objeet ‘basketball’. Following Baddeley’s argument, 
this partieular feature of the basketball may become encoded in this instanee, instead of 
other features of the concept ‘basketball’. That is encoding may be limited to certain 
aspeets of the concept meaning. Importantly, the context in which the word or stimulus 
appears may determine which feature beeomes salient and encoded. A good 
experimental demonstration of this eontext-sensitivity of encoding is the previously 
mentioned Barclay et al’s (1974) study. As a consequence of encoding a specific feature 
of a stimulus, in different interactive contexts the same stimulus ean mean different 
things. For instance, a discussion on healthy eating, chocolate might be encoded as 
something unhealthy to eat. In contrast, the same concept could be categorized as 
something delicious in a conversation about tasty food.
In addition, whether interactive context influences encoding by affecting which 
meaning (i.e. stimuli with multiple meaning) or which aspect of the meaning (i.e. 
features) are encoded, implicit attitudes might be different in response to the same 
stimulus in different interactive contexts. For example, our implieit attitudes towards 
‘traffic jam ’ or ‘strawberry jam ’ can be considerably different. Furthermore, implieit 
attitudes and in fact attitudes in general towards chocolate might be expected to be 
negative in the first ease and positive in the second ease. Implieit attitudes thus could be 
highly context-sensitive in these eases, but the attitude difference is not due to the shift 
in evaluation (positive, negative) towards the same eoneept (chocolate) in different 
contexts, but is the result of the evaluation of different concepts (something unhealthy, 
something delicious).
Independent context is different in that it does not affect the encoding of the 
object. As Baddeley (1982, 1997) argued in the ease of independent context, the object 
in question and its context are encoded separately. The stimulus may appear in a eertain 
context, but the latter have no influence on the processing of the stimulus. Thus the 
object is encoded identically and has the same meaning across independent contexts. 
Baddeley (1982) suggested that for example environmental context (i.e. where a 
stimulus is encountered with) is typically encoded separately from a target objeet. For
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example, the colour of the wallpaper ought not to have any influence on the encoding of 
a piece of chocolate one comes across in a room. Presumably chocolate is considered 
identically, as chocolate, if  the wallpaper was blue or green. Yet, there are some 
indications that despite that the meaning of the objeet is supposed to be identical across 
independent contexts (i.e. various rooms in which chocolate is seen), processing of 
stimuli might be affected by the context. For instanee, Godden and Baddeley (1975) 
carried out an experiment which demonstrated that the recall performance for words 
learnt underwater by divers was higher when they were tested later underwater than on 
land. In this ease, it is very unlikely that the meaning of the studied words were 
influenced by the environment (i.e. underwater or on land), yet the context appeared to 
have some effect on their recollection of learnt stimuli.
Crucially to this researeh project, difference in the encoding and in the meaning 
of the objeet cannot be responsible for any difference in the evaluation of the objeet 
across independent contexts. That is variations in implieit attitude toward an object in 
different independent contexts would reflect shifts in the evaluation of the object that is 
encoded identically. Returning to our example on chocolate, the colour o f the wallpaper 
should not influence the encoding and the meaning of chocolate and hence implicit 
attitudes towards it cannot be attributed to changes of its meaning across context.
The present research focuses on examining the influence of the independent 
context on implicit attitudes. Of course, from a practical point of view, effects of implicit 
attitudinal sensitivity to independent and interactive contexts are both highly significant. 
After all, if raeial attitudes were indeed context-sensitive because of differential 
encoding or because of shifts in evaluation, either way, this eontext-sensitivity would 
still indicate variability and flexibility of raeial attitudes. Alternatively, if neither type of 
context had any effect on implicit attitudes, such implicit attitudinal inflexibility should 
imply that acquired implieit attitudes do not differ across situations. However, fi-om a 
theoretieal standpoint, studying the two types of context is interrelated with two different 
issues. Interactive context-sensitivity is linked primarily to the problem of 
representation and storage of the attitude object concept (e.g. ‘orange’), while 
investigation of independent context should help to inform models o f the representation 
and storage o f attitude objeet evaluations (e.g. ‘orange is good’). The former has been in
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the focus of cognitive psychological researeh on concept representation for decades (see 
for example, Barsalou, 1982). The latter, however, is particularly relevant for social 
cognition and for better understanding the relationship between implieit attitudes and 
evaluative information.
However one ean wonder why independent context would have any effect on 
implicit attitudes. Put differently, why would an implicit attitude be different towards the 
same eoneept in two different contexts? In the ease of interactive context, potential 
evaluation difference can be intuitively quite straightforward. It effectively means that 
attitudinal judgement is made on two different concepts as the same objeet is encoded 
differently in two different contexts. For independent context, intuition may not provide 
any guidance. After all, why would implieit attitudes towards the same, identically 
encoded objeet be different for example in two different rooms?
To answer to this question I need to discuss implicit attitude models eonceming 
the representation of, and memory systems involved in implieit attitudes. Models 
accounting for both of these issues have strong implications for why implieit attitudes 
could be or should not be sensitive to independent context. Nevertheless, it needs to be 
emphasized that the issues of representation and memory system involvement are 
separate problems and models o f them should complement each other. The former is 
concerned with how and what attitudinal information is represented within the memory 
system, whereas the latter in what memory system(s) it is stored. In this chapter, I will 
discuss these attitude models, as well as, their relation to independent context sensitivity.
Assumptions relating to context-sensitive representation
In the next section, I will focus on some fundamental assumptions that are likely to be 
required for representational models to predict implieit attitudinal sensitivity to 
independent context. Yet, before I set out to elaborate these assumptions I have to 
mention a couple of things.
First, to discuss the interrelation between the effect of independent context and 
representational models of implieit attitude, I have to mention at the outset that to this 
date proposed representational models address attitudes in general and do not focus
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exclusively on implieit attitudes. In the previous chapter, it was noted that in some 
models the distinction between implieit and explicit attitudes is not at the 
representational level, but is at the processing or measurement level. As a corollary, 
specifying implicit attitude representation only does not fit well with these models. 
Thus, Twill focus on a few attitude representational models developed in recent years 
which were aimed at accounting for implicit attitudes too.
Second, the models that have been proposed to account for attitude 
representations conceptualised attitudes in various ways, ranging from being single 
summary evaluations assoeiated with an objeet to being patterns of activations in a 
distributed network. Both are representational models, but their primary focus is on 
different aspects of attitude representation. The former is eoneemed mainly with what 
stored information forms the basis of attitudes (e.g. single or dual summary evaluations), 
whereas the latter addresses how (i.e. what format) attitudes are represented (e.g. 
distributed or associative network). While both aspeets have significant implications for 
implieit attitude sensitivity to independent context, I believe the question of what stored 
information forms the basis of attitudes is more relevant than the question of how 
attitudes are stored. It is because, on the one hand, there are some fundamental 
representational assumptions on the ‘what’ question that needs to be met in order to 
implieit attitudes show any sensitivity to independent context. On the other hand, 
assumptions regarding the format of representation in itself may not influence our 
predictions about context-sensitivity. For example, it is possible to create a highly 
context-sensitive distributed network model and an insensitive associative network 
model, but it is not impossible to create the opposite.
Returning to the question posed in the last section; why would implicit attitudes be 
sensitive to independent context? From the point of view of representational models, 
independent context may have an impact because implicit attitudes may be preferentially 
driven by evaluative information learnt in the same context. For instanee, let us assume 
that one learns in one room about someone that he is a nice person, but in another room 
that he tends to be very grumpy. If an implieit attitude test was carried out in the two 
different rooms would the results be any different? If implicit attitudes were based on 
some sort of aggregated evaluation, created from the two pieees of evaluative
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information, the results in the two rooms should be identical. However, if  in an extreme 
ease, they were based on evaluative information learnt only in a given context, implieit 
attitudes should differ.
Some representational models of attitudes clearly are at odds with the hypothesis 
of the sensitivity of implicit attitudes to independent context (Fazio, 2007), but ean 
accept the effect of interactive context. Other representational models strongly support 
the idea that attitudes, implieit attitudes included, are highly context-sensitive (Schwarz 
& Bohner, 2001). Nevertheless, these latter models do not clarify whether independent 
context or only interactive context should influence implieit attitudes. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to work out a series of assumptions whieh are needed for a representational 
model to suggest sensitivity to independent context and then we ean assess whether the 
existing models are in line with these assumptions or not. Naturally, if  a model does not 
meet these assumptions, we can hypothesise that they are at odds with the idea of 
independent context sensitivity.
To begin with, in some form, multiple pieees of information or evaluations are 
essential to be learnt and stored in memory about an object, to provide space for 
flexibility in implieit attitudinal judgements. For instanee, if one thinks that public 
transport is cheap and reliable, but also uncomfortable, then these pieees of evaluative 
information can form the foundation for both positive and negative attitude towards 
public transport. Nevertheless, the same variability of implieit attitudes cannot emerge, 
if there is only one evaluation that can be activated that is associated with the objeet. If 
one was to learn about public transport one single information that it is reliable or he 
creates a summary evaluation abstracted out from several pieees of evaluative 
information (reliable, cheap, uncomfortable) then there was little room for variation in 
implicit attitudes. That said independent context still could facilitate or prevent the 
activation of the evaluation, but cannot activate different evaluations.
A further assumption relates to the storing of independent context features from 
learning episodes. In short, not only multiple pieees of evaluative information need to be 
learnt about an objeet, but also the independent context in whieh this information is 
learnt must be stored in memory too. For example, when one learns in a classroom that 
public transport is reliable and cheap, the specific evaluative information (i.e. reliable,
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cheap) and erucially the context (e.g. the classroom) ought to be stored to serve the basis 
of later context-sensitive implicit attitudinal judgements on public transport. If 
information on the independent context is not stored then it is inevitably lost for later 
implieit attitudinal judgements.
Implieit attitudinal sensitivity to independent context requires not only to have 
multiple pieees of evaluative information or multiple evaluations linked in memory to an 
object, but also that at any one time implicit attitudinal judgements ean be based on 
changes in the probability of the partieular set of evaluative information being activated, 
leading sometimes to only partial activation of the entire set of assoeiated evaluative 
information. For instanee, if all information associated with public transport is activated 
every time with equal probability, the implicit attitudinal outcome will be identical every 
time and also will be no different from activating a single-summary evaluation^. 
However, if  only a partial set of evaluative information is activated when implieit 
attitudinal judgement is about to be made, depending on what information set is 
activated, evaluations could differ every time.
However, independent context sensitivity calls for more than merely random 
variations in the set o f information activated. The activation of the specific pieces of 
information must be sensitive to cues related to the partieular evaluative information or 
to the learning episode, during whieh information was learnt about the attitude object. 
That is the activation of stored evaluative information or evaluations during implicit 
attitudinal judgements should be affected by the presence of independent contextual cues 
(e.g. the classroom). If such contextual cues do not influence the activation of evaluative 
information or of evaluations then again independent context should not have any 
impact on implieit attitudinal results.
In conclusion, the following assumptions look essential for independent context 
to have an impact on implicit attitudes:
’ In such case, the difference between the two models would be whether the summary evaluation 
is created, updated and stored during learning or a momentary summary evaluation is formed during 
implicit attitudinal judgement.
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1) Multiple pieces of evaluative information or evaluations are stored in 
memory about an attitude object
2) storing independent contextual features of learning episodes
3) implicit attitudes can be based on a partial sample of the set of information or 
evaluation learnt about the attitude objeet
4) the sampling from a set needs to be eue-specifie, guided by independent 
contextual features
In the next part of the chapter, I will have a closer look at the various 
representational models as well as at their implications for implieit attitudinal sensitivity 
or insensitivity to independent context. All of the models have been briefly mentioned 
previously, but they will be discussed from a different perspective. Unlike, the 
discussion of representation and processing models in relation to explieit-implieit 
distinction in the previous chapter, the question for these models whieh they need to 
answer here is not how many attitudes are stored, but what attitudinal information is 
stored and serves the basis of implieit attitudes.
Implicit attitude representation within system
The models that will be described in the following pages exemplify three very different 
views of implieit attitude representation. Following from their representational 
assumptions, the models have very different implications for the number of evaluations 
assoeiated in memory with an objeet, the features and details stored from a learning 
episode, the possibility of partial sampling of evaluative information and for the cue- 
specificity of evaluation activation. Hence, the models’ implications for independent 
context sensitivity range from strong inflexibility to high flexibility o f implieit attitudes.
Single-summary-evaluation model
In previous sections, Fazio’s (1990, 2007) single-summary-evaluation model has already 
been mentioned, but here I will discuss this influential model in more detail, focusing on
29
its implications for the context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes. The key assumption of 
the single-summary-evaluation model is that an attitude is an association between an 
objeet and a summary evaluation stored in memory. Occasionally, it is understood as a 
reference to an associative network, but Fazio (2007) stated that the model regards 
attitude as a loose association term and it is not defined in terms of any particular 
representational format. In the single-summary-evaluation model, summary evaluations 
are represented in memory as knowledge and so are part of the knowledge structure. 
Summary evaluations are abstracted out from cognitive, affeetive and behavioural 
experiences. An important property of the model is the strength of the objeet- evaluation 
link. The strength of the association determines the accessibility of the attitude, 
therefore, the stronger the association the better the accessibility o f the attitude. Highly 
established attitudes are accessed effortlessly, since the evaluation-objeet link is strong. 
The outcome o f sueh strong associations is the high probability of automatic activation 
of an attitude in the presence of a given object. The weaker the association the less likely 
is the automatic activation of the attitude. At the other end o f the attitudinal strength 
dimension are nonattitudes, referring to objects without any former evaluation that could 
be activated. By definition, evaluations with zero strength associations have zero 
probability o f being activated by the perception of an objeet.
An interesting problem is how new pieces of attitudinal information are 
combined with old summary evaluations. In other words, a key issue in eliminating 
ambivalence is the process of combining pieees of attitudinal information into one stored 
summary evaluation. For instanee, when people learn that an exotie flower that they like 
very mueh is also highly poisonous, their new summary evaluation should combine the 
old evaluation of liking the flower (positive) and the new information of it being 
poisonous (negative). Fazio’s model is silent on the issue of the process o f information 
combination into one summary evaluation. Anderson’s (1971) Information Integration 
theory suggests that an attitude is formed by averaging the weighted attitudinal value of 
the existing attitude and the new information. The weight is determined by the relevance 
of the information and the old attitude. The Information Integration Theory is eoneemed 
with explieit attitudes and Betseh, Kaufmann, Lindow, Plessner, and Hoffmann (2006; 
see also Betseh, Plessner, Schwiren, & Giitig, 2001) argued that implicitly and explicitly
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formed attitudes are subject to different rules on summary evaluation formation. 
According to Betseh and his colleagues, explicitly formed attitudes are indeed averaged 
out, but implicitly formed attitudes are simply summed. Returning to our example o f an 
already very much liked exotie flower, if one learns in a deliberate learning situation that 
it is also edible, but tastes only moderately good, then the attitude towards the flower 
should become somewhat less positive than before. By contrast, if  one learns the same 
information in an implicit, non-deliberate way, the attitude towards the flower should 
become even more positive. While the Information Integration Theory and Betseh et al’s 
researeh provides further details on a potential way of forming and re-forming stored 
evaluations, in real life the valuation of information and weighing the relevance of the 
information is difficult to precisely determine. For example, one could argue that the 
relevance of the flower’s taste is very low or could state the opposite. Thus the summary 
evaluation formation process remains largely obscure.
Another essential property of the model is that it hypothesizes an objeet to be 
linked to only one summary evaluation. The model allows for other non-summary 
evaluative memories and so information to be assoeiated with an object, but it attributes 
pivotal role to summary evaluations in evaluative judgements, and thus presumably in 
implieit attitudes. As an attitude is defined as an association between a summary 
evaluation and an object, summary evaluations form essential and central part of implicit 
attitudes too. Since by definition, attitudes are object-summary evaluation associations, 
contextual information and details of the specific evaluative information learnt have no 
place for the attitudes in the model, other than storing them as extraneous pieces of 
information related to the attitude objeet. In an evaluative learning experience, the 
evaluative information beeomes abstracted out - loosing its details on the context - and 
gets amalgamated with the already existing summary evaluation. In addition, because 
only one summary evaluation is involved in attitude activation, partial sampling of 
evaluative information is not feasible in the model. Finally, given the sole summary 
evaluative information assoeiated with the objeet with no contextual information or 
details about specific evaluative information, implieit attitudes cannot be activated in a 
cue-specific manner.
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As a result of the above properties, Fazio’s single attitude representation model 
(2007) hypothesizes stable and inflexible attitudes, leaving little spaee for independent- 
eontext-sensitivity of implicit attitudes. As long as an object’s concept node is activated 
and the associative link with an evaluation is strong enough, the evaluation should 
become automatically activated. Therefore, at the automatic processing level, attitudes 
should be highly rigid and thus implieit attitudes are rather inflexible in this model. 
Naturally, additional deliberate processing ean take into account other information or 
focus on specific features of the objeet, but this should not influence implieit attitudes. 
Hence, for instanee when negative information is learnt in one context and positive in 
another context about an object, Fazio’s model will predict identical implicit attitude in 
the two contexts. The negative and positive pieees of information are abstracted out into 
a summary evaluation and this evaluation is accessed across all contexts^.
I have mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, that representational models 
and their implications for independent context sensitivity can have signifleant further 
praetieal implications, for example on views of raeial prejudice or other forms of racial 
bias. It is worth having a look at this for the single-summary evaluations model’s 
implications for implicit racial prejudice. Following Fazio’s model, negative implicit 
attitude towards a racial group is a very relevant issue, because the negative attitude is 
the automatically activated stored evaluation towards a given group, very much like 
evaluation in the purest sense. Furthermore, the fact that implieit attitudes are rigid, 
inflexible constructs that activate automatically and do not change easily makes these 
evaluations even more important.
Dual-summary-evaluation model
The single-summary-evaluation model postulates summary evaluations formed on a 
single bipolar dimension, judgements ranging from extreme positivity to extreme 
negativity towards an objeet. Nevertheless, similar judgements ean be produced by 
assuming not one, but two summary evaluations assoeiated with an objeet, one
* Technically, the notion that context can prevent the activation o f the evaluation o f an object 
could be incorporated in the model, but an evaluation still cannot switch from positive to negative, only 
from positive to neutral.
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representing negative valence, while another positive valence. For example, Bower 
(1991) put forward an associative network model, which features a positive and a 
negative evaluation linked with an attitude objects. The idea of the separation between 
positive and negative evaluation also appeared in the model of Cacioppo and Bemtson 
(1994) and Cacioppo, Gardner, and Bemtson (1997). This dual-valenee property was 
integrated into Petty et al’s (2007) more recent Meta-cognitive Model (MCM). The 
authors accepted some of Fazio’s (2007) attitude representation assumptions, namely, 
that the core o f the attitude representation is the object-summary evaluation link. Unlike 
Fazio, however, but similarly to Bower, the authors suggested that an object can be 
associated with a summary negative and a summary positive evaluation at the same 
time. Another departure from Fazio’s model is that in the MCM each summary 
evaluation is further assoeiated with a validation tag representing the acceptance of the 
evaluation (Figure 1). An important feature of the model is that validation tags are 
usually not assessed by current implicit measures, they only assess automatically 
activated, unvalidated evaluative associations. Explicit measures, on the other hand, ean 
also access validation tags through deliberative processes and can be influenced by other 
considerations. Nevertheless, at the implicit attitudinal level the model can be reduced to 
attitudes represented as an object associated with a summary positive and a summary 
negative evaluation.
EVALUATION
GOOD
EVALUATION
BAD
VALIDATION
TAG
A/0
VALIDATION
TAG
YES
SMOKING
ATTITUDE
OBJECT
Figure 1. Attitude representation according to the dual-summary-evaluation model (figure is based
on Petty et al., 2007, p.659)
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Naturally, the two opposite evaluations are only associated, if  at least one negative and 
one positive piece of information was learnt before about the object. For instance, if only 
negative pieces of information were learnt than the object will be linked to a negative 
summary evaluation only. Furthermore, the MCM also incorporates association strength 
as a main component that determines whether a summary evaluation will be activated.
Implicit attitudes in the MCM are summary positive and summary negative links 
characterised by individual association strengths. Thus the model enables storing 
evaluations with opposing valence associated with the same object, but not more 
evaluations within each valence. That is if an object is learnt to possess a highly positive 
and a mildly positive quality, the model suggests that a summary positive evaluation is 
created from the two and so no distinct evaluations are stored for the two qualities. The 
authors explicitly state that contextual information can influence whether an evaluation 
is activated or not, but they do not distinguish interactive and independent context. 
Presumably, independent contextual information can become stored, when a piece of 
evaluative information is learnt about an objeet. The specific information, however, is 
abstracted out and combined with the existing summary evaluation with similar valence. 
Thus, the details of the particular information are lost from the perspective of the 
attitude. That is, while the independent contextual features of a learning episode can 
become stored, but the details of the evaluative information have no further role in 
implicit attitude representation. An additional characteristic of the MCM is that by the 
individual strength of summary positive and summary negative evaluative links with the 
object, the model incorporates the opportunity for partial sampling o f the evaluative 
information. According to Petty and his colleagues (2007), when a positive and a 
negative summary evaluation are linked to an object, the evaluation with greater strength 
will be activated automatically. Not only that the MCM implies partial sampling in 
certain circumstances, but as mentioned above it also suggests that possibly independent 
contextual cues can fundamentally affect the activation of the summary negative and 
positive evaluations. Nevertheless, while contextual information can result in cue- 
specific evaluation activation, the details of particular evaluative information that were 
learnt about an object cannot serve as cues. It is because implieit attitudes are based
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upon the activation of summary evaluations and so details of specific evaluative 
information should have no impact on these implieit evaluations. If the specific 
information could influence implicit attitudes directly, summary evaluations would 
become redundant and therefore this option does not fit in with the model.
In conclusion, the dual-summary-evaluation model of Petty et al. (2007) leaves 
more room for independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes than Fazio’s model 
(2007). The MCM assumes potentially dual-valence evaluation assoeiated with an 
object, and Petty and his colleagues argue that context may influenee, which evaluation 
is activated. Thus, when opposing evaluations are associated with an object, different 
contexts could lead to the activation of different evaluations. That is in one context there 
may be only the negative summary evaluation, while in another eontext a summary 
positive evaluation activated. It seems from the model that both internal and external 
contextual information can be incorporated. Nevertheless, independent-eontext- 
sensitivity of implicit attitudes also has its limits in the Meta-Cognitive Model. First, it 
assumes that only one positive evaluation is activated. That is an object cannot be 
evaluated more positively or less positively in different contexts. As long as the 
evaluation in both contexts is positive, it can only let the same summary evaluation 
activated. Second, the details of learnt evaluative information are lost for implieit 
attitudes and so these details cannot serve as eues and the particular information itself 
cannot directly drive implicit attitudinal judgements. In sum, the MCM allows for some 
variability of implieit attitudes across contexts, but independent context sensitivity is 
fundamentally limited by assuming summary evaluations driving implicit attitudes. 
Finally, to return to our example on racial attitudes, the possible independent context 
sensitivity of implieit attitudes in the model indicates that racial attitudes are not 
necessarily as fixed as according to Fazio’s single-summary-evaluation model. Even 
though implieit attitude flexibility is limited, but still racial prejudice can easily turn to 
neutral or even favourable attitudes in other contexts. A further important feature of the 
model is that implicit attitudes are merely learnt associations and not necessarily 
endorsed attitudes. Therefore, these malleable negative raeial implicit attitudes might be 
the result of association learning, but do not reflect on one’s personally accepted and 
validated attitude towards the group.
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Online evaluation models
Online evaluation models of attitudes ineorporate two distant lines of researeh. One is 
Schwarz and Bohner’s (2001) construal model, which arose from the rejection of 
attitudes as real cognitive entities. The other encompasses distributed network models 
(e.g. Conrey & Smith, 2007), whieh were mainly designed to address the issue of the 
representational format of attitudes. Both lines of research however suggest that 
attitudes, including implicit attitudes are momentary eonstruets and not summary 
evaluations stored in memory.
Schwarz and Bohner’s (2001) construal model of attitude (see also Schwarz, 
2007) suggests that attitudes are created on the spot when they are needed. That is, 
contrary to the view of attitudes as stored eonstruets, attitudes should be best described 
as momentary constructions. From this standpoint an attitude is the outcome of an 
evaluative judgment made online by recruiting relevant information from memory and 
evaluating it in the given context. Hence, previously formed evaluations, and especially 
summary evaluations, are unnecessary to form attitudinal evaluations (although, it is hot 
incompatible with the construal view, see Schwarz, 2007). The strength o f the construal 
model is that it could explain the context-sensitivity phenomenon of attitudes with no 
difficulty. However, the argument necessarily also leads to the problem of stability, 
since a momentary construct would be expected to be highly volatile and therefore 
unstable over time. The model suggests that attitudinal stability is a by-product of using 
largely the same set of information at different times for evaluation-making.
While the above description could be interpreted as a model for deliberate 
attitude judgement-making, the authors argue that implieit measures of attitudes also tap 
into online evaluations. The details of this evaluation process are not elaborated, but 
according to the model evaluations can be made in a ‘split-second’. Nevertheless, one 
could argue that the phenomenon of evaluative priming, especially subliminal priming, 
is difficult to account for if evaluations are only made when they are needed. After all, 
priming suggests that even irrelevant stimuli are processed in evaluative tasks. It would 
mean that all stimuli are evaluated, that is the brain is in a general evaluation-mode
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during evaluative priming tasks. Schwarz and Bohner (2001) refer to a study, which 
concludes just that and even more.
Duekworth, Bargh, Garcia, and Chaiken (2002) claim that the constant 
evaluation of stimuli is not limited to processes in evaluative tasks, but it is more general 
phenomenon: “ ...all experience is continually evaluated as either positive or negative, 
whether one ponders one’s feeling about it or not” (p. 518-519). Duckworth and her 
colleagues could not account for the details of the underlying process, but their article 
strongly suggests that this constant evaluative processing of stimuli on a positive- 
negative dimension is a general and fundamental early step in stimulus-processing. Note 
that this early evaluative process is also the key eomponent of the affeetive primacy 
hypothesis (Zajonc, 1980). Thus, even though, Schwarz and Bohner’s (2001) arguments 
were rooted in the claim that attitudes are merely hypothetical constructs invented by 
psychologists, they also led to - maybe not on purpose - the implication of constant 
online evaluative judgment-making as a fundamental basic process. However, it is not 
clear from their argument, how implicit attitudinal judgments ean be made within a few 
hundred milliseconds by recruiting relevant information and evaluating it on the spot. 
Distributed network models may offer a way to do that.
The distributed representational view of attitudes is in concert with the construal 
view of attitudes in that it also sees attitudes as momentary constructions. However, 
construal models emphasize the processing-nature of evaluations and potentially exclude 
the need for storing evaluations, while distributed models focus on the representation 
format of attitudes. Furthermore, construal models assume no stored evaluations and 
consider attitudes as a product of information re-evaluation, whereas distributed models 
ean accommodate and seem to suggest storing evaluations in a distributed form.
Following the distributed network tradition, Conrey and Smith (2007) described 
attitudes as temporary pattern of activations of nodes in a distributed network. Similar 
models were proposed by Mitchell, Nosek, and Banaji (2003) and Bassili and Brown 
(2005). The units in the network do not represent concepts, but only an activated pattern 
does. The strength of the connection between units, that is the probability o f the 
activation of a unit leads to the activation of the next unit in a certain direction, is 
described in terms of connection units. According to the learning rule, the successful
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activation of a unit as a result of another unit strengthens the connection between them, 
increases the weight and thus the chanee of activation in the future if  the other unit gets 
activated. Evaluations are never exactly the same, as the activated pattern is altered by 
the stimulus context and changes in the network between activations. Conrey and Smith 
argue that in these networks of units, attitudes are not stored, but are more like 
reconstructions. Attitudes are states, activation patterns in the network system, and sinee 
the eontext can always modify the activation pattern, the activated network of units can 
significantly change from activation to activation. The contextual variability, however, 
does not necessarily lead to complete variability of attitudinal responses, since 
responding to similar external stimuli, the network system can have a tendency to 
activate similar network pattern.
Conrey and Smith’s (2007) model gives an account on how attitudinal 
information can be represented. However, it does not specify what kind of information 
set eomprises an attitude. Most likely, eoneept representations (e.g. public transport) and 
evaluative information (e.g. reliable, crowded) are both stored in the network without 
summary evaluations. Moreover, each evaluative bit of information can be further 
associated with an attitudinal evaluation (i.e. positive, negative) and thus a momentary 
evaluation of an object would be a result of processing the ensemble of activated 
evaluations associated with eaeh activated pieces of information. Alternatively, each 
piece of evaluative information does not necessarily need to be further associated with 
an evaluation. In that case, momentary evaluation would be the outcome of a re- 
evaluation processing step that would follow the activation of evaluative information 
associated with an object. The latter scenario is eloser to the view of construal models, 
but it would include an extra unspecified evaluative proeessing stage which looks more 
cumbersome than the former seenario. Moreover, online evaluation models of attitudes 
are so far very unspecific and represent theoretical principles rather than testable models. 
Schwarz and Bohner (2001) and Schwarz (2007) give little detail about proeessing or 
information representation details. Conrey and Smith (2007) argue for attitudes as 
temporary construetions in a distributed network, but remain silent on the properties of 
distributed networks. Their model does not specify standard details of distributed models 
(e.g. Farah & MeClelland, 1995; McClelland & Rumelhart, 1985; Rumelhart,
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Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986), like the number of layers in the network, 
hidden layers, activation direction between units, information represented by units or 
update rules. Without these details, their distributed model of attitudes is hardly more 
than a set of loosely defined principles, which cannot be empirieally tested.
Implicit attitudes in online models rely on the activation of specific pieces of 
information or of speeific features without formulating stored summary evaluations. 
Therefore, the models can accommodate a multitude of evaluations assoeiated with an 
object. Neither the construal model, nor distributed network models o f attitudes indicate 
what details of a learning experience are retained in memory. In theory, distributed 
network models - as well as the eonstrual model - do not necessarily limit how much 
detail becomes stored in memory. Hence, the framework makes it possible to store 
virtually every detail of each encounter with an object, but also to retain an abstraeted 
adjective-like feature from such encounters. However, distributed network models of 
attitudes seem to promote storing of the independent context details, and provide the 
option of retaining the full details of the learnt evaluative information. Following from 
this and the fact that each bit of evaluative information can be associated with the 
attitude object with a particular, highly changeable weight, distributed models certainly 
support partial information sampling. Similarly, the eonstrual model of Sewharz and 
Bohner (2001) implies that only contextually relevant information is recruited in online 
attitudinal judgements, thus it also suggest the opportunity for partial sampling. Finally, 
according to online models of attitudes, implicit attitudes are highly context-sensitive. 
Specifically, in distributed network models, activation patterns in the network are a 
function of the object and its context and therefore implieit attitudes should reflect this 
by being sensitive to independent contextual feature changes. However, as the details 
retained from an evaluative learning episode are not well-speeified, whieh cues 
influence implicit attitudinal judgement - other than context-features - remains unknown.
In sum, online models argue that malleability and in particular context-sensitivity 
is a vital and inherent property of these attitudes. These models suggest that the same 
object can be evaluated more or less positively, or negatively as a function o f the 
specific contextual eues and probably independent eontextual cues. As a consequence, 
negative racial implicit attitude in a certain context reflects on the online evaluation of
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the group in the partieular context. The implicit attitude towards the same group can be 
more negative or even highly positive in a different context. Therefore, the question 
probably is not so much if  someone has negative implicit attitude towards a group, but in 
what context he has what attitude towards the group and how flexible/changeable these 
attitudes are.
Context-sensitivity and memory models of implicit attitudes
The previous section looked into the implications of representational models of implicit 
attitudes for sensitivity of these attitudes to independent context. Arguably, the 
theoretical assumptions laid out in these representational models had consequences for 
whether such context-sensitivity is to be expected or not. Yet the question can be 
approached from a slightly different angle, from the perspective of memory systems 
involved, as it also has significant implications for sensitivity to independent context. In 
fact, attempts to understanding the role of independent context in implicit attitudinal 
judgements cannot be complete without examining what single and multiple memory 
system models may predict. In the next part of the chapter, I will examine whether 
memory models of attitudes hypothesise independent context sensitivity.
The problem of memory systems in implicit attitudes refers to in what memory 
system(s) attitudinal information is stored. Amodio (2008) criticised the overwhelmingly 
representational view in attitude models and argued for studying attitudes from the 
perspective of memory systems. Models of implicit attitudes most often do not specify 
the memory systems in which implicit attitudes are stored and so may indirectly 
postulate that evaluations are linked to one memory system. Nonetheless, recent 
research in implicit cognition suggests that implicit evaluations can rely on at least two 
memory systems and so two types of associations.
However, why would the issue of memory systems have any implications for the 
sensitivity of implicit attitudes to independent context? The answer lies in the nature of 
stored associations. Multiple memory system models not only hypothesise the 
involvement of at least two memory systems in implicit attitudes, but also that these 
systems store different types of associations. Moreover, certain cues may trigger the
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activation of associations only from one system, but not others. Naturally, models 
assuming the involvement of one memory system, do not offer context-sensitivity due to 
changes in the involvement of different memory systems. Nevertheless, unlike single­
system accounts, in a multiple memory system model different pieces of attitudinal 
information are stored in more than one memory system. In particular, affective and 
semantic associations can be learned and stored in two independent memory systems. 
Therefore two types of evaluations or attitudinal memories can be linked to the same 
attitude object: separate affective attitudinal associations and semantic attitudinal 
associations. By contrast, if  implicit attitudinal judgements are based on one single 
memory store, attitudinal associations can only be of one single type. For instance, in the 
multiple memory system model, feelings about public transport accumulated during 
everyday experiences are stored in the affective memory system, while knowledge about 
its relative inexpensive nature is stored in the semantic memory system. Such system- 
specific distinction in storage of the two types o f information is not made according to 
single-system accounts.
Later on, I will discuss single and multiple memory system models in more detail. 
However, before I would review these models, I will put forward again a series of 
assumptions that needs to be met for a model to suggest sensitivity to independent 
context of implicit attitudes based on the involvement of different memory systems.
Assumptions about context sensitivity in memory system models
Our previous examination of representation models tackled the issue o f the role that 
particular pieces of learnt attitudinal information may play in the independent context 
sensitivity of implicit attitudes. In contrast, examining single and in particular multiple 
memory system models raises the question of whether the type of information has a 
similar influence. Needless to say neither single system nor multiple system accounts 
directly address independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes, but they have 
important implications. To see, if these storage models are at odds or in line with the 
notion of implicit attitudinal sensitivity to independent context, a series assumptions can
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be made about independent context sensitivity, which are rooted in the type of attitudinal 
information. In addition, the models ean be assessed against these assumptions.
First and foremost, the information stored in multiple memory systems ought to 
have some inherent properties or combination of properties which only characterises 
information stored in one but not the other memory system(s). This would result in a 
specific type of information being associated with a memory system. Let us suppose for 
a moment that information on the smell and taste of objects are stored in two separate 
systems. In this case, different sensory source of information could serve as a 
fundamental, inherent feature associated with each type of information. Given that 
memories from each memory system ean be characterised by certain features or certain 
combination of features, it provides a basis for sensitivity to these features and thus 
possibly to independent context. By contrast, if smell and taste memories are stored in a 
unitary system, it becomes an issue of within-system representation of attitudinal 
information (see previous sections of this chapter). Therefore, in this ease the type of the 
memories may not allow for sensitivity to independent context due to the type of 
information. .
Furthermore, just like in representation models, the memory system models also 
should permit partial-sampling of information learnt about an object only from one 
memory system. I f  in the previous example, memories of the taste and smell o f an object 
are always activated even if  they are stored in different memory systems, the model does 
not allow for sensitivity to independent context due to the type of information. The 
operation of the two systems must be independent and the memory model should assume 
that memories can be sampled only from one system.
Finally, the model ought to imply cues related to the type of information, that is 
attitudinal information stored in one particular memory system, ean lead to the 
preferential activation of only one type of memory. Returning to our example, taste- 
related cues should be more likely to activate taste memories, while smell-related cues 
should activate smell memories. As a consequence, attitudinal memories stored in one 
system ean be activated independently from memories in other systems. If such cues do 
not lead to the retrieval of only a certain type of memories, then implicit attitude cannot
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be sensitive to independent context originating from storage of attitudinal information in 
separate systems.
In sum, such memory system-specific sensitivity to independent context o f implicit 
attitudes rests on at least three assumptions:
1) multiple types of evaluative information or evaluations are stored in memory 
and linked to an attitude object
2) implicit attitudes can be based on a partial sample of the set of information or 
evaluation associated with the attitude object
3) the sampling from a set is cue-specific, guided by the cues related to the 
memory system the information stored.
In the next section, I will have a look at single and multiple memory system 
views on implicit attitudes and see how they relate to the above assumptions on memory 
system-specific independent context sensitivity. The models should answer the question 
if the type of information could drive context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes.
Memory system models
The memory models of implicit social cognition address the basic operation, and even 
possibly the basic architecture of memory involved in implicit social judgements, 
including implicit attitudes. From the two views I will discuss, the single memory view 
is more of a collection of indirect implications rather than a clearly stated model. The 
multiple-memory system model, however, addresses the issue very explicitly. As a 
consequence, the latter will be discussed in far more detail.
Single memory system view
Attitude models most often remain silent on the storage of attitudinal information, 
indirectly assuming that attitudes are rooted in memories stored in a single memory 
system or effectively in a single system from the point of view of attitude representation
43
and processing. Nonetheless, some theorists were more explicit about arguing for a 
single memory system view of attitudinal information storage. For instanee, Fazio 
(2007) defines attitudes as knowledge, taking the eoneept into the domain of semantic 
memories. In addition. Bower (1991) suggested a semantie assoeiative network model 
for attitudes (Figure 2). As mentioned previously. Bower’s model incorporated separate 
summary negative and positive evaluations associated with an attitude object. Bower 
also suggests that when evaluative information (e.g. reliable) is learnt about an objeet 
(e.g. public transport), it becomes linked to the objeet and to the summary evaluation 
node (e.g. positive). In addition, the link between the summary evaluation and the 
attitude objeet also becomes strengthened. The model is a elear example of attitudes 
represented in a semantic network.
Negative 
fact A
Positive 
fact A
Sydney
Positive 
fact B
Negative 
fact B
Negative
valence
Positive
valence
General
positive
affect
General
negative
affect
Figure 2. Attitudes in Bower’s associative network model (1991, p.47)
This approach was shared by De Houwer and Hermans (1994), who proposed that 
affective information is embedded in the semantic network. The main empirical 
evidence for this comes from a format effect that is from the observed privileged access 
o f pictures compared to words in semantic memories (De Houwer & Hermans, 1994; 
Spruyt et al., 2002). They argued that these findings were in line with Glaser and
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Glaser’s (1989) semantic memory model, according to which pictures have privileged 
access to the semantic system. De Houwer and Randell (2004) further asked whether 
implicit attitudes are stored in the semantic memory system. Their empirical findings 
strongly suggested that more semantic processing in evaluative priming tasks increased 
the attitudinal effect of the positive or negative primes, while more perceptual 
processing eliminated it. Thus semantic processing and the involvement of the semantic 
memory seem to be vital for implicit attitudinal evaluations. However, they suggested 
two potential alternative interpretations: (1) evaluative information is stored in the 
semantic system, (2) evaluative information is stored in a separate affective system, but 
the evaluation of the object or the activation of evaluative information is preceded by 
semantic processing. This latter view points to the direction of a multiple memory 
system approach.
Even though, the single memory system view is not elaborated enough to form a 
memory-based model of implicit attitudes, some of the implications for the context 
sensitivity of implicit attitudes are very significant. Given that the view does not assume 
separately stored attitudinal associations that is the involvement of multiple memory 
systems, thus such structural features cannot drive context sensitivity. Therefore, the 
view is at odds even with the very first assumption made previously. That is, in this 
view, the memory system in which memories are stored cannot result in implicit 
attitudes being variable across such contexts.
Multiple memory system view
Having reviewed a wide-range of empirical results, including De Houwer and Hermans 
(1994) and De Houwer and Randell (2004), Ferrand, Ric, and Augustinova (2006) 
concluded that in fact the affective system is separate from the semantic system. They 
argued that it is possible that, as mentioned above semantic processing precedes 
affective evaluations, but the authors also proposed two other potential alternatives. 
First, the two independent systems interact and sometimes processing is dominated by 
one or the other. Second, the affective processing may even precede semantic 
processing, as it was put forth in the affective primacy hypothesis of Zajonc (1980). The
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separation of the affective and semantic system also featured in Bargh, Chaiken, 
Raymond, and Hymes’s (1996) argument on the automatic and unconditional nature of 
affective evaluations and a more general affective-cognitive distinction in LeDoux’s 
neural-based emotion model (1989).
The single memory system approach to implicit attitudes and to implicit social 
cognition in general, was also criticised by Amodio (2008). Amodio argued that most 
theories of implicit cognition are associative models related to semantic memory. 
Whereas according to his argument implicit cognition resides in at least two separate 
memory systems:' affective and semantic memory. The two systems usually work 
alongside each other in concert in overt evaluative responses, but they have separate 
neural substrates, they are characterized by different learning mechanisms and they 
influence different types of behaviour. Importantly from our perspective, Amodio’s 
model raises the theoretical possibility that implicit attitudes towards the same object 
might differ as a result of evaluations based on activated semantic or affective 
associations. Crucially, certain cues may preferentially activate semantic associations 
only or affective associations only, and these cues - as we will see - sometimes can be 
considered as independent contextual cues. That is implicit attitudes might be sensitive 
to independent contextual cues and this sensitivity could be rooted in the preferential 
activation of associations stored in the semantic or the affective memory system.
Amodio’s (2008) Multiple Memory Systems model of implicit cognition 
originates from Squire and Zola’s (1996) memory system model (Figure 3), in which 
priming -  including conceptual priming -  is based in the neocortex, while emotional 
responses are based in the amygdala.
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Figure 3. Multiple long-term memory systems in Squire and Zola (1996, p.l3516)
Accordingly, Amodio suggests that affective memory and so affective assoeiations 
reside in subcortieal processing, involving the amygdala, while semantic memory and 
thus semantie assoeiations in neocortical areas. In partieular, Amodio and Ratner (2011) 
suggest that the memory system for affective associations and specifically fear- 
conditioning includes the central nueleus of the amygdala and assoeiated subcortieal 
structures. By eontrast, semantie associations are stored in structures including the 
prefrontal cortex and the temporal lobe. Thus the Multiple Memory Systems model 
specifies specific brain structures involved separately in the processing of semantic and 
affective associations.
The model further suggests (see Amodio & Mendoza, 2010) that affeetive 
assoeiations are affeetive reactions to stimuli and the crucial distinguishing feature of 
affective reaetions is arousal. Stimuli and tasks without arousal do not toueh the 
affective eomponent of attitudes. Semantie associations are learnt evaluative information 
or the results of cognitive appraisal of affective stimuli, but they are without arousal. 
That is the key distinguishing feature between affective and semantic memories is 
arousal. However, as we will see, characterizing features of affective and semantic 
memories remain a problematic feature of the model.
The model also assumes some learning charaeteristics that distinguish the 
affeetive and semantie memory systems. Affective assoeiations are learnt very quickly,
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often after only one stimulus pairing. By contrast, extinction (unlearning) of affective 
associations is a very slow process and in fact it may never oceur. Semantic associations 
are usually learnt relatively slowly through several repetitions of stimulus pairings and 
their extinction is also a similarly slow process, taking place through many repetitions. 
Affective assoeiations are very difficult to unlearn and as the amygdala does not proeess 
semantic information, counterconditioning attempts should focus on gut-reactions and 
possibly use images as opposed to verbal materials. By contrast, semantic associations 
can be unlearned by pairing an object repeatedly with semantie stimuli, preferably 
words. Whereas affective assoeiations influenee eertain non-verbal responses, semantic 
associations tend to manifest themselves in verbal behaviour.
To the affeetive and semantic components, Amodio and Ratner (2011) added a 
third component in implicit social cognition, the instrumental memory system. 
Instrumental associations are stimulus-behaviour associations, encompassing reward- 
directed and habit-like behavioural associations. Amodio and Ratner's model ties in with 
the tri-partite model of attitudes, suggesting that attitudes ean be the product of separate 
eognitive, affective and behavioural processes and manifested in eorresponding 
responses (Breckler, 1984; Rosenberg & Hovland, 1960; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). 
According to the tri-partite model, attitudes are normally eonsidered as evaluative 
responses resulting from cognitive, affeetive and behavioural antecedents. These 
anteeedents ean eorrespond with fundamentally different learning experiences. For 
example, Breckler (1984) suggested that in some views on the model:
“Cognitions can develop through previous exposure to communications 
or educational materials. And affeet (or emotion) may be the product of 
classical conditioning—that is, the past pairing of an attitude objeet with 
an affective stimulus, “(p. 192-193)
Amodio's (2008) Multiple Memory Systems model, however, not only describes 
different learning routes and experiences, but distinguishes separate memory stores for 
affective, semantie and instrumental memories. Furthermore, the model defines neural 
substrates of the learning and activation of these memories.
Having diseussed some of the properties of the Multiple Memory Systems 
model, we ean now turn to evaluate whether the model meets the above-mentioned
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series of assumptions on memory system-speeific independent context sensitivity. 
Firstly, the model explicitly argues for the involvement of two separate types of 
association (i.e. semantic, affective) and Amodio and Ratner (2011) for three types (i.e. 
affective, semantie, and instrumental) in implieit cognition. Therefore, implieit attitudes 
can be made from at least two different associations, which sometimes ean have 
opposing valenee. That is the multiple memory system view allows for opposing 
semantie and evaluative associations, stored in separate memory systems. The model, 
however, coneentrates on the memory systems involved in the storage of evaluative 
assoeiations and so the within-system information representation is not specified. In 
particular, the model does not explain what features of a learning episode (independent 
context, details of the evaluative information) can be and likely be stored in each system. 
Hypothetically, they ean be summary aggregated evaluations within the affective and 
also in the semantic system or can be evaluations based on stored pieees of information. 
Let us take for example a fruit, which someone does not know, but samples it and it 
turns out that it has got a nice taste and smells very good. Furthermore, the person also 
learns that it is very healthy to eat and eheap to buy. According to the multiple system 
model, the experiences of the taste and smell of the fruit are stored primarily in the 
affective system, while on its healthiness and low eost in the semantic system. 
Presumably, the model may allow for forming semantie associations based on affective 
assoeiations and viee versa with further appropriate proeessing. However, feeling-based 
memories should be primarily stored in the affeetive system, while semantic information 
in the semantic memory system. As a eonsequence, the affective or semantie nature of 
information determines in whieh system it will be stored. That is the affective, semantic 
and instrumental assoeiations represent different types of assoeiations stored in different 
memory systems and the distinetion in the storage between the three types is an inherent 
property of the model.
Secondly, a further assumption is related to whether the Multiple Memory 
Systems model leaves the opportunity for sampling evaluative information from only 
one system. Aceording to Amodio (2008), the separate memory systems often work 
together and parallel with eaeh other in the making of evaluative judgements. Its 
implication is that implicit attitudinal results could reflect on semantic and affective
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associations and even maybe instrumental associations. Nonetheless, important to partial 
sampling and also cue-specific association activation is that Amodio and Mendoza 
(2010) argue that current implicit attitude measures are semantie-memory based tasks 
and do not assess affective-memories. Consequently they likely tap into semantic 
associations as opposed to affective assoeiations. A more difficult question is that what 
cues are likely to elieit affective assoeiations and what eues semantic associations. A 
possible suggestion lies in Amodio's line of reasoning about how to ehange implieit 
stereotypes (i.e. semantic association) and implicit evaluations (i.e. affective 
association). He suggests that semantie associations can be altered by semantie, 
preferably verbal stimuli, while affective evaluations ean be ehanged by affective 
reaetions to images. This argument suggests that a verbal implicit test environment may 
likely trigger semantic associations, but pictorial implicit tests may elicit affective 
assoeiations (personal eommunieation, September, 2010). In eonclusion, the Multiple 
Memory Systems model indicates that due to the separate storage of affective, semantic 
and instrumental associations, implicit attitudes ean be dominated one or the other type 
of associations in response to certain cues.
Finally, Amodio's model is primarily concerned with the memory systems 
involved in implieit social cognition and shows that investigating the type of assoeiation 
activated in implicit attitudinal judgements can be just as important as examining the 
information basis of implicit attitudes. Thus, the model draws the attention to the 
arehitecture of the memory system behind implicit attitudes, as opposed to the 
information representation within the system. This, however, also means that the model 
is silent on the within-system representation of implieit attitudes. That is what features 
o f a learning episode can be retained and what information within a eertain type ean 
serve the basis of implieit attitudes. Aceordingly, whether eontextual information or 
details of specific evaluative information beeomes stored or not remains unelear.
Considering the speeial focus of the model, one can conclude that it is difficult to 
estimate how sensitive implieit attitudes can be to independent eontext within the 
affective, semantic and the instrumental memory systems. Thus, if an implieit attitudinal 
judgement was based only on one memory system (e.g. affeetive assoeiations), it would 
be impossible to tell how context-sensitive the attitudes would be. However, the
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Multiple Memory Systems model could attribute independent, eontext sensitivity to 
implicit attitudes, if the judgements ean be made based on different type of assoeiations 
and therefore on different memory systems. It is beeause certain cues (e.g. verbal eues) 
may aetivate assoeiations stored only in one memory system (e.g. semantie), while other 
cues (e.g. high arousal pictures) assoeiations in another memory system (e.g. affective). 
The model therefore has no elear implications for independent context sensitivity within 
eaeh memory system (i.e. affeetive, semantic, etc.), but it seems to support independent 
context sensitivity due to preferential activation of associations stored in one or the other 
memory system.
Returning to our example of attitudes towards a particular racial group, the model 
suggests that there are not one but three types of associations providing the foundation 
for implicit racial attitudinal judgements. Thus, while semantie assoeiations towards the 
group ean show positive attitudes, affective evaluations can result in negative attitudes. 
In addition, these assoeiations may preferentially drive different behavioural responses. 
Thus, the model would imply that it is important to test for all three types of 
assoeiations. Especially, because they ean be altered most effieiently with type-speeific 
information and also beeause they are subject to different learning rules. Negative 
semantie assoeiations towards the group could be best altered by positive, verbal 
information. Negative affeetive associations might be very difficult to change, but 
learning material should include positive, non-verbal stimuli associated with the group.
Conclusion
From the reviewed attitude models, Fazio’s (2007) single-summary-evaluation model 
argues for implieit attitudes which are insensitive to independent context. In Fazio’s 
single-summary-evaluation model, attitudes are not hypothetical constructs or an 
umbrella term for various evaluative responses, but real eognitive entities stored in 
memory. The Meta-Cognitive Model of attitudes (Petty et al., 2007) is somewhat unelear 
on the issue, but it seems that it leaves some room for independent eontextual variability. 
The online models (Conrey & Smith, 2007; Schwarz & Bohner, 2007) strongly favour a 
fundamentally context-sensitive view of implieit attitudes, but fail to explain how
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interactive and in partieular, independent context fit into their model. Nonetheless, in 
theory, these online models allow the possibility of independent-context-sensitive 
implicit attitudes. Finally, whereas single memory system models deny memory system- 
specific independent eontext sensitivity, the Multiple Memory Systems model of 
implieit eognition (Amodio, 2008) can support such context-sensitivity of implicit 
attitudes. In fact, in this view, attitudes are a compound of three different types of 
associations stored in separate memory systems.
In sum, certain representational and memory models of implieit attitudes do 
support the possibility of independent context sensitivity, however for different reasons. 
Other representational and memory models are strongly at odds with the notion of 
independent eontext sensitivity of implicit attitudes. To further examine the issue, let us 
turn to empirieal findings and see how these results fit with the discussed models.
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Chapter 4
Empirical evidence on the context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes
Over the years, considerable empirieal researeh has been directed to examining the 
context-sensitivity of implieit attitudes. This is no surprise given the implieations for the 
inevitability of implicit attitude activation and its potential consequenees in everyday 
life. Most importantly, arguments about attitude representation also centred on the issue 
of context-sensitivity, because -  as we saw in previous ehapters -  some models argue for 
inflexibility of attitudes, whereas others for eontext-sensitivity of attitudes.
Mueh of the empirieal researeh suggests that implicit attitudes are indeed highly 
flexible and variable across contexts. However, these results and partieularly their 
interpretations are not without problems and became subject to strong criticism, 
predominantly because most of the studies only looked at contexts that could have 
influenced the eneoding and eoneeptualization o f the attitude object. The investigation 
o f sueh interaetive eontext is highly relevant too, but from a theoretieal point of view, it 
only reflects on the representation of the attitude object. To understand the context- 
sensitivity of implicit attitudes fully, the effect of independent context also needs to be 
looked at. Such studies should also be able to feed back information to models on 
representation and storage of implieit attitudes. The arguments over the context- 
sensitivity and discussions about empirical results of implieit attitudes avoided 
distinguishing between the effeet of interactive and independent eontext. The problem 
only appeared - even though not labelled as such explicitly in Fazio’s (2007) criticism 
(see later) of the empirical findings demonstrating eontext-sensitivity o f implicit 
attitudes. In the next section, I will discuss briefly empirical research on implicit 
attitudinal context-sensitivity in general then, in the following section, research on 
independent context will be looked at.
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Empirical results on the context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes
Originally implicit attitudes were often thought to be aetivated inevitably (Fazio et ah, 
1986, 1995) and therefore they were indirectly assumed to be resistant to ehanges in the 
context. Yet research findings soon accumulated that indicated at least some flexibility 
in attitudinal responses. For instance, Wittenbrink et al. (2001) demonstrated that racial 
prejudice and stereotyping are eliminated, when faees of Black people are shown in 
front of the baekground of a ehurch, or when respondents see a video of a family event 
with Black people prior to testing. Furthermore, exposure to eounter-attitudinal 
examples of a group prior to testing can also reduce or eliminate raeial implicit prejudice 
temporarily (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; but see Joy-Gaba & Nosek, 2010). 
Moreover, using eounter-attitudinal exemplars in tests can change attitudinal results 
towards the group (Mitehell et al., 2003) and the race of the experimenter ean modify 
participants’ racial attitudinal results in implicit measures (Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 
2001). In addition, implicit attitudes towards known and liked African American athletes 
were also shown to be a function of the eategory into which these exemplars were sorted 
(Mitehell et al., 2003). When they were eategorized as Black, the implicit measure 
showed more negative attitude towards them than towards disliked politieians, 
eategorized as Whites. However, when they were classified as athletes and politicians, 
respectively, implicit attitudes demonstrated an opposite pattern (see also Barden, 
Maddux, Petty, & Brewer, 2004). Finally, thirst and hunger were shown to lead to more 
positive implieit attitudes towards water (Ferguson & Bargh, 2004) and food (Seibt, 
Hafher, & Deutseh, 2007), respectively, compared to when these needs were not salient. 
In a review of over twenty studies, Blair (2002) concluded that empirical findings 
showed that implieit prejudice and stereotyping are moderated by a number of factors. 
For instance, to improve or protect one’s self-image, one could give greater credit and 
more liking to sources with positive feedback, even if the souree is a member of an 
otherwise disliked group. Implieit stereotyping and possibly implicit attitudes are also 
influenced by employment of counter-stereotypic strategies, like attempts of stereotype 
suppression and imagining eounter-stereotypie examples. As it was mentioned earlier, 
exposure to eounter-stereotypie exemplars of a group can modify one’s implicit attitude
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towards the group. Furthermore, high attention load in implieit tasks can reduee 
stereotyping. In addition, implicit attitudes toward a less typical member of a group may 
not reflect attitudes towards the group. Blair eoneluded that despite the often presumed 
inflexible nature of implicit prejudice and stereotyping, the findings strongly argue for 
their malleability.
The large set of demonstrations of implicit attitudinal shift due to various factors 
may seem to support implieit attitudinal variability difference as a function of alteration 
of external or internal context. However, on eloser scrutiny the findings may be far less 
supportive of context-sensitivity, than it may seem. Fazio (2007) mentions two 
particularly relevant issues, which can fundamentally question the conclusion of 
malleability of implicit attitudes. First, objeets usually belong to several eategories and 
so are eonceptualized in various ways. The same attitude object can be a member of 
many eategories and the eategory made salient ean determine the attitude towards the 
object. Fazio’s criticism refers to contextual changes due to the effect of the context on 
the encoding of the object (i.e. interactive context). Clearly, his argument suggests that 
the observed eontextual changes in implieit attitudes eould have oeeurred beeause of the 
interactive nature of the context. Fazio takes the example of Wittenbrink et al’s (2001) 
seeond study, in whieh Black (and White) faees are shown in front of a chureh or a 
dilapidated street. The experiment revealed high eontext-sensitivity of implieit racial 
attitudes, but respondents could conceptualize a Blaek faee in front of a ehurch as a 
‘churchgoer’ and not as an African American. As a result one should expeet a differenee 
in attitude, but it does not reflect on the shift in implieit attitude in different contexts, but 
on the different attitudes towards different eoncepts in the two eontextual settings. Fazio 
argues that even more positive attitudes towards water when someone is thirsty can be 
explained by the possibility that in this ease water is not neeessarily eoneeptualized as 
the same object as when someone is not thirsty. Furthermore, in experiments where 
exemplars of a group were eategorized first as a member of one group (e.g. African 
American) and then of another group (e.g. athlete), the effeet o f multiple categorization 
is even more apparent (e.g. Mitehell et al., 2003). According to Fazio, the eontext can 
guide and therefore largely influence how an object in a given situation is categorized. 
This can entail evaluation shifts in various eontexts, but this oceurs not because of
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attitude difference, but because the same object is conceptualized differently. The 
importanee of the multiple eategorizability of objects cannot be understated, when 
examining eontextual effeets. Naturally, if an object is conceptualized as one thing (e.g. 
cuddly bear) in one setting and as another (e.g. dangerous predator) in another setting, 
the implicit attitudes should refleet this. However, it does not mean that the implicit 
attitude towards the same concept has changed. Contrary to Fazio’s interpretation, one 
ean argue that sueh attitude changes are still genuine contextual ehanges. However, it 
needs to be elarified that these eontextual evaluation shifts are driven by interactive and 
not by independent context. It ean be just as relevant to ask how flexible someone’s 
conceptualization of Black Americans’ is as to ask how flexible their evaluation of 
Blaek Amerieans is. In fact, both could be indicative of a tendency towards racially 
biased behaviour. Nevertheless, as mentioned previously interaetive context is more 
related to eoneept representations, while independent eontext is to the representation of 
their link to evaluative information or evaluations, as well as, to the issue of memory 
systems involved in storing these evaluations.
Seeond, changes in the measurement outcome (e.g. lAT score) does not 
neeessarily mean differenee in the underlying attitude. Aeeording to this argument, 
measurement outeomes can be sensitive to many non-attitudinal factors. For example, 
temporary salienee of features related to an attitude object may influence the results on 
the implicit measure, but it does not entail difference in the attitude. Fazio discusses in 
detail the presumed sensitivity of the lAT scores to extrapersonal associations (see also 
Olson & Fazio, 2004). This sensitivity of the lAT may lead to different results in 
different eontexts due to these extrapersonal associations, but the attitude does not 
necessarily differ. In short, no attitude measure taps into attitudes only and therefore 
context-driven changes in measurement scores do not neeessarily mirror changes in 
attitudes.
In eonclusion, the empirical results diseussed so far ean be aceounted for by 
arguing for eontextual ehange in implieit attitudes, but also by arguing that these 
ehanges were merely the by-products of conceptualizing attitude objeets differently in 
different eontexts or simply a shift in the measured score, but not in the measured 
attitude. In the next section, I will have a look at empirieal results that are presumably
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less subject to such criticism, that is experimental studies whieh manipulated 
independent context to test eontextual variability o f implieit attitudes.
Empirical results on the independent context sensitivity of implicit 
attitudes
The bulk of the empirieal research related to the eontext-sensitivity o f implicit attitudes 
ean be eonsidered as an examination of interaetive eontext. However, a small set of 
studies ean be regarded as investigations of the effect of independent context. 
Particularly important is a series of experiments whieh examined the role of the context 
in implieit attitudinal judgements when only positive and only negative pieees of 
information were learnt about the same object in two different eontexts. These 
experiments are firmly linked to the issue of representational views on implicit attitudes. 
The next section will contain a review on these studies, while another set o f experiments 
will be discussed later on whieh were designed to examine the problem of memory 
systems in implieit soeial cognition through variations of test.
Contextual variability from a representational view
Before turning to experiments on implicit attitudes, it is worth briefly mentioning a line 
of researeh from animal learning that has had a considerable influence on these 
experiments. Bouton (1993, 2002) argued that in Pavlovian eonditioning
countereonditioning in a different context than the previous eonditioning stage results in 
a eontext-speeifie response. That is, in animal research when electric shock was 
associated with a tone in context A, and food reward to the same tone in a later learning 
stage in eontext B, animals showed fear response in context A, but appetitive response in 
context B. Similarly, when electric shock was associated with a tone in context A, but 
later the shoek was absent with the same tone in eontext B, animals learnt the distinction 
soon and demonstrated fear reactions only in context A. The absence of the 
uneonditioned stimulus in a later learning stage (i.e. extinetion) indicated that the 
response to the stimulus beeame context-dependent. Bouton suggested that the earlier
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learnt association was not erased from memory, but both the old and new pieces of 
information become assoeiated with the stimulus, frnportantly, he argues that the initial 
learning is eontext-independent, but later learning is eontext-dependent. In other words, 
context is relevant and thus leamt only in the eounterconditioning and extinetion stage, 
but not in the original learning.
Rydell and Gawronski (2009) demonstrated that this context-free and context? 
dependent learning applies to human evaluative learning and has a strong impact On 
implicit attitudes. In addition, Rydell and Gawronski’s experiments demonstrate that 
ambivalent attitudinal information leamt about an object can result in eontext-dependent 
evaluation shift, without conceptualizing the object differently. In their experiments, 
facial photos were paired with positive and negative information in front of two 
differently eoloured baekgrounds that were in most eonditions predictive for the valenee 
of the information in the study phase. In the test phase, the same photos were presented 
in front of the two backgrounds and also with no background in an Affect Misattribution 
Procedure (Payne et al., 2005) and an evaluative priming task (second study; Fazio et al., 
1986). Note that this experimental design makes it difficult to encode the object in 
different ways as it offers no obvious alternative coneeptual eategory across contexts. 
Thus multiple eategorizability of the objeet is not likely to be responsible for the 
observed evaluation shifts, demonstrating that attitude objeets ean be evaluated 
differently in different eontexts. These experiments also showed that initial learning is 
context-independent, that is the valence of the leamt information is transferred to the 
evaluation of the object and generalised across contexts, including novel eontexts. As 
Rydell and Gawronski argue, when evaluative information is homogenous, the context 
of the information is not leamt. By eontrast, subsequently leamt counterattitudinal 
information tends to be leamt in a context-dependent way, that is the information and its 
context are both leamt. Sueh eounterattitudinal information results in a heterogeneous 
evaluative information set associated with the objeet. The object is evaluated according 
to the valence of the initially associated information in all eontexts - including novel 
eontexts - except in eontexts in which subsequent counterattitudinal information is 
leamt. In this latter context, the evaluation of the object reflects the valenee of the 
eounterattitudinal information. Rydell and Gawronski concluded that Schwarz’s (2007)
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hypothesised general context-dependency o f attitudes and in partieular implicit attitudes 
is not supported, as attitudes based on homogeneous attitudinal information set are 
generalized to novel contexts and are not limited to the specific context they were 
acquired in. In addition, the fact that in a novel context, the attitude object is evaluated 
according to the initial information, and not influeneed by subsequent eounterattitudinal 
information, strongly suggests that evaluation can be based on context-independent 
information learning and access. Rydell and Gawronski do not diseuss it but their 
findings are also at odds with Fazio’s (2007) object-evaluation association model. With 
a heterogeneous information set, any context should have resulted in a summary 
evaluation. Nonetheless, the partial context-sensitivity o f their results demonstrated that 
no summary information was created. The findings may imply that implieit attitudes are 
based on information access associated with an object. However, the eontext- 
dependeney of the storage and access of this information is a function of the eontext- 
dependent or independent evaluative learning and the heterogenous-homogenous nature 
of the set of evaluative information.
Gawronski, Rydell, Vervliet, and De Houwer (2010) further suggested that the 
attention paid to the eontext eue is a crucial factor in whether evaluative information is 
leamt in a eontext-lfee or context-dependent manner. When a new piece of information 
is leamt about a novel object, it usually is leamt without encoding and learning the 
eontext. In contrast, subsequent counterattitudinal information has a tendeney to be 
leamt together with its context, as counterattitudinal information invites paying more 
attention to additional details, in order to explain the eontrast between initial and 
subsequent information. Furthermore, manipulating the attention paid to the context in 
the initial and the subsequent teaming stages were shown to determine whether, 
information was leamt in context-free or eontext-dependent fashion. If pieees of 
evaluative information are leamt about an objeet in a context-dependent fashion, 
subsequent implicit attitudinal judgements in the same context may refleet only on this 
eontext-speeifie set of evaluative information.
A key issue in both studies is whether participants associated the context (e.g. 
blue background) with the positive or negative information direetly, as opposed to 
assoeiating the object (i.e. face) in a particular context with valenced information.
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Naturally, the former means that the test evaluates participants’ attitudes towards the 
eontext and not towards the faee in the eontext. After all, the context in the learning 
stage of the experiment was always presented with information of a certain valence. 
Rydell and Gawronski (2009), and Gawronski et al. (2010) tested this by presenting 
novel faces with the partieular back^ound and found that the context itself remained 
affectively neutral. Therefore, it is likely that the evaluation of the face in a particular 
context drove implieit attitudinal results. However, as Gawronski et al. pointed out, this 
eonelusion was based on null findings and so it needs to be treated with some caution. 
Moreover, participants could have created a more holistie representation for eaeh face 
and context. A face with the combination of context A (e.g. blue background) form 
object A and the same face with context B (e.g. green background) form object B. 
Therefore, however remote this possibility is, it is not impossible that in fact the context 
resulted in different eneoding of the faces.
Another feature of the experiments eondueted by Rydell and Gawronski (2009) 
and Gawronski et al. (2010) is that with the exeeption of one study, in whieh an 
evaluative priming task was also applied, all the implieit attitudinal tasks were assessed 
by the Affeet Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne et al., 2005). However, one can 
argue that it has got relatively little built-in protection against participants being aware 
of the goal of the experiment. Furthermore, researeh (Payne et al., 2005) that tested 
some of the implicit properties of the AMP diseovered a very eurious feature of the task. 
Namely, the study showed that unlike other priming tasks, attitude was deteeted at short, 
but also at long stimulus-onset asynchrony (SOA). This eould potentially indicate that 
results in the AMP eould be driven just as much by explicit, as implicit processes. 
Considering these issues, it remains an open question whether explicit processes, 
demand and goal awareness eould have had an impaet on the results of these 
experiments.
Finally, it is an interesting question how much these results relate to Bouton’s 
(1993, 2002) researeh on classieal eonditioning. It is not so mueh of a representational 
than of a memory system issue, but it is still very mueh worth mentioning here. As we 
saw earlier, in Amodio’s (2008) Multiple Memory Systems model, the affective and 
semantie assoeiations rely not only on different memory systems but also have different
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learning charaeteristics. Affective assoeiations and classical conditioning are attributed 
to the operation of a similar system, but semantic associations and presumably semantic 
association learning to a separate system. It is very mueh of a question from the 
perspective of Amodio’s model whether the learning task in Rydell and Gawronski
(2009) and Gawronski et al. (2010) qualifies as classieal conditioning or rather as 
semantic association learning. Especially, if we take into eonsideration that Amodio and 
Ratner (2010) consider sueh trait formation as semantic association learning.
In conclusion, the studies of Rydell and Gawronski (2009) and Gawronski et al.
(2010) produced a series of results demonstrating, that the context-dependency of 
implicit attitudes is not necessarily a by-product of re-conceptualization of the attitude 
object in different eontexts. These findings certainly add to our understanding of 
eontext-sensitivity and potentially the independent eontext sensitivity o f implicit 
attitudes. Furthermore, they also have important implications for representational 
models, as they provide no unitary support to any of the models. The best fitting model 
to their results would be a model whieh presumes the formation of both context- 
independent summary evaluations, but also eontext-dependent evaluations if needed. 
The studies lend some support for the notion of independent eontext sensitivity of 
implicit attitudes as a eonsequenee of the within system representation, but there are a 
number of issues with these results that needs to be further investigated.
Contextual variability from a multiple system view
The Multiple Memory Systems model (Amodio, 2008) was examined direetly only in 
very few behavioural experiments. In fact, I am only aware one published study that has 
investigated the issue. Applying the semantic-affective distinetion to racial bias, Amodio . 
and Devine (2006) asked whether implicit stereotyping is rooted effeetively in semantie 
assoeiations, while implicit evaluations are rooted in affective associations. 
Nevertheless, this study has relatively little to say about potential independent memory 
system-speeific context-sensitivity of implieit attitudes. However, a separate line of 
research may have implieations similar to those of the Multiple Memory Systems model.
I need to stress that the Multiple Memory System model may offer only one of the many
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possible explanations to the following empirical results and that the theoretical link 
between them stands on untested and speeulative grounds. Nevertheless, I believe the 
potential relation between the findings and the model merits further attention, especially 
in the examination of independent eontext sensitivity of implieit attitudes.
Implicit attitudinal research provided further insight into many areas of interest 
in soeial psyehology, but they have also produeed a few puzzling findings. Particularly, 
addiction-related, presumably ambivalent, attitude objeets were often found to be 
negatively evaluated even by the substance users themselves. Accordingly, smokers’ 
implicit attitudes towards smoking and also heavy-drinkers’ implicit attitudes towards 
aleohol were often found to be negative. The findings would imply that smokers and 
heavy-drinkers maintain negative implicit attitudes towards it despite receiving 
presumably positive bodily feeling from using the given substance. One has to wonder, 
how ean they maintain their negative attitudes despite the bodily reward resulting from 
the addictive behaviour?
Swanson, Rudman, and Greenwald (2001) eondueted a series of experiments on 
implieit attitudes toward stigmatized behaviour by explieit and implieit (lAT) measures. 
One of the behaviours of interest in their research was smoking. The results showed 
negative implicit attitudes toward smoking among smokers and non-smokers, and thus 
strong inconsistency between smokers’ attitudes toward smoking and their behaviour. 
Swanson et al. assumed that this inconsisteney may not cause any diseomfort for 
smokers, beeause they hypothesised that eognitive dissonance may emerge only if one is 
eonseiously aware of it. However, there is no theoretical reason behind this argument 
and in fact it remains still difficult to explain why negative aspeets of smoking dominate 
implieit attitudes in the ease of smokers.
Not surprisingly, these results prompted further research to investigate the 
relation between implieit attitudes and smoking. Sherman, Rose, Koeh, Presson, and 
Chassin (2003) examined the context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes towards smoking 
measured by the evaluative priming task, as well as, the lAT. They found that smoking 
attitudes in the priming task were sensitive to variations of the task enhancing the 
sensory versus the cost/health implications of smoking. In addition, evaluative priming 
task results were also sensitive to smokers’ state of craving. By contrast, the lAT was
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found to be insensitive to all these eontextual faetors (see also Huijding, De Jong, Wiers, 
& Verkooijen, 2005). Yet, these results are not necessarily examples of sensitivity to 
independent context, but eould also be to interaetive eontext. This is beeause in the 
implicit tasks contrasting sensory and cost/health aspects o f smoking examined the issue 
by using different smoking stimuli (e.g. eigarette in the hand vs. a paek of cigarette with 
the health warning on h) in the sensory and the cost/health versions of the task. This 
eould have resulted in different coneeptualizations of these stimuli. In sum these 
experiments had important results and also showed that the lAT and the evaluative 
priming task may not be similarly sensitive to eontext, but it remains a question whether 
the eontext they refer to ean be eonsidered as independent or interactive.
Before going into the diseussion of these results it must be mentioned that these 
negative attitudes towards an otherwise addictive behaviour are not limited to smoking. 
Wiers, van Woerden, Smulders, and de Jong (2002) also found negative implieit 
attitudes towards aleohol among heavy-drinkers. These negative attitudes measured by 
the lAT were similar to those of light-drinkers. Similarly negative implicit alcohol- 
related attitudes were reported by De Houwer, Crombez, Coster, and De Beul (2004) 
among heavy drinkers assessed by the lAT. Their study however also showed that in fact 
these seemingly negative attitudes were likely to be caused by the faet that in the lAT 
aleohol was contrasted with soft-drink, and the latter was evaluated positively and the 
former neutrally. They drew this eonelusion from the results o f an additional implieit 
task they administered, that is the EAST.
In addition, smoking and aleohol are not the sole attitude objects toward which 
implicit attitudes have been at variance with theoretieal expectations. Karpinski and 
Hilton (2001) found a somewhat analogous ease that is implieit attitude toward apples 
and eandy bars. They found that their participants had more positive Implieit 
Assoeiation Test (LAT) scores toward the former than the latter. Karpinski and Hilton 
used this result to suggest that the LAT may be a measure of environmental associations, 
rather than of how much one may favour one attitude object over another. These 
associations are to be found in people’s cultural environment and built in their 
knowledge, and so the lAT is a measure of implicit associations rather than implieit 
attitudes. The view on the LAT as a measure of cultural associations (Karpinski &
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Hilton, 2001) postulates that what is assessed by the lAT is not personal attitudes, but 
simply leamt associations.
This view was shared relating to smoking by De Houwer et al. (2006), who 
raised the question whether smokers actually have negative implicit attitude toward 
smoking. They elaimed that the reason for the negative attitude toward smoking among 
smokers is merely that the lAT is sensitive to soeietal views and extrapersonal 
assoeiations (Olson & Fazio, 2004). Aeeording to this reasoning, people ean maintain 
views at an implicit level which they do not find appropriate and the LAT may reflect 
these views. So, De Houwer et al. replicated the Swanson et al. picture lAT task 
(Experiment 3), but also used a variation of the LAT that was supposed to be less 
sensitive to soeietal views, reflecting on the personal attitudes of the partieipants^. The 
standard LAT experiment provided similar results to that o f Swanson et al. (2001), 
showing no positive attitudes among smokers toward smoking. However, in the 
personalised LAT task the researehers found positive implicit attitude toward smoking 
among smokers, but negative attitude among non-smokers. Furthermore, Houben and 
Wiers (2007) eondueted an experiment with a personalized version of the LAT (Olson & 
Fazio, 2004), similar to that on smoking by De Houwer et al. (2006). They found that 
with the personalized lAT implieit attitudes towards alcohol were if  anything more 
positive than towards soda among heavy-drinkers. According to their eonelusion, these 
results indieated that the earlier demonstrations of negative implicit attitudes towards 
alcohol in this group could be attributed to that lATs are sensitive to extrapersonal 
assoeiations. That is LAT results ean be contaminated by such extrapersonal assoeiations 
(Olson & Fazio, 2004).
As these experiments show the extrapersonal assoeiation view is one of the 
potential and favoured explanations on why smokers have negative implieit attitudes 
towards smoking in LATs. Therefore, it is worth discussing this view very briefly. Olson 
and Fazio (2004) eondueted a series of experiments and argued that the lAT is sensitive 
to extrapersonal assoeiations that is to assoeiations whieh do not “contribute to an 
individual’s personal evaluation” (p.656). Extrapersonal associations are usually learnt
,  ^The latter differed in the words applied (nouns, instead of adjectives) and in the labels (T like’ 
and T dislike’ instead o f ‘positive’ and‘negative’).
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through socialization, but are not necessarily accepted by the person. Olson and Fazio’s 
personalized lAT was supposed to be free from extrapersonal associations and showed 
stronger correlation with self-report measures. In addition, they thought that the affective 
priming task is not contaminated by such associations. Further research findings (Han, 
Olson, & Fazio, 2006) were also in line with this argument, as they showed that 
traditional lATs, but not personalized lATs or evaluative priming tasks, were influenced 
by learnt extrapersonal associations which were at odds with the participants’ own 
attitudes. However, these findings and the validity of Olson and Fazio’s claim was 
fundamentally questioned by Nosek and Hansen (2008a), who argued that the 
personalized version of the lAT is, in fact,- merely a more explicit version of the 
measure. Its more explicit nature makes its results more strongly correlated with self- 
reported findings. Moreover, Nosek and Hansen (2008b) found no relationship in their 
correlational study between cultural knowledge (e.g. belief on other people’s racial 
preference) and the lAT results. De Houwer et al. (2009a) concluded in their review that 
there was little empirical support remaining for Olson and Fazio’s original claim. Yet, 
the debate is not settled, as Olson and Fazio (2009) further explained their position and 
suggested that the lAT does tap into personal attitudes, but unlike the evaluative priming 
task it is also sensitive to extrapersonal associations.
Nevertheless, another potential explanation for the rather curious empirical 
results on smoking and alcohol is rooted in the Multiple Memory Systems model of 
implicit cognition (Amodio, 2008). It also corresponds to Huijding and de Jong (2006), 
who found positive implicit attitude towards smoking when they used pictorial stimuli in 
the task that presumably focused on the sensory aspect of smoking. Huijding and de 
Jong (2006) suspected an important role for sensory aspects o f smoking in their report. 
They conducted an experiment applying a single target lAT (sIAT) task with pictures 
that were intended to reflect on the ‘affective associations’ and enhancing the ‘sensory 
aspects’ of smoking. They found positive attitudes in smokers and negative attitudes in 
non-smokers and raised the theoretical possibility that smoking is linked to multiple 
automatic associations. According to this explanation, if stimuli used in traditional LATs 
emphasize the learnt semantic associations about smoking and alcohol, then it is likely 
that they would demonstrate negative or neutral implicit attitude towards these objects
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even among smokers and heavy-drinkers, respectively. This is because recent health 
campaigns on these topics would have primarily affected semantic associations. 
However, as Amodio (2008) suggests affective associations are stored separately and it 
might be that these associations are more reliant on sensory memories and would be 
largely unaffected by learnt information about mainly the health implications of these 
behaviours. That is the empirical findings on smoking and alcohol may simply reflect 
the fact that the traditional lAT taps primarily into semantic associations. The 
discrepancy between the results gained from evaluative priming and the traditional 
lAT’s on smoking may originate from that the former may tap into both affective and 
semantic associations.
In sum the independent context-specificity of implicit attitudes as a result of the 
operation of multiple memory systems has so far received little research attention. 
Addiction-related implicit attitudes provided findings that may be considered as limited 
support for this notion. However, it must be emphasised that it is only one possible 
explanation for these findings.
Conclusion
The research conducted on implicit attitudes provides strong empirical evidence that 
these attitudes are indeed context-sensitive yet, most of the evidence demonstrates 
interactive context-sensitivity only. Whereas these results have important practical and 
theoretical implications, they have little to say about issues of representation and 
memory systems involvement in implicit attitudes. By contrast, independent context 
sensitivity could have strong implications on both of these issues and could have 
relevant practical implications. Nevertheless, as the above review should have 
demonstrated, empirical research on the independent context sensitivity o f implicit 
attitudes is rather scarce. Especially, the relation between multiple memory system 
involvement and independent context sensitivity remained unexplored.
6 6
Chapters
Context and implicit attitude measures
The empirical studies reviewed in the previous chapter gave some support to the notion 
of interactive context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes, measured by various implicit 
attitude measures, including the evaluative priming task and the lAT. However, with the 
exception of Rydell and Gawronski (2009) and Gawronski et al. (2010) no research has 
been conducted directly on context effects that would qualify as independent context. 
Nevertheless, as I showed earlier their findings are far from being conclusive.
A further issue, as Fazio (2007) noted, is that the empirical findings on the 
context sensitivity of implicit attitudes may reflect on the context-sensitivity of the 
measures and not the underlying construct. Since, no implicit attitude measure is 
considered to be process-pure (Conrey, Sherman, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 
2005) or insensitive to non-attitudinal factors, this argument applied to findings to 
context-sensitivity would be difficult to refute. Nevertheless, if  multiple, procedurally 
different implicit attitude measures demonstrate similar contextual attitude shift or 
alternatively resistance to contextual manipulation, then it is probable that this reflects 
on the sensitivity/insensitivity on the level of construct and not on the level o f measures.
Unfortunately, employing multiple measures has its drawbacks, particularly in 
the area of implicit attitudes. It was mentioned in Chapter 2, the correlation between 
results gathered by different implicit attitude measures is often rather small. Some o f the 
correlation issues certainly originate from the rather different procedures of these tasks, 
sometimes different dependent measures, and often low reliability of the measures. 
However, as Fazio and Olson (2003) argued the issue may also stem from differences in 
the mechanisms that drive these measures. Obviously, the low correlation between the 
measures used could defy the purpose of employing multiple measures to examine 
context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes on the intended construct level. I will therefore 
discuss in this chapter, the differences between the lAT and the evaluative priming task,
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the measures that will be employed later on in the experiments of the present research. 
Before addressing this issue though, I will introduce the main procedural features of the 
two tasks briefly.
The measures in general
Evaluative priming task. The evaluative priming task was introduced by Fazio et al. 
(1986), but the measure originated from the area of semantic priming research. The task 
itself is an adaptation of de Groot’s (1983) semantic priming procedure to measuring 
attitudes.
NEGATIVE POSITIVE
NEGATIVE POSITIVE
COCKROACH
NEGATIVE
INTER-TRIAL
INTERVAL
POSITIVENEGATIVEPRIME
PARTY
INTER-STIMULUS
INTERVALI Response: Keyboard keys “d” and "k“ 
I "d“ -  categories in the left corner 
I "k" -  catégories in îhe right corner
TARGET
Figure 4. A sample trial of the evaluative priming task (Fazio et al., 1986)
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Significant variations are available of the evaluative priming task and the following 
description is only an example to the procedure in evaluative priming (Figure 4). 
Normally, each trial starts with displaying the prime stimulus on the screen. The attitude 
objects of interest are displayed as prime stimuli. The prime is then replaced by a blank 
screen for a short while. After this blank screen, the trial continues with the presentation 
of the target stimulus. The target stimuli are stimuli unrelated to the prime, but they are 
known to have positive or negative valence (e.g. party, war). Participants respond only 
to the target, categorizing it quickly as either positive or negative (good/bad, 
pleasant/unpleasant, etc.). Each trial is separated from the next by a display of blank 
screen for some time. This inter-trial interval is set long enough (often four seconds or 
longer) to eliminate the potential effect o f the previous trial stimuli on the following 
trial. The duration of the presentation of the prime and the following blank screen 
comprises the so-called stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) and its value is critical in 
setting the experiment more on the implicit or explicit side of processing. Large numbers 
of studies (for review, see e.g. Klauer & Musch, 2003) have demonstrated that responses 
are typically faster when the valence of the prime and the target are compatible (both 
positive and both negative), than in trials with incompatible prime-target pairs (the target 
and the prime associated with opposite valence). Thus attitudes towards objects in a task 
are manifested in the difference of response times of the combination of prime and target 
stimuli.
Implicit Association Test. A procedurally dissimilar response latency measure is the 
Implicit Association Test (Greenwald et al., 1998). Unlike the evaluative priming task in 
which only the target is categorized by participants, both the stimuli representing two 
attitude objects and the set o f evaluative stimuli are assessed by the participants, but on 
different dimensions in the crucial experimental blocks of trials of the lAT. Let us take 
the classic example of the flower versus insect LAT published in Greenwald et al’s 
original article.
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Table 1. The block structure of a conventional 7-block flower-lnsect lAT (table based on Greenwald
et al., 1998)
Target words
Categories 
associated with 
the left response 
key
Categories 
associated with 
the right response 
key
Block 1
Target concept block 
(practice)
poppy, iris, etc. (flowers) 
fly, maggot, etc. (inects)
flower insect
Block 2
Attribute target block 
(practice)
party, freedom, etc. positive) 
accident, cancer(negative)
positive negative
poppy, iris, etc. (flowers)
Block 3 Combined block (practice)
fly, maggot, etc. (inects) 
party, freedom, etc. (positive) 
accident, cancer(negative)
flower + positive insect + negative
poppy, iris, etc. (flowers)
Block 4 Combined block (test)
fly, maggot, etc. (inects) 
party, freedom, etc. (positive) 
accident, cancer(negative)
flower + positive insect + negative
Block 5
Reversed target concept 
block (practice)
poppy, iris, etc. (flowers) 
fly, maggot, etc. (inects)
insect flower
poppy, iris, etc. (flowers)
Block 6
Reversed combined block 
(practice)
fly, maggot, etc. (inects) 
party, freedom, etc. (positive) 
accident, cancer(negative)
insect + positive flower + negative
poppy, iris, etc. (flowers)
Block 7
Reversed combined block 
(test)
fly, maggot, etc. (inects) 
party, freedom, etc. (positive) 
accident, cancer(negative)
insect + positive flower + negative
In the first block of trials (i.e. target concept block), participants learn to sort 
flower and insect words (target concept stimuli) into either the category flower or insect 
(Table 1). They need to push the left response key (e.g. letter ‘d’ on a keyboard) for one 
category (e.g. flower) and the right response key (e.g. letter ‘k’) for the other (e.g. 
insect). In the next block (i.e. attribute target block), participants need to sort positively 
and negatively valenced words (i.e. attribute target stimuli) by categorizing them as 
either positive or negative. They use the same response keys as in the previous block, 
one key is associated with one attribute target category (e.g. positive) and the other with 
other category (e.g. negative). The next block is a combination of the previous two
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blocks. That is flower-insect words, as well as, positive-negative words are sorted into 
their respective categories (Figure 5). The same key is assigned for one of the target 
concept categories (e.g. flower) and one of the attribute target categories (e.g. positive), 
whereas another key for the opposite categories (e.g. insect, negative). Crucially, in a 
later stage during the experiment a very similar combined categorization block is 
completed by participants, but in this one flower and insect words are sorted out with the 
opposite response key (i.e. reversed combined block; see Figure 6). As a consequence, 
the two attitude objects fall onto the key of the opposite attribute target category (e.g. 
flower, negative and insect, positive).
flower
POSITIVE
insect
NEGATIVE
CANCER
Insect
NEGATIVE
flower
POSITIVE
cockroach
flower
POSITIVE
insect
NEGATIVERESPONSE^
PARTY
flower
POSITIVE
Insect
NEGATIVERESPONSE ^
RESPONSE
I Response; Keyboard keys “d" and "k" 
I ”d'-categories in the left corner 
||;;k":g|calBgories in the
RESPONSE
Figure 5. Sample trials of the combined block in a flower-insect lAT (Greenwald et al., 1998)
The overlap between the responses typically results in faster stimulus categorization, in 
combined blocks of trials in which the target concept and the attribute target category 
that are associated with the same key have similar valence (i.e. congruent block; e.g.
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flower and positive, insect and negative) compared to blocks when the opposite attribute 
target category shares the same key with the target concept category (i.e. incongruent 
block e.g. flower and negative, insect and positive). The attitude towards flowers arid 
insects is measured effectively by computing the difference between the response times 
in the combined block and the reversed combined block.
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Figure 6. Trials of the reversed combined block in a flower-insect lAT (Greenwald et al., 1998)
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Differences between the Implicit Association Test and the affective 
priming paradigrn
Three areas of difference between the evaluative priming task and the lAT are 
particularly interesting for this research. First, the two measures may assess implicit 
attitudes, yet they may not tap into entirely the same level o f the construct or may be 
differentially sensitive to other factors. Second, the cognitive mechanisms that drive 
these measures can be substantially different. Third, the two measures may have 
different implicitness characteristics.
What do the evaluative priming task and lAT measure?
De Houwer (2003b) analysed both the LAT and the evaluative priming task from the 
perspective of stimulus-response compatibility (Komblum, Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990; 
Komblum & Lee, 1995; Komblum, Stevens, Requin, & Whipple, 1999). According to 
this analysis the evaluative priming task measures global attitudes toward the stimuli 
presented, while the lAT taps into the attitude of a certain feature of the target stimuli. 
These correspond to the evaluation of exemplars and the evaluation of categories, 
respectively. For instance, the face of a particular Black American young male could be 
evaluated based on many features, including that he is Black, young and male. 
According to De Houwer, as the evaluative priming task assesses global attitudes, it 
should tap into all of these features. In contrast, due to the nature o f the lAT, only one of 
these features (e.g. Black) is evaluated in the LAT.
Related to this argument was the examination of whether the LAT measures 
attitudes towards the category exemplars (e.g. a particular Black American face) or the 
superordinate category (e.g. Black). De Houwer (2001) set out to test which drives LAT 
results. The task was based on a standard LAT procedure, with the exception of the 
chosen target stimuli. Normally, the category valence and the valence of the stimuli 
associated with the category are confounded, but in this case the category exemplars 
varied in valence within a given category (e.g. exemplars: Hitler -  Einstein, category: 
Foreign). The design rendered it possible to ask if the valence of the category or the 
valence of the stimuli influences the difference in performance between compatible and
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incompatible lAT trials. The experiment revealed no effect for exemplars and De 
Houwer concluded that evaluation of categories and not the evaluation of individual 
exemplars is what lies behind the lAT effect.
In contrast to the above finding, Mitchell et al’s (2003) study (Experiment 2) 
demonstrated significant effects due to the exemplars selected in a racial lAT. Each of 
their participants sorted faces into the corresponding racial category (BlackAVhite) in 
two separate lATs. The tasks differed only in the exemplars chosen, that is in one lAT 
the Black category exemplars were Black persons who participants rated as disliked 
Black individuals and the White category exemplars were rated as liked White 
individuals. In the other lAT exemplars were selected in an opposite fashion: Black 
category exemplars were liked people, while White exemplars were disliked people. 
While strong negative attitude towards Black people was found in the first lAT, this 
effect disappeared in the second lAT. Having reviewed the literature, Nosek, Greenwald, 
and Banaji (2007) argued that neither exemplars nor categories are exclusively 
responsible for the lAT effect. They concluded that both the evaluation of the exemplars 
and the categories influence lAT results.
Fazio and Olson (2003) claimed that the evaluative priming task is driven by the 
evaluation of category exemplars and to this date no report has questioned their claim. 
Olson and Fazio (2003) devised a modified version of the evaluative priming task to test 
whether more category-based evaluations in the task make the correspondence between 
the results of the affective priming and the lAT stronger. In a block of trials preceding 
the actual priming block, they asked participants to categorize the race of the faces 
presented. These faces later served as primes in the priming block. They found that 
while the traditional evaluative priming task scores did not predict the I AT scores in 
their regression analysis, the categorization task introduced led to significant 
correspondence between the modified priming task scores and the lAT scores in a 
similar analysis.
In conclusion, the LAT is most likely to be influenced by both exemplars and 
categories, while the affective priming task is sensitive only to the evaluation of the 
exemplars. If we return to De Houwer’s (2003b) argument, this means that the affective 
priming task assesses global attitudes toward the prime displayed, whereas the lAT is a
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measure of some combination o f global attitudes toward the target stimuli displayed and 
attitude toward a particular feature represented by the category in which these items 
need to be sorted. Presumably, it only implies that the attitude toward the particular 
categorizing feature (e.g. Black) has a stronger weight in lAT results than in evaluative 
priming results. Other propositions suggested that the lAT is a measure of cultural 
(Karpinski & Hilton, 2001) or extrapersonal associations (Olson & Fazio, 2004) or a 
mixture of extrapersonal associations and implicit attitudes (Olson & Fazio, 2009), 
whereas the evaluative priming task is thought to be a measure of implicit attitudes. As 
shown in the previous chapter, these are strongly debated suggestions, but further 
empirical research is needed on this issue to close this debate.
Underlying mechanisms
The two tasks may also rely on different cognitive processes. There have been a number 
of explanations developed to account for the results of the lAT and the evaluative 
priming task. The lAT was originally proposed to measure associations between the 
target category concept (e.g. fruit) and the attribute category concept (e.g. positive) 
assigned to the same key (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwarz, 1998). However, 
Greenwald and his colleagues remained largely silent on the supposed mechanisms 
behind the lAT task. Rothermund and Wentura (2004) presented an alternative 
theoretical view of the lAT, and at the same time questioned the construct validity of the 
lAT. They reasoned that it is more of a measure of salience asymmetries, than of 
underlying evaluations. In their figure-ground model, they suggested that certain 
categories can be more salient than others. When salient categories are assigned to one 
key and non-salient categories to the other key, responses should be faster compared to 
when one category is salient and the other non-salient, but both are mapped onto the 
same key. Salience asymmetry between categories can have many roots, including 
linguistic properties, perceptual characteristics, familiarity and importantly, valence. 
Rothermund and Wentura suggested that negative stimuli tend to attract attention and so 
are generally more salient than positive stimuli. However, valence asymmetry is only
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one factor among many that would cause salience asymmetry and so influence lAT 
results.
Klauer and Mierke (2005) proposed a task-switching explanation for lAT results. 
In standard lAT tasks, two tasks alternate trial-by-trial: categorizing attribute concepts 
and target concepts. The two alternating categorization tasks require the participants to 
constantly switch the category that is relevant for correct responding. The resulting task- 
switch cost is manifested primarily in slower responses. Trials in which the evaluation of 
the target concept category (e.g. fruit = positive) does not match the attribute target 
category (e.g. negative) mapped onto the same response key (i.e. incompatible trials) are 
subject to task-switching cost. This is because the categorization task cannot be carried 
out in reference to one pair of categories, but two alternating pairs of categories (e.g. 
pleasant-unpleasant, flower-insect) have to be processed, resulting in a constant switch 
between trials. In contrast, trials in which the evaluation of the target concept category 
matches the attribute target category associated with the same key (i.e. compatible 
trials), can be successfully conducted by sorting all the stimuli merely according to their 
belonging to one pair of categories that is to their valence (e.g. pleasant-unpleasant). 
These trials are thereby free from any task-switching cost, resulting in relatively quick 
responses. Nevertheless, as Klauer and Mierke noted, in this form the explanation is 
incomplete and therefore added another theoretical element, the task-set inertia. The 
concept relates to the suppression of task irrelevant task-set and the activation of 
relevant task set. Task set inertia refers to the lowered activation of irrelevant task-set 
and the higher level of activation o f the activated set that remains after the completion of 
the given task (a trial in the lAT). Testing the hypothesised relationship between lAT 
effect and task set inertia, Klauer and Mierke demonstrated that evaluative 
categorization (but not colour categorization) of stimuli {flower, insect) slowed down 
after mixed incompatible lAT block o f trials^ \  but not after compatible or blocked
A smaller size lAT effect still remained in the cued versions o f the lAT, which should have 
disappeared if task-switch had been the only factor behind the effect.
“ The set o f stimuli (flower-insect, positive-negative) was presented in random fashion during the 
24 lAT trials.
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incompatible^^ blocks. This effect was found even though the modality of response was 
different for lAT tasks and the subsequent evaluative task.
As a mid-way alternative, Nosek and Hansen (2008a) speculated that both 
association and salience can influence the lAT. However, De Houwer et al. (2005) 
argued that these two are still incomplete explanations of the lAT effect, as they cannot 
incorporate perceptual similarity. In fact, in their view, the lAT can be considered as a 
general measure of similarity, including semantic association, salience, but also 
perceptual and other similarities. The authors studied the effect o f perceptual and 
functional similarity between items. They found that when perceptual similarity is 
relatively salient then this similarity can generate an lAT effect (pizza-coin, snake-river), 
while the same items produced a different lAT effect when functional similarity 
(eatable) was salient.
The evaluative priming task initially was explained by spreading activation 
(Fazio, 2001; Fazio et al. 1986) adapted to implicit attitudes from semantic memory 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975) models. The spreading activation account suggests that 
perceiving the prime stimulus (i.e. attitude object) results in the activation of the concept 
node in the semantic network. In addition, the activation further spreads to the evaluative 
node associated with the object and then further spreads to object nodes linked to the 
same evaluative node. However, a range of experimental findings questioned the 
viability of the spreading activation model (for review, see Klauer & Musch, 2003). 
Further experiments (for review, Wittenbrink, 2007), favoured an alternative model 
based on the response level. Wentura (1999) argued that instead of spreading activation 
in semantic memory, the prime activates a categorization response which facilitates the 
categorization of the target, when both are affectively congruent (e.g. both are negative). 
When the prime and target are affectively incongruent (e.g. negative prime, positive 
target), the response activated by the perception of the prime slows the categorization of 
the target stimulus. That is the task is more related to selective attention tasks, such as 
the Stroop task, than to semantic priming tasks. Klauer (1998) and Klauer and Musch
In one group the first 12 trials are evaluative (positive-negative), while the second 12 trials are 
semantic categorization (flower-insect) from the 24 trials, in another group the order is reversed.
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(2003) also argued for a Stroop-like response competition explanation for the evaluative 
priming task. Wittenbrink (2007) proposed that both accounts can be valid, as both 
processes may result in affective priming, separately.
Implicitness of the tasks
Finally another characteristic that distinguishes the lAT from the affective priming task 
might be the implicitness of these measures. Nosek, Greenwald, and Banaji (2007) 
suggested that dissimilarities in the underlying cognitive processes can have 
considerable impact on the relationship between various implicit measure results. In 
particular, these measures may vary considerably in terms of implicitness. As Conrey et 
al. (2005) argued, neither the lAT nor the affective priming task reflects implicit 
processing exclusively. De Houwer et al. (2009a) looked at how the lAT and the 
evaluative priming task fare on various implicitness criteria (i.e. the presence of 
‘proximal goals’, ‘distal goals’, ‘awareness’, ‘processing resources’ and the ‘availability 
of time’). According to De Houwer and his colleagues, the lAT seems to fare well on the 
‘processing resources’ criterion, because some studies showed that the attitudinal scores 
remained unaffected by the use of a secondary task. As they argued this suggests that the 
processes involved in the attitudinal effect of the LAT are efficient, meeting one of the 
features of implicitness. They also argued that available empirical studies revealed only 
mixed support for the lAT’s resistance to attempts to fake it (‘proximal goals’). 
Furthermore, they claimed that no empirical findings backed assumptions that the LAT 
can assess attitudes of which participants are not aware (‘awareness’). However, niany 
aspects of implicitness related to the lAT are untested and so no conclusion could be 
drawn as to how the LAT fares on the remaining criteria. Compared to the lAT, the 
evaluative priming task met more implicitness criteria. Studies showed that attitudinal 
effects were obtained even in the absence of the task of evaluating the target stimuli 
(‘presence of distal goals’) and without awareness of the prime (‘awareness’). In 
addition, some experiments showed that the attitudinal score was unaffected by a 
secondary task (‘cognitive resources’) and many findings supported the claim that 
processes underlying the priming effect operate very quickly. It needs to be mentioned
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though that studies examining whether the priming task score can be controlled or not 
revealed mixed findings. In sum, as they argued, none of the measures have been studied 
thoroughly enough to draw firm conclusion, but their analysis showed that claims about 
the implicitness of the lAT are based on weak empirical foundations (also. De Houwer, 
2006a). Furthermore, De Houwer and Moors (2007) argued that implicit measures could 
achieve different levels of implicitness, by meeting certain criteria, but not others. 
Moreover, some measures can be considered implicit in different ways than others. 
However, due to the lack of empirical research, the implicitness of the evaluative 
priming task, but especially the lAT remains somewhat in question.
Other potential factors
Differences between the evaluative priming task and the lAT are not restricted to the 
above three areas. Certainly, there are many other potential factors that could have 
differential impact on the results obtained from these tasks. For example, they may also 
differ in the amount of cognitive resources they require (see De Houwer et al., 2009a). 
In addition, it is important to emphasize that the two measures are considerably different 
in certain psychometric properties, most significantly, in their test-retest reliability, in 
their dependent variable, in their trial versus block-based response latency calculation 
and in the fundamentally relative nature of the lAT results to the compared categories.
Assessing independent context sensitivity with different measures
Despite being response latency-based indirect measures o f attitudes, the evaluative 
priming and the lAT have several dissimilar properties, beyond the obvious procedural 
differences. These dissimilarities may also have some implications for the ability of 
these measures to capture independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes, assuming 
such context-sensitivity is a real phenomenon, for whichever theoretical reasons. 
Although, the dissimilarities discussed above between the two implicit attitude measures 
have not always got straightforward consequences for their ability to assess independent 
context sensitivity, some of them are certainly worth mentioning.
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Let us take first the controversial issue of the lAT and the priming tasks possibly 
measuring implicit attitudes towards different levels of a stimulus (exemplar versus 
superordinate category). A potential consequence would be that contextual 
manipulations may need to address different levels o f the stimulus to successfully tap 
into the context-sensitivity of the attitude towards these stimuli. For instance, 
manipulations of the context at the level of exemplars (e.g. colour of the background o f a 
target face in the lAT) may have no influence on the results in the lAT, even if  the 
attitudes themselves are indeed sensitive to independent context. O f course, in these 
cases, it would be questionable whether the two measures assess the same attitude object 
at all. Similarly, if  the lAT is a measure of extrapersonal associations, contextual 
manipulation should affect the activation of these associations and not attitudinal 
associations. In such a case, the obvious problem is that the LAT could not be considered 
to be a measure of attitudes. Furthermore, the spreading activation account o f the 
evaluative priming task could imply highly insensitive priming task results, while the 
salience asymmetry and in particular similarity-based accounts of the lAT could leave 
space for context-sensitive attitudinal results in the LAT. Finally, differences between the 
implicitness of the tasks could have a considerable effect on the presumed context- 
sensitivity of the results obtained in these tasks. For instance, if the lAT was to rely on 
the involvement of more explicit processing than the evaluative priming task, one could 
argue that it could also be more sensitive to contextual manipulation. This is because 
then episodic memories may have stronger impact.
The implications of these issues are not at all straightforward. To make matters 
rnore complex, potentially many combinations o f the above differences could occur. 
Nonetheless, if both measures were to indicate implicit attitudinal sensitivity to 
independent context then it would give support to the results indicating contextual 
sensitivity in the underlying construct (i.e. implicit attitudes) and not contextual 
sensitivity o f the measures. If both measures were to show inflexibility to the same 
contextual manipulation, then it could indicate again that the construct itself is 
insensitive to that variable and not merely the measures.
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Conclusion
To summarize the above arguments, a particular challenge in examining the independent 
context sensitivity of implicit attitudes is to maximize the chance o f measuring the 
sensitivity of the construct that is implicit attitudes and not the sensitivity of the 
measures. Results obtained from one measure alone cannot distinguish between these 
two options. Therefore, it is essential to employ more than one implicit attitude measure. 
In the present research, the two most popular measures will be applied to test the 
independent context sensitivity o f implicit attitudes: the evaluative priming paradigm 
and the lAT. They are not only popular, but their psychometric properties are possibly 
the best examined among the available measures. In addition, given the procedural 
differences between the two measures, similar findings with both of them could result in 
the possibility of drawing strong conclusions on the issue of independent context 
sensitivity.
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Chapter 6
Experiment 1. implicit test modality and attitudes towards smoking
In this chapter, I report an experiment that was designed to test whether implicit attitudes 
are sensitive to independent context. To examine this type of context-sensitivity, it had 
to be made sure that the context did not influence the encoding of the attitude object. To 
that end, a pictorial and a verbal version of the lAT was administered in the study. The 
modality of the lATs (picture or word) served as context to the implicit attitudes towards 
the chosen attitude object which was smoking.
The Implicit Association Test has traditionally been used with verbal stimuli 
(Greenwald et al., 1998) and most of the lAT tasks conducted have employed verbal 
stimuli and lab e lsN ev erth e less , later a pictorial version of the LAT was also 
implemented by employing pictorial target stimuli (picture LAT; Dasgupta, McGhee, 
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000). Studies assessing psychometric properties of the LAT (e.g. 
Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001; Lane, Banaji, Nosek, & Greenwald, 2007; 
Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007) rarely made any distinction between the pictorial 
lAT and verbal lAT, indirectly implying that the two can be regarded as equally valid 
attitudinal measures. Nevertheless, Greenwald (2001, 2004; see also Dasgupta, McGhee, 
Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000) suggested that LATs with verbal stimuli often achieve larger 
effect sizes than LATs with pictorial stimuli, which casts doubt on the assumption that 
the two measures are interchangeable. However, how interchangeable the two versions 
are may also depend on the modality of which stimuli are manipulated in these versions, 
because there are at least three groups of stimuli in a typical LAT (target concept stimuli, 
attribute concept stimuli, category reminders) that can be displayed in either a pictorial 
or verbal form.
I have carried out a review o f 130 lAT experiments conducted between 1998 and 2007 and 
examined the modality of materials used in these studies (attribute target stimuli, target concept stimuli, 
category reminders). The resulting table based on the experiments that reported these stimuli is available 
upon request.
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The terms pictorial lAT and verbal lAT are often used in the literature to 
distinguish lATs employing pictorial or verbal target eoncept stimuli, while at the same 
time leaving stimuli of the positive and negative categories constant across lAT versions 
(e.g. using positive and negative adjectives in both versions). For example, participants 
could categorize pictures of fruits and insects into their corresponding categories in a 
pictorial fruit-insect lAT, but names of fruits and insects in a verbal lAT. Importantly, 
the attribute concept stimuli would remain words with positive and negative valence in 
both versions of the lAT. However, Foroni and Bel-Bahar (2010) examined the 
difference between these pictorial and verbal lATs and concluded that the pictorial 
version often accesses a different representation level of the attitude objects than the 
verbal version (e.g. a particular lion versus the eoncept of lion in general). Even more 
importantly, their argument may raise the question of whether the same attitude objects 
are being examined. As mentioned previously, lAT results are thought to be influenced 
by attitudes towards the target concept (e.g. fruits) and towards the particular exemplars 
of the target concept (e.g. a photograph of an apple, o f a pineapple, of an orange, etc.). 
One eould argue that a particular pictorial example of an attitude object in pictorial 
format is not necessarily the same attitude object in verbal format. For instance, a picture 
of a woman is not necessarily the same attitude objeet as the one represented by the 
name Catherine. Given that the LAT is thought to partially be driven by attitudes towards 
the exemplar stimuli, such difference in attitudes towards the verbal and pictorial 
exemplars of a target coneept category should also be manifested in the overall lAT 
seore. Therefore it is questionable whether such pictorial and verbal versions of the LAT 
are equivalent measures and they tap into the same attitude object. There are examples in 
the literature to test the general context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes by employing a 
pictorial and a verbal lAT in this fashion (Sherman et al., 2003). Nevertheless this sort 
of manipulation is elearly not appropriate for examining the independent context 
sensitivity of implieit attitudes, for the above mentioned reasons. However, exemplars of 
the target concept eategory are not the only stimuli of which the modality can be 
manipulated.
Another way to create a verbal and a pictorial version of the lAT is to manipulate 
the modality of the stimuli referring to the attribute target categories (e.g. positive and
83
negative adjectives or pictures). So while for instance Foroni and Bel-Bahar (2010) 
changed the modality o f the target concept stimuli (i.e. pictures of smoking vs. smoking- 
related words), but left the attribute target stimuli constant across the pictorial and verbal 
lAT version (i.e. positive and negative adjectives), one could also leave the target 
concept stimuli constant and change the modality of the attribute target stimuli.
Let us take the example of a fhiit-insect lAT. Pictures of fruits and insects could 
serve as target concept stimuli in both versions of the lAT, but the attribute target 
stimulus set would incorporate positive and negative pictures in the pictorial lAT and 
positive and negative adjectives in the verbal version of the lAT. Additionally, however, 
the category reminders shown during the task will also change from pictorial to verbal or 
viee versa in the respective tests. By the use of pictorial target concept stimuli, category 
reminders and attribute target stimuli, the pictorial lAT will contain no verbal stimulus, 
whereas only the target concept stimuli will be pictorial in the verbal lAT. This 
manipulation of stimulus modality is supposed to be in keeping with the Multiple 
Memory Systems model (Amodio, 2008), to emphasize the role of semantic versus 
affective associations in the two versions of the test.
An important aspect of the proposed test manipulation is that it presents little 
opportunity for the context to influenee the encoding of the attitude object. This is 
mainly due to the fact that the stimulus set representing the attitude object is invariant 
across the pictorial and verbal version of the lAT. For instance, in a fhiit-insect lAT the 
same set of photos of fruits and inseets would be employed in the verbal and the 
pietorial versions of the lAT. The attribute target stimuli would change across versions 
of the lAT, but this should have no impact on the encoding, for example, of a pieture of 
an orange. The pictorial and verbal category reminders are also supposed to refer to the 
same underlying concept that is to the same attitude object. For attitudinal results in an 
lAT are assumed to be driven by attitudes towards the target concept stimuli and 
towards the target eoncept category, and both are supposed to be actually or 
conceptually constant across the pictorial and verbal versions of the lAT, the test 
modality manipulation in this fashion can be an appropriate way to test the independent 
eontext sensitivity of implicit attitudes.
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However, the test environment should not only avoid interfering with the 
encoding of the attitude object(s), but at the same time it needs to be strong enough a 
contextual cue to elicit context-specific changes. The proposed test modality 
manipulations are very subtle and therefore may run the risk o f being too weak to elicit 
any contextual effect. It is a particularly concerning issue when the expected general 
implicit attitudinal effect is also weak, because a potentially subtle eontext effect on an 
already weak attitude may be difficult to detect, even if the context effect does exist. 
Therefore, in the present study an attitude object will have to be examined that has the 
potential to activate reasonably strong attitudes.
In addition, the learnt information about context cues ought to activate 
qualitatively different attitudes towards the same object. For instance, if  a person learns 
positive information about fioiits in one room and negative information in another room, 
implicit attitude tests conducted in the two different rooms could reflect the information 
learnt only in the particular room, assuming the environmental context (i.e. particular 
room) had any effect on implicit attitudes. In this experiment an attitude object was 
employed which was supposed to have relatively strong attitudes associated with it that 
might be considerably different in the contexts employed. The attitude object in question 
is smoking. More specifically, implicit attitudes towards smoking were tested among 
smokers and non-smokers and the verbal and pictorial versions of the lAT served as the 
context manipulations.
Before any further discussion, I want to draw attention to an important point. The 
verbal lAT in our study is often called a pictorial lAT in the literature, because the 
attribute target stimuli were words, but the target concept stimuli were pictures 
(photographs of smoking and non-smoking scenes) in our study. In contrast, verbal lAT 
often refers to lATs, using verbal stimuli only. I do not follow this terminology in the 
present research. This is so that I can clearly differentiate between two types o f implicit 
tests I used in this research: verbal lATs with verbal attribute target stimuli and pictorial 
target concept stimuli, and pietorial lATs with pictorial attribute target and pictorial 
target concept stimuli. Now, I can turn to why smoking was chosen to be the examined 
attitude object in the two versions of the lAT.
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Smoking is an attitude object that fits the goals of the current study for two 
reasons. First, implicit attitudes towards smoking may be fairly strong among both 
smokers and non-smokers. Notably, the previously mentioned study of Swanson et al., 
(2001) revealed strong enough implicit attitudes in both groups. Second, as it was 
discussed in Chapter 4, the study and several later studies demonstrated negative implicit 
attitudes towards smoking among smokers. These results ean be explained a priori in 
several ways, ineluding one that is related to the contextual manipulation in the study. It 
could be argued that the negative implicit attitudes found in the group o f smokers may 
be context-specific and are only found in the verbal lAT. One may predict considerably 
different implicit attitudes towards smoking among smokers in a pictorial lAT. 
However, this assumption relies on one o f many possible explanations of the found 
negative implicit attitude towards smoking among smokers.
One explanation is that smokers do genuinely have negative implicit attitudes 
towards smoking (Swanson et al., 2001). That is presumably despite of the positive 
aspects of the behaviour (e.g. feeling relaxed), such positive reward does not influence 
implicit attitudes. Alternatively, these positive aspects might be overshadowed by other 
informational sources suggesting that smoking is a ‘bad’ thing (e.g. health campaigns). 
Accordingly, if  implicit attitudes were rooted in summary evaluations, as suggested by 
the single-summary evaluation model (Fazio, 2007), manipulating the test modality 
should have no effect on the implicit attitudinal results. The reason is that the summary 
evaluation, which is activated, is supposedly negative and hence we should find no 
difference between the pietorial and the verbal version of the lAT results in either the 
smoker or in the non-smoker groups.
A second explanation can be derived from Olson and Fazio’s (2004) view of the 
lAT regarding it as a measure of extrapersonal associations. According to this argument, 
the negative implicit attitudes toward smoking found, among smokers merely suggest 
that smokers’ extrapersonal associations with smoking were negative. Personalized 
versions of the lAT should reveal actual and so perhaps more positive attitudes. Yet the 
modality of test should not affect LAT results, because the pictorial version and the 
verbal version of the lAT are supposed to be similar in terms of being measures of 
extrapersonal associations.
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A third explanation follows from the suggestions of online-models and Multiple 
Memory Systems model. As indicated by these explanations, the verbal attribute concept 
stimulus cues provided by conventional LATs activated primarily verbal or semantic 
memories associated with smoking, whereas non-verbal or affective memories were 
activated to a much smaller extent. The uneven activation of the two kinds of memories 
could have led to negative attitudes towards smoking. This supposition is rooted in the 
speculation that much of the pleasantness associated with smoking comes via positive 
physical sensations associated with smoking while verbal associations of smoking can 
often be highly negative (e.g. health campaigns against smoking). If this assumption is 
correct and a pictorial lAT is able to tap into non-verbal/affective memories to a larger 
extent than a verbal lAT, then it is more likely to provide positive attitudinal effects 
among smokers toward smoking. Thus smokers’ implicit attitude towards smoking may 
be negative in the verbal LAT, but it may also shift towards the positive direction in the 
pictorial LAT. Furthermore, the lack of positive sensations associated with smoking 
among non-smokers means that they should have identical attitudes in the two versions 
of the lAT so we should expect negative attitude toward smoking among non-smokers in 
both kinds o f tests.
Experiment 1 was designed to partially replicate Swanson et al’s (2001) study^" .^ 
As mentioned previously, Swanson et al. found negative implicit attitudes towards 
smoking among non-smokers and, crucially, among smokers. In fact, this research was 
the first among several experiments on smoking and alcohol-consumption which found 
negative implicit attitudes towards these attitude objects among the substance users. 
Their findings were obtained by an LAT which used pictures for target concept stimuli, 
but words for attribute target stimuli. However, following the implications of the 
Multiple Memory Systems model, one could argue that these results were obtained, 
perhaps because of the use of verbal materials in the test. By using verbal stimuli, the 
lAT may have assessed primarily semantic memories. In contrast, using non-verbal 
attribute target stimuli - together with the non-verbal target concept stimuli -  could
Only explicit and implicit measures o f attitude towards smoking were administered. Measures 
of self-esteem and identification with smoking were not relevant in the current study and therefore they 
were omitted.
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facilitate the activation of affective associations. This would imply that the lAT eould 
assess the non-semantic aspects of smoking. The present study aimed to examine 
whether changing the verbal materials to pietorial stimuli in the lAT - with the exception 
of the target eoneept stimuli - would result in ehanges in implicit attitude results of 
smoking among smokers. Thus the current study employed a verbal and a pictorial 
version of the lAT to assess implieit attitudes towards smoking among smokers and non- 
smokers. The verbal lAT was a replication of implicit attitudinal lAT in Swanson et al., 
whereas the pietorial lAT was a modified version of the same task. In the latter, the 
target concept stimuli and the category reminders were pictures, instead of the words of 
used in the verbal version.
Let us assume for the moment that Swanson et al’s (2001) study indeed assessed 
implicit attitudes towards smoking originating primarily from semantic associations and 
also that replacing the verbal stimuli in their lAT would make the lAT more sensitive to 
affective associations linked to smoking. In this case, smokers’ implicit attitude towards 
smoking should be more positive in the pietorial than in the verbal lAT. This is because 
the lAT would be more sensitive to affective assoeiations based presumably on positive 
bodily reward (sensations) in response to smoking eigarette. These positive affective 
associations should shift the lAT results in a positive direction. By contrast, such 
positive bodily reward -  and so positive affeetive assoeiations in general -  must be 
absent among non-smokers. As a consequence, implieit attitudes towards smoking 
would be expeeted to be similarly negative in the verbal and the pietorial version of the 
lAT in this group. In sum, aecording to this hypothesis implicit attitudes towards 
smoking would be signifieantly different between the pictorial and the verbal lATs in 
the smoker group, but would not differ in the non-smoker group. To summarize this 
modality-specific hypothesis, one eould expect the following attitudinal results^
- Verbal lAT/non-smoker group: negative implicit attitude
- Pietorial LAT/non-smoker group: negative implicit attitude
Please note that the lAT results of an attitude object are understood relative to the other attitude 
object examined in the test. In this case, smoking was compared to non-smoking (see later) and so 
assuming, for instance ‘negative implicit attitude towards smoking’, this should only be interpreted as 
‘more negative attitude toward smoking than towards non-smoking’. Of course, non-smoking might be 
considered as neutral attitude object, providing a neutral point to which attitudes towards smoking can be 
compared. However, this is a largely untested assumption.
- Verbal lAT/smoker group: negative implicit attitude
- Pictorial lAT/smoker group: neutral or positive implicit attitude
Conversely to the modality-specific hypothesis, if  test modality is not a strong enough 
cue, or the pictorial lAT does not tap into affective associations or attitudes were based 
on the activation of summary evaluations in a single memory system, such modality- 
specific effect should not be found. This means that implicit attitudes towards smoking 
should be similar in both versions of the lAT in the non-smoker, but crucially also in the 
smoker group. Again to summarize this alternative hypothesis, the following pattern of 
results might be found:
- Verbal lAT/non-smoker group: negative implicit attitude
- Pictorial lAT/non-smoker group: negative implicit attitude
- Verbal LAT/smoker group: negative implicit attitude
- Pictorial LAT/smoker group: negative implicit attitude.
This experiment aims to test the above predictions on modality-specific implicit 
attitudinal results and by implication the independent context sensitivity of implicit 
attitudes. Assuming that the manipulation of test modality is strong enough, the 
experiment could feed information back into explanations of implicit attitudes towards 
smoking, implicit attitude models in general and importantly independent context 
sensitivity of implicit attitudes.
Method
Participants
Twenty-six female and five male students were recruited on the campus of the 
University of Surrey (M^ gg =21.10, SD^^=3.66). Volunteers received one course credit or 
four pounds in exchange for their participation. Data from two ex-smoker participants 
and another subject who could not comply with the task requirements were excluded 
from the analysis. The final sample consisted of thirteen smokers (3 male, 10 female.
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Mgge =21.62, SD^^=A.9\) and fifteen non-smokers (2 male, 13 female, =20.67, 
SD^^=2.16Ÿ^. The smokers in the sample regarded themselves as regular smokers, but 
as their self-assessed cigarette consumption data showed, their daily cigarette intake was 
moderate. The median fell in the ‘five to ten cigarettes a day’ response category. All 
smokers had been smoking for a year or longer {M  = 5.308, SD = 4.72). Informed 
consent was received fi-om all participants (see Appendix A and Appendix B). 
Volunteers were all native English speakers with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
This study and also the subsequent experiments received favourable ethical opinion from 
the University of Surrey Ethics Committee.
Design
The experiment used a mixed quasi-experimental design with two independent 
variables: group of participants (smoker or non-smoker) and test type (pictorial or verbal 
lAT). Group was the between-subject variable, while test-type the within-subject 
variable^^. The dependent variable was the so-called d-score. The d-score is calculated 
fi-om the response latencies of each participant and is recommended as dependent 
measure in lATs by Greenwald, Nosek, and Banaji (2003). The d-score indicates the 
difference between the implicit evaluations of two target concepts. In the current study, 
the larger the d-score, the larger is the difference between the implicit attitudes towards 
‘Smoking’ and ‘Non-Smoking’. Positive d-score value indicates more positive implicit 
attitude towards ‘Non-smoking’ than ‘Smoking’. In contrast, negative d-score suggests 
more positive implicit attitude towards ‘Smoking’ than ‘Non-smoking’
Materials
The pleasant and unpleasant words used in the verbal version of the LAT task were 
identical to the attribute target words employed in the Swanson et al. (2001) experiment. 
Eight pleasant and eight unpleasant target words were displayed throughout the attribute
The low sample size was due to difficulties o f finding regular smokers with at least a few 
cigarettes daily consumption, who did not want to give up smoking. It is worth noting that the experiment 
was conducted near the time o f the introduction o f smoking restrictions in public places in England. 
Because each participant completed both types of lATs.
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practice target blocks and combined blocks of the verbal lAT (Table 2). These target 
verbal stimuli were presented in black colour in the middle o f the screen, in Arial Bold 
36 point font. The category reminders in the lAT were presented in similar colour and 
font style, but with font size 30.
Table 2. Attribute target words in the verballA T
Pleasant Words cuddle, happy, smile, joy, warmth, peace, paradise, love 
Unpleasant Words pain, awful, disaster, grief, agony, brutal, tragedy, bad
The smoking and non-smoking target concept stimuli used were black-and-white
photographs taken of common household objects with and without items indicating
smoking. The eight non-smoking and smoking pictures were similar, except that in the ■
. non-smoking settings, the smoking items were replaced by various objects from every-
day life (Table 3).
Table 3. Smoking target concept pictures in both the verbal and the pictorial lATs
Item(s) beside ‘Smoking' item ‘Non-smoking^
item
1. books burning cigarette in a scissors
hand, lighter
2. empty glass pack of cigarettes, lighter leaflet
3. kitchen sink, empty glass pack of cigarettes sponge
4. boxes (metal, can of juice, pack pack of cigarettes plastic boxes
of foil)
5. table lamp pack of cigarettes. CDs
cigarette
6. mug, candle pack of cigarettes. mug
cigarette
7. Newspaper pack of cigarettes two pens
8. sheets of paper burning cigarettes in a pen in a hand
hand, lighter
The target items remained the same in the pictorial lAT task presenting pictures of 
smoking and non-smoking related scenes. However, the pleasant and unpleasant
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affective target words in the verbal lAT task were substituted with colour photographs 
supposedly with pleasant and unpleasant emotional connotations (Table 4). The pictures 
were collected from internet sites. The selection of these images was in keeping with 
articles (Payne et ah, 2005; Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007) that reported 
pleasant and unpleasant picture stimuli used from the International Affective Picture 
System (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1995). All the presented pictures of the categories 
‘Pleasant’, ‘Unpleasant’, ‘Smoking’ and ‘Non-smoking’ were displayed in the size of 
400x310.
Table 4. Attribute target pictures in the pictorial lA T
Pleasant Photographs castle, baby, bunny, kittens, money, red
squirrel, baby seal, sailing ship 
Unpleasant Photographs accident, garbage can, jail, shark, snake,
 __________________________________  snarling wolf, spider, dirty toilet__________
The verbal category labels were also replaced in the pictorial lAT task. A red plus and a 
blue minus sign were used as labels of the category ‘Pleasant’ and ‘Unpleasant’, 
respectively. Furthermore, a ‘Non-smoking’ and a ‘Smoking’ symbol were shown as 
category reminders, replacing the words of ‘Non-smoking’ and ‘Smoking’ in the verbal 
lAT. During each trial, category signs appeared on the left and right comer on the 
screen. Pleasant/unpleasant category signs were presented with the size of 100 x 80 
pixels and the smoking/non-smoking signs 160 X 120pixels.
All stimuli were presented in front of a light grey background. The lAT tasks were 
carried out on a Compaq Evo N1020v laptop computer by using the Millisecond Inquisit 
2.0 software (2006). The questionnaire was conducted by applying Microsoft Excel 
2003 Userforms.
Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were seated in front of the experimental computer and read the 
information sheet that provided information about the confidentiality and anonymity o f 
the collected data, as well as, about their right to withdraw from the study at any time 
during the experiment. Having read the information sheet, volunteers read and signed
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the consent form. They were then asked to complete two TAT tasks which aimed to 
assess participants’ implicit attitudes towards smoking. Later they also completed a 
questionnaire on the same computer that evaluated their explicit attitudes and the 
ambivalence o f these attitudes toward smoking. The two lATs were a verbal and a 
pictorial version of the lAT. The two separate standard seven-block lAT tasks were 
completed by each participant. The order of the completion of the LATs was 
counterbalanced across participants.
lATs in general, involve categorizing attribute (positive/negative) and target 
concept stimuli into their correct categories. In both versions of our lAT, volunteers 
sorted positive (pleasant) and negative (unpleasant) stimuli into the affective categories 
of ‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’. In addition, the conceptual LAT categories in this 
experiment were ‘Smoking’ and ‘Non-smoking’. Therefore volunteers also sorted 
smoking and non-smoking stimuli into the conceptual categories of ‘Smoking’ and 
‘Non-smoking’. Participants’ task was to categorize each stimulus into its correct 
category by pressing either of two response keys. They were instructed to respond to the 
presented stimuli as fast and accurately as they could. Response latencies, 
correct/incorrect responses, trial and block codes were recorded.
The verbal LAT task was a close replication of the experiment (3) in the Swanson 
et al. (2001) study. It was constituted of the following seven blocks of trials:
Block 1: Practice block of categorizing attribute (positive/negative) target 
words only (20 trials)
Block2: Practice block of categorizing target concept (smoking/non-smoking) 
pictorial stimuli only (20 trials)
Block 3: Practice block o f combined categorization task, in which affective 
words (i.e. attribute target stimuli) and smoking/non-smoking pictures 
(i.e. target concept stimuli)was presented in a sequential order (25 
trials)
Block 4: Actual test block o f combined categorization task (41 trials)
B locks: Practice block of reversed categorization of attribute target stimuli 
with opposite response key assignment (see later) to eaeh attribute 
target category (20 trials)
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Block 6: Practice block o f reversed combined categorization task (see Block 3) 
with opposite key assignment of attribute target concepts (25 trials)
Block 7; Actual test block o f reversed combined task (41 trials)
In the first block of trials, on each trial, an affective word appeared on the screen 
and participants sorted the target word either into the ‘Positive’ or into the ‘Negative 
categories. Target words were categorized by pressing the ‘d’ or the ‘k ’ keys. The name 
of the category assigned to the key ‘d’ was shown on the top left comer of the screen 
(left category reminder). The category associated with the key ‘k’ was presented on the 
top right comer (right category reminder). So for example, if  an affective word had a 
positive connotation and the category reminder ‘Positive’ was shown in the top right 
comer, participants had to press the key ‘k ’ on the keyboard for correct categorization. If 
participants categorized a stimulus incorrectly, the stimulus word was replaced by a red 
“x” sign after response to indicate that the item was sorted into the incorrect category. 
The incorrect sign stayed on the screen until correct response was given. A trial was 
completed when a correct response was given. The interval between trials (intertrial 
interval) was set to 400 ms in all blocks of both LATs. After a correct response was 
received, the task automatically continued with the next trial. The task of the participants 
stayed similar in the second block, but now they sorted pictures associated with smoking 
and non-smoking into the categories of ‘Smoking’ and ‘Non-smoking’. Trials began 
with the presentation of a picture in the centre of the screen and they needed to be sorted 
by pressing again either the ‘d’ or the ‘k ’ button on the keyboard. The categories 
(‘Smoking’/’Non-smoking’) associated with each key was presented in the upper left 
(key ‘d’) and right corner (‘key ‘k ’) of the screen. Again, an incorrect sign (red ‘x ’) was 
displayed in the place of the target stimulus, when incorrect response was obtained. The 
third block was a combination of the previous two blocks. The target items in this block 
were both affective words and smoking/non-smoking photographs (combined block), 
presented in altemating order, starting with affective words. Crucially, each response 
key was associated with two categories: an affective and a conceptual category. The two 
categories, which were associated with the key ‘d’ were presented in the top left comer
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of the screen, while categories associated with the key ‘k’ were shown in the top right 
comer (see Figure 7).
NON-SMOKING SMOWNG
POSITr/E NEGATIVE
NON-SMOKING
POSITIVE
SMOKING
NEGATIVE
SMOKING
NEGATIVE
posmve
Responss: Keyboa-d keys "d" a n d 'k  
• d * -  catego.’ res in the lot! corns r 
"k* -  categories in the right coiper
Figure 7. Sample verbal lAT trials
As in all practice blocks, incorrect responses were followed by the presentation of an 
incorrect sign (‘x ’). The fourth block was identical to the previous block. Participants 
were wamed that unlike the previous three practice blocks, this fourth block of trials was 
a test and therefore no incorrect sign was shown, when they made an error. Having 
completed this test block, the task continued with another practice block, in which again 
the same affective words were sorted out as in the first block. However, the categories 
now were assigned to the opposite response key. Thus, if  for example in the first block 
positive words were categorized as positive by pushing the k e y ’d’, in the fifth block th e . 
key ‘k’ had to be pressed for correct categorization. Together with the opposite key 
allocation, the category reminders also swapped places to indicate the category assigned 
to each key. The fifth block was followed by another practice trial block, in which both 
affective and conceptual target items were sorted, but the affective words were assigned 
to the same key as in the previous block, while the smoking/non-smoking items were 
assigned to the keys in block 2 and 3. As a consequence, the smoking/non-smoking
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category associated with each response key was paired with the opposite affective target 
category then in the second or third block (reversed combined block). The following 
seventh block was identical, but no incorrect sign was displayed in response to incorrect 
categorization of a stimulus, as it was another test block. The order o f the combination 
of affective and conceptual target stimulus to the response keys was counterbalanced 
across subjects.
The verbal and the pictorial lATs were identical in design, only the stimuli 
employed were different in the two tasks, as the latter contained no verbal stimulus or 
label. The affective words and category reminders (‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’) were 
replaced with affective pictorial stimuli and signs (red ‘+’ and blue ‘-‘) as category 
reminders, respectively.
After finishing the lAT tasks, participants filled out a questionnaire on the same 
computer. In this questionnaire, participants’ explicit attitudes were measured toward 
smoking by a 9-point thermometer scale. In addition, a series of 7-point semantic 
differential scales were administered, examining how well certain adjectives described 
smoking from the participants’ perspective, such as (1) Good-Bad, (2) Healthy- 
Unhealthy, (3) Sexy-Unsexy, (4) Pleasant-Unpleasant, (5) Harmless-Harmful, (6) 
Sociable-Unsociable, (7) Glamorous-Ugly and (8) Calming-Stressful^^. The latter set of 
questionnaire items was thought to reflect on various aspects of smoking and therefore 
contribute to exploring how ambivalent volunteers’ explicit attitudes were towards 
smoking. In addition a short demographic section and in the case of smokers, some 
questions regarding their smoking habits were shown. Having completed both the lATs 
and the questionnaire, participants were debriefed.
Results
Mean overall response latencies (Table 5), were not significantly different between the 
verbal and the pictorial lAT, t(21) = 0.92, p  = .366. In addition, the proportion o f error 
trials was very low in both lATs and did not differ signifieantly across the two versions, 
t(27) = -1.44, p  = .161. However, the number of extremely fast (<400ms) trials was
This set o f explicit measures was employed from Swanson et al. (2001) study
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significantly higher in the verbal lAT than in the pictorial lAT, r(27) = -2.29, p  = .030, r 
= .40. Furthermore, somewhat more errors were made on pictorial lAT trials compared 
to verbal lAT trials, t(21) = 3.21,p  = .003 r = .53.
Table 5. Overall mean latency, rate o f  error trials and o f  exceedingly fast, as well as slow trials in the 
verbal and pictorial lATs
Verbal Pictorial
lAT lAT
Mean Mean
Overall mean latency (ms) 913.42 951.78
SD 22A75 276.66
Overall errors (%) 6.33 9.63
SD 3.05 5.87
Latencies below 400 ms (%) 1.37 0.42
SD 3.06 1.01
Latencies above 10000 ms (%) 0.06 0.00
SD 0.27 0.00
The procedure o f data treatment followed the suggestions of Greenwald et al. 
(2003) for using the improved scoring algorithm in the analysis o f the lAT. The 
algorithm produces one single value for each participant from the response latency 
difference between two sets of lAT blocks (combined vs. reversed combined blocks). 
This value, the d-score, represents the implicit attitudinal result obtained from the lAT 
by the improved scoring algorithm. For calculating d-scores, both practice and test 
combined block trials are used. In addition, the first two trials in each of these blocks 
and error trials too are included in the analysis. The only trials that were excluded were 
those in which response latencies fell below 400ms or exceeded 10000ms.
The calculation of the d-score followed the subsequent steps for each 
participant’s data:
(1) The standard deviation of response latencies was calculated for practice and 
test blocks separately
(2) Four mean response latencies were calculated for each combination of 
pairing (Smoking+Positive blocks, Smoking+Negative blocks) and test 
(practice blocks, test blocks).
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(3) The mean latency of the Smoking+Positive combination practice block was 
subtracted from the mean latency of the Smoking+Negative practice blocks. 
The procedure was repeated with test blocks. The result was two difference 
scores (practice and test) between Smoking+Positive and Smoking+Negative 
blocks.
(4) The practice block difference scores were divided by the earlier calculated 
(see step 1) standard deviation value. The same division was made for the 
test block difference score.
(5) The two difference scores were divided by their standard deviation values 
then added up and divided by two.
The key part of computing the d-scores can be summarized in the following equation:
' ^P2B
a =   ------------------------------------------------------------------------------:—
, where
= pairing I, that is Smoking+Positive + Non-smoking+Negative
?2 -  pairing 2, that is Smoking+Negative + Non-smoking+Positive
SD]at ^ standard deviation o f the response latencies
A = practice block(s)
B = test block(s)
Since the verbal lAT was a close replication o f the Swanson et al. (2001) 
experiment 3, it was expected that the implicit attitudinal results on smoking in this 
version of the TAT would be similar. Swanson and her colleagues found slower 
responses in the Smoking+Positive condition than in the Smoking+Negative condition in 
both groups, suggesting more negative attitude towards smoking than towards non­
smoking. The mean response latency difference between the two conditions was, 
however, smaller in the smoker group (M = 69.42, SD = 244.87) than in the non-smoker 
group (M = 245.30, SD = 257.77), potentially indicating less negative attitudes toward 
smoking in the smoker group. Our results in the verbal LAT (see Figure 8) were in line 
with those of Swanson and her colleagues, showing more negative attitude toward 
smoking than toward non-smoking in both the practice and test blocks. Moreover, the
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mean latency difference of the test blocks was very close to their findings (A^ moker 
87.41, 5D s m o k e r  = 176.74, M ^ ^ n - s m o k e r  = 236.68, SD n o n - s m o k e r  = 230.37)^^ and implied a 
less negative attitude toward smoking in the smoker group than in the non-smoker 
group. The practice block mean latencies showed a similar pattern to the test blocks in 
the verbal lAT.
Practice Practice Test Test
Smoking/- Smoking/+ Smoking/- Smoking/+
Block Block Block Block
Non-smoker group
Practice Practice Test Test
Smoking/- Smoking/+ Smoking/- Smoking/+
Block Block Block Block
Smoker group
Figure 8. Mean latencies (ms) of four verbal lAT blocks in the smoker and the non-smoker group.
Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval o f the means.
Furthermore, in the non-smoker group, the verbal lAT d-score (M = 0.655, SD = 
.355) indicated significantly more negative implicit attitudes towards smoking than 
towards non-smoking, /(14) = 7.15, j? < .001, r = .89. Importantly, in the smoker group 
the verbal lAT d-score (M = 0.25, SD = .48) showed a similar result. However, in this 
case the d-score value was considerably smaller and was only marginally significantly 
different from zero, t{\2) = 1.85, p  = .088, r = .47. This suggests that their implicit 
attitude towards non-smoking was only slightly more positive than towards smoking. 
Moreover, the t-test revealed that the mean d-score difference between the two groups 
was significant, f(26) = 2.61, p  = 0.015, r  = .46, just like those of the log-transformed 
latency results in the Swanson et al. (2001) study.
To calculate the d-score, they used only results from the test blocks. This procedure was used , 
in the conventional scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al., 1998). However, Greenwald and his colleagues 
(2003) argued that their improved scoring algorithm fared better on many factors and so they 
recommended using it instead o f the conventional scoring algorithm to calculate d-scores from lAT data. 
Following their recommendations we used the improved scoring algorithm.
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In the pictorial version of the lAT, the mean response latencies o f the non- 
smoker group were again considerably lower in the Smoking+Negative practice and test 
blocks than in the Smoking+Positive blocks, indicating a more positive implicit attitude 
towards non-smoking than towards smoking (see Figure 9). A one-sample t-test analysis 
of the d-score (M = 0.63, SD = .47) of this group confirmed these findings and revealed 
a significant difference from zero, t{\2) = 5.14, p  < .001, r  = .83, suggesting rather 
negative implicit attitudes towards smoking. No such result emerged in the smoker 
group. The mean verbal lAT d-score of this group (M = -0.08, SD = .40) showed no 
attitude preference towards non-smoking relative to smoking, t{\2) = -.lA ,p = .471.
Practice Practice Test Test
Smoking/- Smoking/+ Smoking/- Smoking/+
Block Block Block Block
Non-smoker group
Practice Practice Test Test
Smoking/- Smoking/+ Smoking/- Smoking/+
Block Block Block Block
Smoker group
Figure 9. Mean latencies of four pictorial lAT blocks in the smoker and the non-smoker group with
95% confidence interval lines.
To further analyse both the verbal and the pictorial lAT d-scores, a 2 {Test) x 2 
{Group) X  2 {lAT-order) mixed-ANOVA was conducted^®. Test was the only within 
subject factor and it had two levels: verbal lAT d-score and pictorial lAT d-score. In 
addition to the between-subject factor Group (smoker and non-smoker), the completion 
order of the lAT (verbal LAT first, pictorial LAT second vs. pictorial lAT first, verbal 
lAT second) was included in the analysis as another between-subject factor, to examine
The results o f the ANOVA need to be interpreted with some caution, as the Levene’s test o f the 
visual lAT d-scores was borderline significant, F(3,24) = 3.00,/? = .05 and so indicated that variances in 
the smoker and the non-smoker group may not be considered to be equal. All procedures of data 
transformations failed to correct this issue without violating the assumptions o f normal distribution. In 
addition, all o f the corrected F-ratios were identical to each other and to the reported uncorrected F-values.
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if  completing an lAT first versus second had any influence on the results. The ANOVA 
revealed a main effect for Test, F{\, 24) = 5.02,/>=.035, r = .43, which was due to the 
lower mean d-score in the pictorial lAT relative to the verbal LAT. However, this lower 
mean in the pictorial lAT was largely attributable to d-scores of the smoker group, 
whose mean d-score - unlike the non-smoker group - was considerably lower in the 
pictorial lAT than in the verbal lAT (Figure 10).
verbal lAT 
pictorial lAT
0.6 -
0.4 -
0.2 -
- 0.2
non-smokers smokers
Figure 10. Mean d-scores of the smoker and non-smoker groups in the verbal and the pictorial
lATs
Furthermore, the main effect of Group, F (l, 24) = 17.10, p  < .001, r = .65, was also 
significant. The direction of mean difference between the two d-scores groups (M = .59) 
suggested that the d-scores were closer to zero in the smoker group than in the non- 
smoker group. Crucially, the two-way interaction effect of Test x Group was found also 
significant, F{\, 24) = 4.40,/? = .047, r -  .39. The two-way interaction showed that the 
test results were significantly different in the two groups. Moreover, the Test x lAT- 
order two-way interaction effect was significant too, F (l, 24) = 8.31, p=.008, r =  .51. 
This latter interaction effect indicated that the completion order of the lATs had
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considerable effect on the results. The unwanted effect was a consequence of, on the one 
hand, the larger verbal lAT d-scores when the verbal lAT was completed first (Table 6). 
On the other hand, pictorial lAT d-scores were somewhat larger, when the pictorial lAT 
preceded the verbal lAT. No other effect was significant in the model.
Table 6. Mean d-scores in the verbal and pictorial lATs as a function of lAT completion order
Verbal lAT Pictorial LAT
Verbal Pictorial Verbal Pictorial
I  ATfirst ■ lAT first lATfirst lAT first
Mean d-score 0.58 0.31 0.25 0.35
SD O.VO 0.50 0.57 0.5&
From the perspective of the hypothesis laid out earlier, it was important to 
examine whether the verbal and the visual lAT d-scores differed within each group 
(Figure 10). In the non-smoker group, the two d-scores revealed no significant 
difference, f(14) = 0.31, /? = .714. By contrast, the difference between the verbal and 
pictorial LAT d-score in the smoker-group was significant, /(12) = 225, p  = .044, 
r = 0.54. The effect size of the difference between the two lAT d-scores indicates a 
substantial attitude difference as a function of the type of LAT in the smoker group. The 
direction and the size of the effect suggest that smokers’ implicit attitudes towards 
smoking were considerably more positive in the pictorial LAT, than in the verbal lAT. 
By contrast, non-smokers’ implicit attitudes were not different in the two versions of the 
LAT. Therefore, the pattern of results is in line with the hypothesis that suggested a 
modality-specific effect in the two lATs only in the smokers group.
Table 7. Mean thermometer score and standard deviation in the smoker and non-smoker group
Mean SD
Non-smoker 8.13 0.74
Smoker 3.54 1.98
The explicit attitudes were also different between the two groups (Table 7). On 
the one hand, the thermometer score of the non-smoker group was considerably higher
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than the neutral attitude value (5) and thus suggested negative explicit attitudes toward 
smoking in this group. A t-test revealed that the log-transformed thermometer scores 
indeed were significantly higher than the neutral value, r(14) = 20.15,/? < .001, r  = .98. 
On the other hand, the mean thermometer score implied positive attitude in the smoker- 
group, t{\2) = -3.50, /? = .004, r  = .71. The independent t-test analysis demonstrated that 
attitudes toward smoking were significantly different between smokers and non- 
smokers, r(13)^^ = 7.07,/? < .001, r  = .89.
Table 8. Mean scores on a series o f  semantic differential scale measures o f  smoking^^
Non-smoker Smoker
Mean* SD Mean* SD
good 6.80 O.'^ / 4.85 7.77
healthy 6.93 0.26 6.77 0.44
sexy 6.67 0.62 3.46 7.67
pleasant 6.60 0.63 4.08 1.71
harmless 6.73 0.46 6.46 0.66
sociable 5.40 1.35 3.00 7.58
glamorous 6.27 O.gg 4.15 7.52
calming 3.87 /.06 2.00 1.00
The set of semantic scales revealed a somewhat more complex picture. Non- 
smokers rated smoking on the negative side of each of the eight semantic scales, with 
the exception of the item calming-stressful. While the mean values on the semantic 
differential scales were more or less in unison in the non-smoker group, the scores 
showed very ambivalent set of attitudinal judgments among smokers (see Table 8). 
Moreover, the aggregated semantic scale^^ (M =  4.35, SD = 0.84) did not differ from the 
neutral value (4) in the case of smokers, t(l2) = 1.49, p  = .163, and implied strongly 
negative attitudes toward smoking among non-smokers (M = 6.16, SD = 0.51), /(14) = 
16.47,/? = < .001, r =  .98.
The df was corrected to thirteen, because the Levene’s test revealed unequal variances between 
the two groups, F = 18.740,/?=. 000.
Smaller number indicates more positive judgement 
^ The aggregated scale was created by averaging out the eight responses on the eight items.
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Table 9. Correlations between implicit and explicit measures
Pictorial lAT Verbal lAT
Log-
transformed
thermometer
score
Composite
semantic
differential
score
Pictorial lAT
Verbal lAT .65**
Log-transformed 
thermometer score .54** .51**
-
Composite semantic 
differential score .57** .47* .88** -
* p < . Q5  
**/ ?< .01
Swanson and her colleagues (2001) found r = .32 correlation between their 
smoking lAT and thermometer score and r =26  between the lAT and composite 
semantic differential score. In the present study these correlations were considerably 
higher (Table 9).
Discussion
The experiment.was designed to replicate and extend Swanson et al’s (2001) findings 
about implicit attitudes towards smoking among smokers and non-smokers. The verbal 
version of the lAT in the experiment was identical to that used in Experiment 3 in 
Swanson et al. and importantly it provided very similar results to their findings. They 
revealed strongly negative attitudes towards smoking among non-smokers and slightly 
negative attitudes among smokers. Nevertheless the pictorial lAT results of the present 
study differed considerably fi*om those of the verbal lAT and the results of the Swanson 
et al. study. Whereas implicit attitudes towards smoking were negative in both versions 
of the lAT among non-smokers, smokers’ implicit attitudes were slightly negative- 
neutral in the verbal lAT and neutral in the pictorial lAT. Importantly, these attitudes in 
the latter group were significantly more positive in the pictorial lAT, than in the verbal 
lAT.
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The fact that the results revealed very similar lAT scores among non-smokers, 
but significantly different lAT scores among smokers suggests that implicit attitudinal 
decisions can be partially determined by the modality o f test. Given that a significant 
difference between the two versions was found only in the smoker group indicates that 
implicit attitude difference due to altering the modality of test is not a general 
phenomenon, not simply a result of using a different variant of the lAT. Moreover, the 
pictorial lAT in the smoker group revealed somewhat more positive attitudes, than in the 
verbal lAT, and this result corresponds with the predicted attitude shift based on attitude 
models suggesting independent context sensitivity. The results therefore are in line with 
the online attitude models and the Multiple Memory Systems model (Amodio, 2008), 
while they do not support the assumption that implicit attitudes are based on single 
context-independent summary evaluations. Thus these data gave some support to the 
hypothesis that independent context manipulation can result in shifts in implicit 
attitudes.
Nevertheless, these conclusions must be treated with caution, since the study has 
a number of limitations. First and foremost, whereas the quasi-experimental design and 
the examination of a pre-existing attitude object had a number of advantages it also had 
considerable disadvantages. Crucially, the hypothesis that test modality serves as a cue 
to preferentially activate cue-specific memories or evaluations was derived from the 
assumption that verbal and non-verbal associations were significantly different among 
smokers, but not among non-smokers. Nonetheless, this is a rather speculative 
assumption and it is difficult to know for certain if it is correct. The set o f attitudinal 
information learnt about the object was not controlled for and therefore it remains only 
an assumption that there is a clear divide between the attitudinal connotation of verbal 
and non-verbal memories among smokers.
Second, the experimental design was aimed at minimizing the interference 
between context and the encoding of the attitude object. Yet one could argue that 
changing the target concept category reminders between pictorial and verbal lATs made 
it possible to encode the target categories differently. Consequently, the attitude object 
may not have been entirely identical in the two versions or perhaps this manipulation 
may have had some other unwanted effect on the results.
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Finally, one could also argue that even if  the results provided evidence for the 
modality-specificity of implicit attitudinal results, it only implies the context-sensitivity 
of the measure and not necessarily of the underlying construct. Given that only one 
implicit attitude measure (i.e. lAT) was used in the experiment, the findings cannot be 
taken as evidence for context-specific changes in the implicit attitude itself. Especially 
because the Implicit Association Test - as mentioned earlier - may also be sensitive to 
various non-attitudinal factors.
In sum, while these findings clearly showed that the modality of the test could be 
strong enough cue to change implicit attitudinal results, more empirical test was needed 
to show that it is rooted in the preferential activation of associated information and that 
the change reflected on the difference in the underlying construct in different contexts.
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Chapter?
Experiment 2. Modality-specific effect in the evaluative priming task with 
novel attitudes
The previous study provided some support for the notion of the independent context 
sensitivity of implicit attitudes but the experiment had a number of limitations. The 
present study was conducted to conceptually replicate the findings of the previous 
experiment and to address some of the previous study’s limitations.
One of the problems with the previous study is that information already 
associated with the attitude object in question (i.e. smoking) was not controlled for. The 
experiment showed what participants’ attitudes were towards smoking, but the set of 
information associated with smoking accumulated during participants’ lifetime was not 
known. Thus, however likely the assumption may be that smokers’ non-verbal and 
verbal memories are qualitatively different, it is not necessarily correct. To test whether 
modality cues do indeed favour the activation of modality-similar information associated 
with an attitude object, the acquisition of associated information set must be controlled 
for. That is the learning process in which verbal and non-verbal information with 
positive and negative valence is acquired has to be experimentally manipulated. When 
the verbal and pictorial information sets learnt about an attitude object are known, 
hypothesis about the modality-specificity or modality-insensitivity of implicit attitudes 
can be based on the exact knowledge of the associated information. In the present 
experiment the attitude objects were novel stimuli with no information leant about them 
before the experiment and the acquisition of implicit attitudes towards these objects was 
kept under strict control.
The acquisition of the implicit attitudes to the chosen novel stimuli (i.e. facial 
photos) was achieved by the introduction of an evaluative conditioning task (Levey & 
Martin, 1975), which preceded the implicit testing stage. “Evaluative conditioning (EC) 
refers to the formation or change of an attitude towards an object following that object’s
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pairing with positively or negatively valenced stimuli.” (Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009, 
p.933). Procedurally evaluative conditioning is considered to be a sub-class of classical 
conditioning^"^ (De Houwer, 2007). In the terminology of evaluative and classical 
conditioning, the conditioning effect is a result o f a conditioned stimulus (CS; attitude 
object) being paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US; affective stimulus). What is 
often observed in this kind of associative learning is that the evaluation of the CS shifts 
towards the direction of the US. For instance, if  an otherwise neutrally evaluated face 
becomes paired with a positive stimulus, the evaluation of the face often becomes more 
positive. The evaluative conditioning paradigm has been successfully employed to create 
or alter attitudes towards various objects in a large number of published studies (for 
meta-analysis, see Hofmann et al., 2010). The majority of these studies have relied on 
explicit attitude measures to assess attitude change, but a handful of studies reported 
evaluation shift detected also by implicit attitude measures (De Houwer, Hermans, & 
Eelen, 1998; Hermans, Vansteenwegen, Crombez, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2002; Jones et al, 
2009; Olson & Fazio, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2006; Pleyers et al., 2007). These studies 
thus indicated that the evaluative conditioning paradigm can be employed to form 
implicit attitudes in a way that the particular stimuli which get associated with the 
attitude object are kept under experimental controP^.
The conditioning task used in the present study was different from previous 
experiments in one respect, it was aimed at creating not only positive and negative 
attitudes, but also ambivalent attitudes. To examine the modality-specific effect on 
implicit attitudes, the formation of ambivalent attitudes was crucial. This is because the 
modality-specific effect was going to be tested on these ambivalent attitudes. Therefore, 
in the evaluative conditioning task some novel attitude objects were associated with only
However, the underlying mental processes o f classical and evaluative conditioning may be 
different (Jones et al., 2009; Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010).
Please note that beside the numerous reports on successful application o f the evaluative 
conditioning paradigm, several experiments were also reported that failed to find significant evaluative 
conditioning effect (see e.g. Rozin, Wrzesniewski, & Byrnes, 1998). Some authors even questioned 
whether the EC effect was a genuine phenomenon (Field & Davey, 1997, 1998, 1999). Recent research 
and reviews concluded that the evaluative conditioning effect is a genuine, but at the same time elusive 
phenomenon (De Houwer, Baeyens, & Field, 2005; De Houwer, Baeyens, Vansteenwegen, & Eelen, 
2000; De Houwer, Thomas, & Baeyens, 2001). Despite considerable research effort directed toward 
understanding factors that may weaken or strengthen attitude shift due to evaluative conditioning, these 
factors are still not well understood (De Houwer, Baeyens, & Field, 2005; Rozin et al., 1998).
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negative, some with only positive, but some attitude objects with a mixture of positive 
and negative information. Gawronski et al. (2010) employed a similar attitude formation 
task (Experiment 2), in which an object became associated with a mixture of negative 
and positive information. Similar to the current study, in their experiment these 
ineongruent pieces of information were presented in an interspersed fashion. Their 
findings suggested that this kind of presentation resulted in the context-dependent 
learning of both the positive and negative pieces of information. That is the context was 
learnt together with the negative and the positive information. It is also worth noting that 
their results suggest that the very first affective information that is presented with (or 
learnt about) the attitude object does not overshadow the attitudinal effect of the 
subsequently learnt affective information with opposite valence. Put it differently, the 
implicit attitudes towards the object were not determined only by the first information 
learnt about the attitude object. Thus Gawronski et al’s research indicates that the task 
should result in attitude formation influenced by both negative and positive information 
and that they would be learnt in a context-dependent manner. This context in the current 
research was introduced in the form of stimulus modality.
That is the positive and negative information associated with an ambivalent 
attitude object would also differ in modality. For instance, positive information 
associated with a novel attitude object is presented in pictorial form whereas the 
negative information is in a verbal form. This was so that in later implicit attitudinal 
testing the modality of test stimuli could serve as independent contextual cues, which 
may preferentially activate modality-similar associations. Finally, since both of these 
dimensions (valence and modality) of the evaluative information were important in the 
subsequent implicit attitude test, it was essential to assure that these features of the USs 
were processed, memorized and retained^^. Therefore in our conditioning task 
participants were instructed to learn, which picture and word was paired with which
Particularly because previous experiments with the evaluative conditioning paradigm did not 
find independent contextual effects (Baeyens, Crombez, De Houwer, & Eelen, 1996; Baeyens, 
Hendrickx, Crombez, & Hermans, 1998; for discussion see De Houwer, et al., 2001). However, one could 
argue that the contextual information was perhaps simply not processed in these studies.
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attitude object^^^^. As a consequence o f this explicit instruction and the attitude 
acquisition in a highly controlled form, the test o f modality-specificity o f the implicit 
attitudinal test results could rely on knowing exactly what verbal and pictorial 
information was learnt about the attitude object. This is unlike the previous experiment 
in which the hypothesis was based on speculations about the verbal and non-verbal 
information associated with smoking.
Another difference between the present and the previous experiment was 
changing the implicit attitude measure. This alteration followed from addressing another 
limitation of the former study that is the modality-specific findings relied on one 
particular implicit attitude measure. This means that it is impossible to disentangle 
whether the context effect only influenced the results on the particular measure (i.e. 
LAT) or also the implicit attitudes themselves. Therefore, the present experiment was 
conducted by employing the evaluative priming paradigm (Fazio et al., 1986), a pictorial 
and verbal priming task, to test the acquired implicit attitudes and their independent 
context sensitivity^^. Crucially, the primes (i.e. faces selected fi’om the conditioning task) 
were identical in the two versions, but the target stimuli were words in the verbal version 
and pictures in the pictorial version. This test-modality manipulation was thought to 
have no influence on the encoding of the attitude objects. The details o f the two versions 
will be discussed later, but it is also important to note that employing the evaluative 
priming task instead o f theTAT, also automatically addressed another limitation o f the 
previous experiment.
A problematic issue with the former study was that changing the target concept 
category label between the verbal and pictorial version of the lAT may have had 
unwanted influence on the results. This problem is eliminated with using the evaluative
This instruction was used previously in De Houwer’s (2006b) study on evaluative 
conditioning, and in the present experiment it was given so that participants could retain both the modality 
and the valence o f stimuli.
^ It is important to stress though that by this instruction, attitude acquisition was the result o f  
explicit learning. As a consequence, our results have implications on attitudes acquired in similar fashion 
and not necessarily on those formed via implicit or involuntary learning.
The evaluative priming task also has an advantage over the lAT that its results are interpretable 
not only relative to another conceptual category. The implicit attitudes can be assessed for a single attitude 
object. In addition, unlike the lAT, there appears to be little debate over the construct validity o f the 
evaluative priming task and its results are commonly thought to reflect on implicit attitudes (Wittenbrink, 
2007).
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priming task, as the attitude objects (i.e. faces) are the primes in the task and are not 
categorized by the participants. They are simply shown before the target stimulus 
presentation, without participants’ responding to the primes. Therefore target concept 
category reminders are not needed in the priming task. The attribute category labels are 
still changed between the two versions, but changing these labels is not supposed to have 
any unwanted effect on the results.
In sum, the present study was designed to examine independent context 
sensitivity of implicit attitudes by manipulating test-modality and strictly controlling 
information that becomes associated with the attitude object both in terms of valence and 
modality. Participants completed an evaluative conditioning task and then a pictorial and 
a verbal version of the evaluative priming task. It was expected that the evaluative 
priming task would reveal positive implicit attitudes towards positively conditioned and 
negative attitudes towards negatively conditioned faces^®. These results would indicate a 
conventional affective congruence effect in the priming task due to evaluative 
conditioning. Importantly, these faces are expected to be evaluated negatively in both 
versions of the priming task in the modality-speeifie group too, because the pictorial and 
verbal associations linked to the faces are both negative^ ^
However, according to the modality-speeifie hypothesis, it was also assumed that 
when faces were associated in the conditioning task with pictures and words with 
opposing valence, their implicit attitudes in the pictorial and the verbal versions of the 
evaluative priming task would reflect attitudes based primarily on the learnt pictorial and
More precisely, positive affective target stimuli would be categorized quicker when they are 
preceded by CS-H- faces (conditioned with positive word and picture) than by C S - faces (conditioned 
with negative word and picture) in both versions o f the priming task. In addition, negative affective target 
stimuli would be categorized slower when they are preceded by CS++ faces than by C S - faces in both 
priming tasks.
Positive affective target stimuli should be categorized faster when they are preceded by CS++ 
faces than by CS-+ faces (conditioned with negative word and picture) in the verbal test. However, there 
should be no difference using any o f these primes in the pictorial test. In contrast, the opposite pattern of 
results should be found at negative target stimuli. Crucially, significant difference should appear between 
the results o f the pictorial and the verbal tests. By contrast, based on the associationist summary evaluation 
model, one would expect that attitudes towards CS-+ primes would reflect summary evaluation formed 
from the affectively ineongruent negative and positive information. The evaluation o f these faces therefore 
should be more negative than of CS++ faces. Hence, categorization should be somewhat faster when 
CS++ primes precede positive target stimuli and when CS-+ stimuli precede negative target stimuli in both 
version o f the priming task. Most importantly, there should be no difference between the results o f  the 
pictorial and the verbal test in this group
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the verbal associations, respectively. For instance, when the pictorial associations learnt 
about a face are positive, whereas the verbal associations are negative, one would expect 
more positive implicit attitudes in the pictorial task, but more negative in the verbal 
evaluative priming task. Crucially, we should be able to detect a significant implicit 
attitude difference towards these faces between the verbal and the pictorial versions of 
the priming task. If such modality-specific effect was not found, it would imply that 
either the test modality is not strong enough cue in the priming task or that implicit 
attitudes are not sensitive to such independent contextual manipulation. The following 
experiment tested these alternative inferences.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight students, including six male and forty-two female were recruited on the 
campus of the University of Surrey and took part in the experiment in exchange for £6  
or one course credit for their participation. Participants were aged between eighteen and 
twenty years of age (M = 19.2, SD = 0.86). Half o f the volunteers were randomly 
assigned into the basic conditioning group (M = 19.00, SD = 0.93) and the other half to 
the modality-speeifie group (M = 19.04, SD = 0.81). Both the basic conditioning group 
and the modality-speeifie group had three male and twenty-one female volunteers. 
Participants’ first language was English and they all had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. Informed consent was received from all participants.
Design
As the design of the present study is somewhat complex, there will be a 
relatively detailed discussion of it. Some parts of the present section are related to non­
design aspects of the study and will be explained in more detail later on.
The first task of the experiment is an evaluative conditioning task. During this 
task, participants learnt to associate several facial pictures (CSs) with either a positive or 
a negative word (e.g. stubborn) and a positive or a negative picture (e.g. a scene o f a
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robbery). This procedure provided four sets of faces associated with all the four possible 
combinations of evaluative information across modality (Picture, Word) and valence 
(Positive, Negative)^^.
The second task was the implicit attitude testing stage. A feature of the implicit 
attitude tasks in the current experiment that needs to be emphasized is that its design was 
largely influenced by the goal of this experiment of being a conceptual replication of the 
previous study. In Study 1, it was assumed that non-smokers had overwhelmingly 
negative associations related to smoking. It was further assumed that smokers’ verbal 
associations were possibly negative, but their non-verbal associations were considerably 
more positive. Furthermore, both groups’ implicit attitudes towards smoking were tested 
by comparing them to the presumably positive (or perhaps neutral) attitude object of 
non-smoking. Therefore, in the current study one participant group (i.e. the basic 
conditioning group) was examined to reproduce the implicit attitudes of non-smokers 
towards smoking and non-smoking, while another group (modality-specific group) to 
reproduce smokers’ implicit attitudes. Most importantly, two participant groups were 
created whose implicit attitudes would have been tested on different sets o f faces 
(CSs)^^. The particular CSs that were given in each group during the implicit attitude 
testing were determined by the aim of conceptually replicating the previous experiment 
and by the specific goal of the data collection in the group "^ .^ In one group (i.e. the basic 
conditioning group), the two sets of faces selected for the evaluative priming task were 
associated during conditioning with:
A. positive words and positive pictures (CS++)
B. negative words and negative pictures CCS—
(1) Faces associated with positive pictures and positive words, (2) faces associated with 
negative pictures and positive words, (3) faces associated with positive pictures and negative words, (4) 
faces associated with negative pictures and negative words.
The hypothesis on independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes towards smoking among 
smokers rested on the assumption that smokers had more positive non-verbal than verbal information 
associated with smoking. We further assumed that non-smokers’ verbal and non-verbal information 
associated with smoking was rather negative. This pattern was aimed to be replicated in this experiment.
It was also influenced by the aim of conceptually replicating the previous experiment.
CS++ faces were aimed at conceptually embodying the attitude object o f non-smoking, 
whereas the C S - faces the attitude object of smoking in the group of non-smokers o f the previous 
experiment.
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The purpose of the priming task in the basic conditioning group was to see if  the 
evaluative conditioning paradigm produced a significant affective priming effect in both 
the verbal and the pictorial priming tasks and that the effect size was similar in both 
versions of the priming task. This part of the experiment was aimed at replicating the 
conditioning effect found in earlier implicit attitudinal studies and examining whether 
the two versions of the implicit priming task produce comparable results. These attitudes 
could thus lead to a conventional basic conditioning effect or as often called congruence 
effect in the evaluative priming task.
By contrast, in the other group (i.e. modality-speeifie group) the CSs were 
associated with:
A. positive words and positive pictures (CS++)
B. negative words and positive pictures (CS-+)^^.
Data from the modality-speeifie group are aimed at testing whether the pictorial priming 
task preferentially activates pictorial associations, while the verbal task activates verbal 
associations. That is findings from this group were supposed to test the modality-speeifie 
hypothesis, outlined earlier. Therefore at least one of the selected CS face sets employed 
in the priming tasks as primes needed to have mixed conditioned associations in this 
group^^. An important consequence o f this design and replicating the presumed attitudes 
of the previous experiment is that not all CS sets of the evaluative conditioning stage 
were included for implicit attitude testing. The CS+- set was thought to replicate neither 
smokers’ nor non-smokers’ implicit attitudes towards smoking or non-smoking and 
therefore was omitted for later analysis.
As a result o f these design features, the study had a mixed design with four 
independent variables: participant group (basic conditioning or modality-specific), test- 
type (pictorial or verbal evaluative priming task), prime (CS++, CS--/CS-+), target 
(positive or negative). Participant group was the between-subject variable and its two 
levels were basic conditioning and modality-speeifie conditioning groups. In the basic
CS++ faces were aimed at conceptually embodying the attitude object o f non-smoking, 
whereas the CS-+ faces the attitude object o f smoking in the group of smokers of the previous experiment.
The second task was followed by a recognition task and explicit attitude assessment (see later). 
These tasks, however, were not central to the particular questions examined in this research project and 
thus are not discussed in the design section.
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conditioning group, it was tested if a eonventional evaluative eonditioning effeet was 
achieved. In the modality-specifie group, it was examined whether test-modality would 
lead to evaluations in line with same-modality assoeiations. Moreover, eaeh participant 
completed two evaluative priming tasks, one verbal and one pictorial, and the 
independent variable test-type referred to these two tests. Prime and target were new 
independent variables, whieh will be explained later on. The dependent variable was 
mean response lateney.
Materials
Evaluative Conditioning
Twelve facial photographs from the pieture set of the Productive Aging Laboratory 
(Minear & Park, 2004) served as eonditioned stimuli. The final set of these twelve CS 
photographs underwent a systematie selection procedure. These steps were made to 
ensure that the later implicit evaluation of the selected set of CS photographs would not 
be overshadowed by the attractiveness or by some irrelevant pereeptual features of the 
faees. First, twenty photographs were seleeted. These photographs featured young white 
males showing neutral faeial expression. The selected faces had no glasses, earrings, 
piercings or other distinetive feature. Moreover, the lower segment of the photographs 
was digitally cut off so that no parts of clothing remained visible. Furthermore, the 
eolour and size of the pietures was also modified. The original eolour pictures were 
digitally ehanged into blaek and white. In addition, the resolution of the images was 
reduced to 300x300 pixels. Then a pre-test was conducted with five partieipants, who 
evaluated these twenty faees on a feeling thermometer seale (Alwin, 1997). Partieipants 
indieated their general feelings toward the person displayed on a 9-point scale, ranging 
from very warm or favourable to very cold or unfavourable. Twelve o f these 
photographs were seleeted by their thermometer scores to the current experiment. The 
mean feeling thermometer of the selected photographs approximated most elosely the 
neutral point (5) that indieated no feeling at all response.
In addition to the CS photographs, twelve adjectives were seleeted from the 
eollection of Affective Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999) and
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these served as verbal uneonditioned stimuli (USs). Half of the US words had positive 
(US+) and half had negative (US-) affective valence (Table 10)^ .^ The words were 
matehed as elosely as it was possible on word frequency = 18.33, = 5.85;
Mus- ^  17-33, 5Dus- = 6.12)^^, as well as on word length (Mys+= 6.17, = 1.17;
Mus- ^  6.33, iS!Dus- ^  1-75). The sets of negative and positive words did not differ 
signifreantly on word frequeney, r(10) = 0.289, = .778, or on word length, /(ID) = -
0.194,^ = .850. The mean affective rating o f positive (Mu§+= 7.54, = 0.44) and
negative (Mug. = 6.33, SD^ _^ = 1.75) US words was, however, significantly different, 
/(lO) = 2 4 . 4 1 , <  .001, r = .99, indieating that US+ words were evaluated as more 
pleasant than US-words.
Table 10. Words used in the evaluative conditioning procedure
Positive Words brave, gentle, lively, loyal, romantie,
wealthy.
Negative Words eruel, depressed, lonely, rude, unhappy,
violent
The verbal US stimuli were presented in Arial Bold font style and in 36 font size.
A further set of USs was created by seleeting twelve pietures (Table 11) from the 
eolleetion of the International Affective Picture System (LAPS; Lang et al., 1995). Six of 
the pietures were positively valenced, while six were negatively valenced. The 
photographs were seleeted based on their published valenee and arousal ratings (Lang et 
al., 1995). The set of positive US photographs (Mu§+ = 7.61, 5!Dus+ = 1-40) differed 
signifreantly from the negative US photographs (Mug. = 2.01, = 1.31) in their
The main criterion for US words was to make it difficult for the participants to visualise these 
words, therefore abstract words should have been ideal for the purpose o f the study. However, abstract 
words are considerably more difficult to memorize than concrete words and pietures (Paivio, 1971), 
therefore a special subset, personal adjectives were chosen, which were hypothesised to be easily 
associated with faces (CSs) and thus easily memorised during the conditioning task. Poor performance on 
conditioning trials with words could have resulted in a picture superiority effect which may or may not 
have affected both implicit and explicit attitude results, by picture USs having stronger effect than verbal 
USs.
Based on Leech, Rayson, and Wilson (2001)
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mean valence, ^(10) = 24.040, < .001, r = .992, suggesting that the positive pictures
were deemed more pleasant than the negative pictures. The original lAPS pictures were 
reduced in size to 16 x 12 cm (width x height) and in resolution to 600 x 450 (width x 
height). All verbal and pictorial stimuli were presented in the centre of the screen, in 
front of light grey background.
Table 11. Pictures used in the evaluative conditioning procedure with their lAPS name and code
Positive Pictures Father (2057), Baby (2070), Mother 
(2311), Sailing (8080), Skydivers (8185), 
Rafting (8370)
Negative Pictures DrugAddict (2717), SadChild(2800), 
BatteredF em(3181), Mutilation (3225), 
Infant (3350), StarvingChild(9040)
Priming Tasks
In addition to the US words described above, further eight positive (target+) and 
eight negative (target-) affective verbal target stimuli, in this case nouns, were drawn 
from the ANEW set (Table 12). The target words were employed as target stimuli in the 
verbal version of the evaluative priming task. Similarly to the verbal US stimuli, the 
positive and negative target words were selected so that their word frequency (M^ arget+ ^  
21.25, = 9.41, = 22.25, 5D^ arget- ^  9.25), and word length rating (Marget+ ==
6 .88 , <SDtarget+ ^  1-64, Mjarget- = 6.63, 5D^ arget- ^1-92) would bc as close to each other as it 
was possible. Indeed, the two sub-sets of verbal targets differed on neither of these 
factors significantly (word frequeney: r(14) = -0.214, p  = .833, word length: /(14) = 
0.280,7? ^  .784). Conversely, the mean affective rating (Lang et al., 1995) of the positive 
(M =  8.13, SD = 0.34) and negative target stimuli {M = 1.90, SD = 0.28) differed 
strongly, /(14) = 39.99, p  < .001, r = 1.00. The verbal target stimuli were displayed in 
identical font style and size to the verbal US stimuli (Arial Bold, 36).
Table 12. Verbal stimuli used in tbe verbal evaluative priming task
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Positive Words delight, glory, joke, laughter, miracle,
promotion, rainbow, sunlight
Negative Words devil, disaster, grief, infection, misery,
nightmare, poverty, rage
Sixteen target photographs (Table 13) were selected again from the International 
Affective Picture System (Lang et ah, 1995) for the pictorial version of the evaluative 
priming task. The chosen eight positive target photographs (M = 7.66, SD = 0.33) had 
significantly higher mean affective rating than the eight negative photographs (M = 3.19, 
57)=0.32),r(14) = 27 .40 ,7?< .00I,r= .99 .
Table 13. Pictorial stimuli used in the verbal evaluative priming task with their lAPS name and 
code
Positive Words Kitten (1460), Rabbit (1610), Monkies 
(1811), Flowers (5200), Nature (5760), 
Sky (5982), Torte (7260), Desert (7580)
Negative Words Snake (1052), Spider (1220), AttaekDog 
(1525), Gun (6610), Garbage (9290), 
BumtBldg (9471), SickKitty (9561), Jet 
(9622)
The size and resolution of the pietures was decreased to 10.5 x 8.2 cm (width x height) 
and 400x310 (width X height), respectively.
Recognition task
Further eight words (Table 14) and eight pictures (Table 15) were sampled from the 
ANEW and LAPS affective stimulus collections, respectively, as decoy stimuli for the 
recognition task. The four positive (deeoy+) words (M = 7.62, SD = 0.51) had 
significantly higher mean affective rating than of the four negative (decoy-) words (M = 
2.35, SD = 0.87), /(6) = 10.49,77 < .001, r  = .97. The positive and negative decoy words 
were selected so that they would be as closely matched for word frequeney (M^ ecoy+ “
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24.25,5Ddecoy+ = 9.39, M^ ecoy. = 28.50, = 14.98) and word length %gcoy+ = 6.00,
5!Djjecoy+ = 2.16, J%ggqy_ = 6.00, 5DjggQy_ = 2.45) as it was possible. A t-test showed no 
significant difference between positive and negative words on word frequency and word 
length, t{l4) = -0.48,7? = 648, t(14) = 0 .00 , 7? ^  1-000, respectively.
Table 14. Decoy verbal stimuli used in the recognition task
Positive Words confident, tender, wise, proud
Negative Words terrible, nasty, dreadful, sad
The affective rating o f the positive (M= 7.32, SD = 0.62) and negative (M = 2.26, SD = 
0.26) decoy pictures was significantly different, t{6) = 15.038,7? < -001, r = .987.
Table 15. Decoy pictorial stimuli used in the recognition task with their JAPS name and code
Positive Words Woman (2030), Baby (2040), Astronaut
(5470), Watermelon (7325)
Negative Words Gun (2811), EyeDisease (3160), Suicide
(6570), Skinhead (9800)
In the recognition task, the size of the CSs was reduced to 7 x 7 cm to fit in a small 
image box. Similarly, all USs were presented in a 5.1 x 3.5 cm image box and so both 
pictorial and verbal USs were decreased considerably in size. Pictorial USs filled the 
area completely, while verbal USs were shoW  in the middle of this display area in Arial 
Bold 18 font.
Explicit attitude task
The presentation of the CSs was identical to that in the recognition task, but the CSs 
were presented on the left side of the screen.
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Hardware and software
In the priming task, participants categorized the target words and pictures by pushing 
either of two response buttons on two response boxes. These parallel port response 
boxes were custom-made following the procedure published by Voss, Leonhart, and 
Stahl (2007). Stimulus presentation and data recording in the conditioning and the 
priming tasks were controlled by E-Prime 1.2 (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuecolotto, 
2002) experimental software. The recognition task and the feeling thermometer task 
were run by MS Excel 2003 software. The experiment was conducted on a single IBM 
compatible PC.
Procedure
Partieipants were tested individually in the presence of the experimenter. Upon arrival 
participants were welcomed and seated in front of the experimental computer. The 
experiment was introduced as a category learning and categorization study. Participants 
were given a pair of noise-cancelling headphones and were asked to wear them during 
the experiment. Fuzzy noise (white-noise) was played through headphones throughout 
the study to reduce the effect of environmental noise. The study was composed o f four 
main parts: (1) evaluative eonditioning stage, (2) implicit attitude measurement, (3) 
recognition task, and finally (4) explicit attitude task.
Evaluative conditioning
12 CSs (facial photographs) were paired with 12 verbal USs and 12 pictorial USs in the 
acquisition phase. Eaeh CS was paired with one specific verbal US and one specific 
pictorial US. The USs paired with the CSs were randomized across participants. The 
following pairings were created:
- 3 CSs [CS-H-]: eaeh CS paired with one positive verbal and one positive pictorial US
- 3 CSs [CS+-]: each CS paired with one positive verbal and one negative pictorial US
- 3 CSs [CS-+]: each CS paired with one negative verbal and one positive pictorial US
- 3 CSs [CS—]: each CS paired with one negative verbal and one negative pictorial US
120
CSs were presented five times with a particular US and so the conditioning stage was 
constituted o f 120 trials. After the first 72 trials, participants were given a short break. 
On each trial, a CS was presented in the centre of the screen for 1000ms. It was followed 
by blank screen for 100ms and then by either a verbal or a pictorial US (see Figure 11 
and Figure 12, respectively) displayed in the position of the CS for 1000ms. Trials were 
separated by a 4000ms inter-trial interval, when the screen stayed blank. After the inter­
trial interval, the next trial was initiated automatically. ’
Conditioned
Stimulus
(CS)
Blank
Unconditioned
Stimulus
(US)
Intertrial Interval 
- Blank Screen
Figure 11. Sample evaluative conditioning trials with verbal US
CSs and USs were randomly seleeted across participants. No response was required 
from participants during the task. Participants were instructed to memorize which face 
was followed by which particular word and picture. They were told that they would need 
to complete a recognition task later on, and so that they had to try to remember the CS- 
US pairings to perform well on the recognition task.
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Conditioned
Stimulus
(CS)
Blank
Unconditioned
Stimulus
(US)
Intertrial interval 
- Blank Screen
Figure 12. Sample evaluative conditioning trials with pictorial US
Priming Tasks
Once the evaluative conditioning task was completed, the experiment continued with the 
evaluative priming tasks. Participants were told that the task was a category judgement 
task, during which positive (pleasant) and negative (unpleasant) pictures and words 
would appear on the screen and they had to categorize them as positive and negative by 
pushing either the left or the right response key. Participants were asked to use their left 
and right index finger, when using the response buttons. The affective categories 
associated with each response key appeared in the top left (left response key) and right 
(right response key) corners of the screen. In the pictorial version of the evaluative 
priming task, participants categorized a set o f positive and negative pictures, while in the 
verbal version the items to be sorted were positive and negative words. They were also 
told that just before the presentation of a word (verbal priming task) or a picture 
(pictorial priming task), they would see a face presented briefly. The instruction warned 
them that they should respond only to the affective itenis, but should not ignore the 
faces, as remembering the faces was essential to successfully complete the subsequent 
recognition task. The recognition task later on, however, contained no questions 
regarding the priming task. The instruction to remember the faces displayed during the
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priming tasks was given to participants to increase the chance that they processed the 
presented, but seemingly task-irrelevant faces. Similar instruction was given to 
participants in key published priming experiments that demonstrated successful 
evaluative priming effect by using facial pictorial primes (Fazio et al., 1986, 1995; 
Wittenbrink et al., 2001). During this stage o f the experiment, participants completed 
two versions of the evaluative priming task in succession: a pictorial and a verbal 
version. The completion order of the two versions was counterbalanced across 
participants.
In the priming task, CSs employed in the evaluative conditioning task served as 
primes. However, only a sub-set of faces were selected and used as primes. The selected 
CS faces were different in the basic conditioning group and in the modality-specific 
group. In the basic-conditioning group, six CSs were selected: three faces that had been 
conditioned with positive words and positive pictures (CS++) and three faces 
conditioned with negative words and pictures (CS—). In contrast, in the modality- 
specific group, one of the selected sets of three CS photographs was CS-+ faces (positive 
pictorial and negative verbal associations). The other selected CS set was the CS++ 
faces (Table 16), just like in the basic conditioning group.
Table 16. CS-US pairings in the modality-specific group
Modality-specific US
Word Picture
CSs CS++ Positive Positive
CS-+ Negative Positive
Trials began with the presentation of a CS face (prime) in the centre of the 
screen, followed by a positive or negative target stimulus (target). Participants sorted the 
target item into the positive or negative category by pressing the left or the right 
response key. The categories assigned to the response keys were shown in the left and 
right comer o f the screen, respectively. Participants had to sort the target item into its 
category as quickly as they could. A CS was displayed for 120ms and was followed by 
blank screen for 50ms. Therefore the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) was 170ms in 
the priming tasks. After the presentation of a blank screen, a target item appeared in the
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centre o f the screen and stayed there until a valid response (left or right response button 
click) was obtained. A new trial was automatically initiated after a correct response was 
given. Trials were separated by a 2000ms interval, during which the screen went blank 
again. It needs to be mentioned that the category reminders remained on the screen 
throughout the trials, even when otherwise the screen was blank. A CS face was shown 
sixteen times during each version of the priming task.
The pairings of the prime and target stimuli were formed in a way that a 
particular prime was paired with all eight negative and eight positive target stimuli in 
each version of the priming task. The pairings of CSs and target items were randomized 
across participants. In total, each version was composed of ninety-six trials. Each 
priming task was preceded by a sixteen-trial practice block, in which participants could 
familiarise themselves with the task. During the practice block, each CS face was 
presented once with a randomly selected target item. The practice trials were identical to 
the actual test block of ninety-six trials, with the exception that if participants made an 
error, an incorrect sign (red ‘x’) was displayed for 200ms in the place of the target item. 
The incorrect sign was not shown in test trials.
Recognition Task
In the recognition task, participants were asked to identify, which stimulus (picture or 
word) was paired in the evaluative conditioning task with the CS presented (see 
Appendix C and Appendix D). During the recognition task each CS face was displayed 
twice, once with pictorial and once with verbal unconditioned stimuli. Half o f the US 
pictures shown were decoy photographs. On each recognition trial the CS face was 
presented in the middle of the upper half of the screen. In the lower half, eight US 
stimuli were displayed. In pictorial recognition trials, the US stimuli were pictures, while 
in verbal recognition trials words served as US stimuli. The USs were shown in two 
rows of four. One of the eight US stimuli was paired with the CS presented during the 
evaluative conditioning stage, that is it was the correct US. Another stimulus was paired 
with a different CS during the EC stage, but had identical valence to that of the correct 
US. Two stimuli were also paired with different CSs, but they had opposite valence to
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the correct US. Two further stimuli were new items (decoy stimuli) and thus were never 
shown in the evaluative conditioning task, but had identical valence to the correct US. 
Another two decoy stimuli were presented, which had opposite valence to that of the 
correct US. Participants had to select one of the eight real and decoy US stimuli. On 
selection of a stimulus, a dark red frame appeared around the image box in which the 
stimulus was shown, indicating that the particular stimulus has been selected. By 
clicking on the next button they proceeded to the next trial. Only one stimulus could be 
selected, but one had to be chosen, otherwise a message appeared on the screen, asking 
the participant to select a US stimulus. Proceeding to the next trial was blocked unless a 
selection was made. The order of the CS presentation was fixed for all participants. Each 
CS was presented twice during the recognition task. First, participants had to recognize 
pictorial USs and then verbal USs. Thus the recognition task was composed of twenty- 
four trials. The trials were subject to no time limit.
Explicit Attitude Task
After the completion of the recognition task, the experiment continued with measuring 
participants’ attitudes toward CS faces with an explicit measure. A feeling thermometer 
scale served as explicit attitude measure (see Appendix E). Each CS face was evaluated 
on a seven-point feeling thermometer scale in separate trials. Participants indicated their 
general feelings towards the CS faces. The scale ranged from “very warm or favourable 
feeling” to “very cold or unfavourable feeling”. The middle point of the scale suggested 
“no feeling at all”. The presentation order of the CS photographs was fixed and followed 
the CS presentation order of the recognition task. In this task, again, evaluations were 
made under no time restriction.
Results
Before conducting the data analysis, trials with incorrect responses were removed from 
the dataset of the verbal and the pictorial priming tasks (5% of trials from each task). 
Moreover, trials in which participants’ response latency was extremely short or long 
were also removed. Trials with reaction times quicker than 200ms or slower than
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1500ms were excluded"^®. In total, 94% of the verbal version of the priming task trials 
and 95% of the pictorial version trials remained in the dataset for analysis.
Basic Evaluative Conditioning effect. In order to see if  the evaluative conditioning task 
resulted in attitude shift towards the CSs in line with the valence of the USs, the data of 
the basic conditioning group were analysed first. In the verbal version of the priming 
task, mean response latency was lower when CS++ primes preceded positive target 
stimuli compared to when the same target stimuli followed CS— primes (Table 17). With 
negative target trials, the opposite pattern emerged and so response latencies on trials 
with CS— primes and negative target words demonstrated faster categorization 
performance relative to trials when negative target words were preceded by CS++ 
primes.
Table 17. Mean response latencies in the verbal priming task
Prime Mean SD
Positive target
CS++ 567.62 90.22
CS-- 591.12 109.15
Negative target
CS++ 570.22 103.94
C S - 558.22 90.63
Note: For ease o f interpretation raw reaction times (ms) are reported, instead of log-transformed reaction 
times.
This observed priming results pattern is in line with the hypothesised evaluation shift 
occurring due to evaluative conditioning. For further analysis the raw mean reaction 
times of each combination of prime and target calculated for each participant were log- 
transformed to make these latencies meet the criteria of normality. The analysis of these 
log-transformed mean reaction times included two within-subject factors {Prime and 
Target) and a between-subject factor {Order) Analysis of Variance. The resulting 2 
{Prime) x 2 {Target) x 2 {Order) mixed-ANOVA revealed no main or interaction
This cutoff point was used in Pleyers et al’s (2007) study (Experiment 3). Reported cutoff point 
for fast responses tend to be between 100ms and 300ms, whereas for slow responses between 1000ms and 
3000ms in published evaluative priming studies.
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effects. The only effect that approached statistical significance in the model was the 
crucial Prime x Target interaction, F(l,22) = 4.14, p  = .054, r  = .40.
To see whether the affective congruence effect was obtained, first the mean 
response latency of congruent trials was calculated for each participant. The mean 
response latency on trials of CS++ primes followed by positive target words and trials of 
C S - primes followed by negative target items were calculated. A similar calculation 
was carried out to obtain mean incongruent latencies from trials with positive target 
words preceded by CS— primes and trials with CS++ primes followed by negative 
words. The mean congruent and incongruent trial latencies were then log-transformed to 
reduce the effect of extreme values and to make the variables normally distributed. 
These scores were tested in a repeated-measures ANOVA. The results showed that 
response latencies on congruent trials were significantly faster than on incongruent trials 
(Table 18), F(l,23) = 4.43, p  = .046, r = .40. The difference between congruent and 
incongruent mean reaction times"^^  (i.e. mean facilitation score; M =  17.75, SD = 42.60) 
was smaller, but still comparable to those reported in Pleyers et al. (2007) and De 
Houwer et al. (1998). However, the mean reaction times in the present experiment were 
in some cases also considerably lower relative to those in the above-mentioned studies.
Raw, untransformed response latencies.
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Table 18. Mean response latencies (ms), mean facilitation (ms), effects and effect sizes in the current 
and two previous studies (Pleyers et al., 2007; De Houwer et al., 1998)
Congruent 
trials 
M  SD
Incongruent 
trials 
M  SD Facilitation
(ms)
F  value Significance
level
Verbal 
priming task 562.92 86.06 580.67 702.04 17.75
7T(1,23) 
= 4.43 p  =.046
Pictorial 
priming task 548.49 8 ^ .0 0 558.01 88.54 9.52
7^1,23)
= 3.36 p  =.080
Pleyers et al. 
,(2007) 705.99 709.75 727.28 772.45 21.29
F(l,127) 
= 35.56 p  <.001
De Houwer 
et al., (1998)
- Exp. 1 643 702 665 702 22 f(l,2 9 )  = 9.85 JP < .0 0 1
- Exp. 3* 559 8 6 580 8 8 21 F(l,32) = 13.22 p  <.001
- Exp. 4 748 727 766 117 18 f(l,2 5 )  = 5.61 P  <05
Note: *SOA300
The results obtained from the pictorial version of the priming task showed a very 
similar pattern to the verbal version. Mean response latencies (Table 19) indicated that 
categorization on positive target trials was quicker when they were preceded by CS++ 
primes than when by CS— primes. When negative target pictures were categorized, 
responses were faster when the target items followed C S - primes than when they 
followed CS++primes.
128
Table 19. Mean response latencies in the pictorial priming task
Prime Mean 8D
Positive target
CS++ 549.51 86.65
C S - 560.16 98.35
Negative target
CS++
CS--
555.86
547.46
86.66
85.57
Note: For ease of interpretation raw reaction times (ms) are reported, instead of log-transformed reaction 
times.
Similarly to the data of the verbal priming task, the log-transformed mean response 
latencies of all combination of prime and target in the pictorial priming task underwent 
an ANOVA analysis. The model remained identical, so three factors were involved in 
the analysis: Prime, Target and Order. Again, all o f the factors had two levels and Order 
was the between-subject factor in the mixed-ANOVA model. No main effects were 
significant, but the crucial Prime x Target interaction effect was found to be marginally 
significant, F(l,22) = 2.96, p  = .099, r = .34. However, the Prime x O r& r interaction 
effect also proved to be significant, F{\,22) = 9.14, p  = .006, r = .54, indicating that a 
considerable reaction time difference was between trials when the verbal priming task 
was completed before the pictorial priming task and trials in the opposite task 
completion order (see Figure 13). In addition, this effect was considerably larger for 
CS++ primes than CS— primes.
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Order 1 OrderZ Order 1 Order2
Positive target Negative target
C S - Prime
Figure 13.Mean response latencies (ms) in the pictorial priming task
The analysis of the mean log-transformed congruent and incongruent trial 
response latencies revealed that reaction times on congruent trials were marginally 
significantly faster than on incongruent trials (Table 18), 7^(1,23) = 3.36, p  = .080, r = 
.36. Not only was the effect marginally significant, but also the mean facilitation score 
(M = 9.52, SD = 24.74) calculated from the mean response latencies on congruent and 
incongruent trials, was considerably smaller than in the verbal priming task and in the 
above-mentioned published experiments reporting successful conditioning.
Having analysed the effect of the evaluative conditioning paradigm on the 
reaction times in the two priming tasks, it was also relevant to investigate the 
relationship between the two implicit attitude measures in the verbal and the pictorial 
priming tasks. A Pearson correlation revealed no relationship between the facilitation 
score of the verbal and the pictorial priming task, r = .03, p  = .888 . The lack of 
correlation between the facilitation scores of the two versions is intriguing, since two 
versions of otherwise procedurally identical implicit attitude measures were completed 
by the same participants. Possibly, this may indicate the low reliability o f the priming 
task results, but this issue is difficult to firmly explain.
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Modality-specific effect, 'hi the verbal version of the affective priming task, positive 
target words had somewhat longer mean response latencies when they were preceded by 
CS++ than when they were preceded by CS-+ primes (Table 20). The negative target 
words were also categorized slower when they followed CS++ primes, relative to CS-+ 
primes.
Table 20. Mean response latencies in the verbal priming task
Prime Mean 87)
Positive target
CS++
CS-+
552.83
547.91
82.97
95.19
Negative target
CS++
CS-+
547.65
539.29
87.32
81.69
Furthermore, a 2 {Prime) x 2 {Target) x 2 {Order) mixed-ANOVA, again Order being 
the between-subject factor, was performed. The analysis revealed only a marginally 
significant three-way interaction effect between Prime, Target and Order, F{\,22) = 
2>.\2,p = .091, r  = .35. No main effect or two-way interaction effects were found to be 
significant. Behind the three-way Pr/we x Target x Order interaction lays a rather 
curious pattern of data (Table 21). This pattern shows that response latencies of various 
combinations of prime and target were fundamentally different depending on whether 
the verbal priming task was performed before or after the pictorial priming task. 
However, since the interaction effect was only marginally significant, these results 
should be interpreted with caution.
Table 21. Mean response latencies in the verbal priming task
Positive target CS++ Prime 
CS-+ Prime
Order 1 
Mean SD
561.43
538.36
76.27
88.98
Order 2
Mean SD
544.22
557.46
97.78
104.06
Negative target CS++Prime 546.34 99.07 548.96 78.27
CS-+Prime 544.77 87.64 533.82 78.80
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Furthermore for the modality-specific group a congruence score was calculated. Of 
course, congruent and incongruent trials do not exist in this group, given that one set of 
prime (CS-+) had been associated with mixed affective stimuli during the evaluative 
conditioning task. Hence, CS-+ primes can be considered as neither positive nor 
negative stimuli. However, if  any attitudinal effect was to be found, it should be 
manifested in a pattern of results resembling the above described congruence- 
incongruence effect. That is one set of target stimuli (either positive or negative) is 
categorized faster when it is preceded by one set of CSs than the other. For the other set 
of target stimuli responses should be faster on trials with the opposite set of CSs. Given 
that one set of CSs (CS++) was paired with only positive stimuli, the mixed conditioned 
set of CSs (CS-+) should produce very similar response latencies or should result in a 
pattern of results showing more negative attitude towards the CS-+ primes than towards 
CS-H- primes. This latter scenario should manifest in a congruence-incongruence effect. 
Therefore, the congruence-incongruence and congruence score terminology is kept for 
the further analysis of the modality-specific group results. When the data across priming 
completion order was collapsed, the calculated congruence-incongruence scores 
demonstrated no significant effect between congruent {M = 546.06, SD = 78.51) and 
incongruent trials (M = 547.78, SD = 87.47), 7(23) = -0.23, /? = .818. In fact, the mean 
facilitation score was close to zero (M = -1.72,8D = 36.12).
The mean response latencies in the pictorial priming task showed that responses 
were faster when positive target pictures were preceded by CS-H- primes than when 
CS--t- primes preceded them (Table 22). In addition, negative target pictures were also 
categorized quicker, followed by CS-H- primes, and slower when CS-+ primes preceded 
them.
Table 22. Mean response latencies in the pictorial priming task
Prime Mean 8D
Positive target
CS++
CS-+
524.50
531.94
77.64
79.25
Negative target
CS++
CS-+
520.76
526.91
85.57
68.45
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A mixed analysis of variance was performed to assess the effect o f primes on 
reaction times. Like with the verbal priming data above, the ANOVA had three factors: 
Prime, Target and Order. All these factors had two levels. Prime and Target were 
within-subject factors, while Order was the between-subject factor. The results, 
however, showed that neither the crucial Prime x Target two-way interaction effect nor 
any other effects were significant. Unlike the verbal priming, the Order had no impact 
on the results. In fact, the mean response latencies displayed a similar pattern across 
both groups of completion order of the pictorial priming task. The congruence score was 
calculated as above and showed no congruence-incongruence effect. Response latencies 
on congruent trials = 525.70, = 67.80) did not differ significantly from
those on incongruent trials (A/j^ cong ^  526.35, ^D^ c^ong 74.94), 7(23) = -0.11, p  = .913. 
Crucially for the hypothesis, the congruence score did not differ between the verbal and 
pictorial priming task, 7(23) = 0.10, /> = .921, in the modality-specific group. The 
facilitation score was small and similar to the verbal priming task facilitation score {M =  
-0.65, SD = 28.45). The correlation between the verbal and the pictorial priming task in 
the modality specific group was highly non-significant, r  = .02,/? = .941.
In sum, the results of this basic conditioning group revealed a small basic 
evaluative conditioning effect in both the verbal and pictorial version of the priming 
task. The effect however was very small and was only marginally significant in the 
priming version of the priming task. Crucially though, the findings from the modality- 
specific group revealed no modality-specific effect in the evaluative priming task.
Feeling Thermometer. The explicit attitude scores of the basic-conditioning group 
demonstrated that the evaluation of the CS-H- faces (A/cs++ = 6.07, SDq^ ++ -  1.33) 
reflected a positive attitude, since the score was significantly higher than the neutral 
value (5), 7(23) = 3 . 9 4 , =  .001, r = .63. In addition, the feeling thermometer scores of 
the CS— faces = 4.11, SDq _^_ = 1.37) showed negative attitude towards these
faces, for the difference between the mean score and the neutral value proved to be 
significant, 7(23) = -3.18,7? = -004, r  = .55 . Furthermore, the feeling thermometer score
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of the CS-H- faces and C S - faces differed significantly, 7(23) = 4.44,77 < .001, r  = .68 . 
Finally, the difference score between CS-H- and C S - faces did not correlate with either 
the verbal congruence score or the pictorial congruence score of the participants, = 
.01,77 = .976, r  = - .00,77 = .989, respectively.
The explicit attitude scores of the modality-specific group similarly to the basic 
conditioning group demonstrated positive attitudinal evaluation of the CS-H- faces, 
having significantly higher scores = 5.99, SDq +^+ = 1.33) than the neutral value,
7(23) =  3.63,77 = .001, r =  .60. By contrast, the evaluation of CS--f faces (M cs_+  =  4.92, 
SDcs.+ = 1.10) was not significantly different from the neutral value, 7(23) = -0.38, 
p  = .11. The difference between CS-H- and CS-4- feeling thermometer scores (M = 1.07, 
SD = 1.67) was found to be significant, 7(23) = 3.13, 77 = .005, r  = .55. Again, the 
correlations between this calculated difference score, the verbal congruence and pictorial 
congruence scores were not significant, r = -.21, 77 = .327, r = -.22, p  = .292, 
respectively.
Recognition Performance. The mean recognition accuracy was 80% {SD -  20.16) for 
verbal CS-US pairings. Moreover, 78% {SD = 24.11) o f the pictorial USs were 
recognized correctly with their corresponding CSs. Sixteen participants (33%) 
recognized each CS and verbal US correctly, while seventeen participants (35%) 
achieved a perfect recognition rate with pictorial USs. The recognition accuracy 
difference between the verbal and the pictorial USs was tested with Wilcoxon Signed 
Ranks Test, as the values were not normally distributed and therefore its parametric 
alternative could not be performed"^^. The recognition accuracy of the CS-verbal US and 
the CS-pictorial US pairs did not differ significantly, Z =  -.84,77 = .401. In fact, the two 
variables had a significant correlation, Tg = .67,77 < .001.
Furthermore, it was important to test the implicit and explicit attitude scores 
against the recognition accuracy, to find out if the higher recognition rate increased the
The mean recognition accuracy of CS-verbal US pairs was positively skewed beyond the range 
of 2.58 (Field, 2005). The histogram confirmed the positive skewness o f these data. Thus the 
recognition accuracy scores did not meet the criteria of normal distribution. Importantly, no conventional 
data transformation (e.g. log-transformation) could correct the problem.
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evaluative conditioning effect on these measures. Such finding would demonstrate that 
awareness of which CS had been paired with which US (i.e. contingency awareness) 
could influence the implicit attitudes created by the used evaluative conditioning 
paradigm. As the measures of the basic-conditioning group produced more defined 
attitude scores, this analysis was carried out only on the data of this group first.
The recognition rate of the verbal USs did not correlate with either the verbal or 
the pictorial facilitation score of the priming task, = -.06, p  = .796, r =  A5 , p  = .490,
respectively. Furthermore, the pictorial US recognition rate was not correlated with the 
facilitation score of the verbal priming task, = -.15, p  = .481, but had a marginally 
significant correlation with the facilitation score of the pictorial priming task, r = .35, 
p  = .094. The direction of the correlation suggests that the fewer CS - pictorial US pairs 
were recognized, the larger the congruence effect was in the pictorial priming task. 
Importantly, both the verbal US and the pictorial US recognition rate was significantly 
correlated with the score created from the feeling thermometer value difference between 
the CS++ and CS— faces for each participant, r = .56, p  = .002, r = .66 , p  < .001, 
respectively. These findings suggest that contingency awareness did not correlate with 
the implicit attitude scores, but did with the explicit attitude scores. When the data were 
reanalysed with including both groups’ data, most of the results were very similar. Thus 
the verbal US recognition rate correlated neither with the verbal nor with the pictorial 
facilitation score, = -.04, p  = .767, r^  = .15, p  = .288, respectively. However, in this 
entire sample analysis, no significant correlation was found between pictorial US 
recognition rate and verbal (r^ = -.02, p  = .919) or pictorial facilitation score (r  ^= -.16, 
p  = .280). This latter result was unlike the analysis with only the basic-conditioning 
group. Again, analysing the entire sample revealed a significant correlation between the 
verbal US recognition rate and the thermometer difference score, r^  = -.41, p  = .004. In 
addition, pictorial US recognition rate also correlated with the thermometer difference 
score, = .31,7? = .035.
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Discussion
The main findings of this second experiment suggested that the evaluative conditioning 
task was successful in the formation of attitudes, but the implicit attitudes created were 
not influenced by the modality of test. As shown earlier, only a few studies have 
demonstrated evaluative conditioning effects assessed by implicit attitude tests and our 
findings are further demonstration that such evaluative conditioning effects can be 
measured by implicit attitudinal tasks. This also means that the particular procedure was 
successful in gaining control over the learning process of evaluative information 
associated with the attitude object, and producing shifts in evaluation detectable with the 
used implicit attitude measure.
Nonetheless, in contrast to Study 1, the experirnent revealed no modality-specific 
effect. That is incongruently conditioned faces (i.e. CS-+) were evaluated similarly in 
the pictorial and the verbal version of the priming task. This finding is in considerable 
contrast to the modality-specific effect found in the previous experiment. The lack of 
modality-specific effect can be interpreted as that the test modality is not strong enough 
cue to elicit such independent contextual changes or that implicit attitudes are not 
sensitive to such cues. However, these negative findings should be treated with some 
caution.
A central issue with these negative findings is that the basic conditioning effect 
itself was rather small, especially in the pictorial version of the priming task. This is not 
unusual, as the evaluative priming tasks “ ...tend to produce relatively small effect sizes 
and are relatively low in reliability” (Wittenbrink, 2007, p.49).Yet, the fact that two 
separate versions of the same priming task in our study produced basic conditioning 
effects supports the idea that the measured basic conditioning effect was genuine. At the 
same time though, both versions revealed only very small effects, indicating that the 
attitudes created were rather weak. With weak basic conditioning effects, the modality- 
specific effect could have been difficult to detect. As a consequence, the null results 
could indicate either the lack of the effect or the lack of power to detect the effect.
Furthermore, the experiment evaluated the modality-specific effect only on one 
group of incongruently conditioned CSs, even though two incongruently conditioned CS
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groups could be used for this purpose. The modality-specific effect thus was not 
examined on all incongruently conditioned CSs. A further experiment is needed to 
address the weak basic conditioning effect and the issue of testing modality-specificity 
only on one CS group. However, before turning to the next study, it is worth briefly 
discussing the findings on the relationship between recognition rate and implicit 
attitudes.
In this study, the recognition rate was rather high, suggesting that our 
participants successfully learnt which face was followed by which picture and word in 
the conditioning task. Yet, despite the fact that they could recognize most of the CS-US 
pairs, the attitudinal effect remained weak. Our results therefore imply that implicit 
attitude formation in the particular evaluative conditioning procedure outlined above 
may require additional mental processes beyond merely associating an object with an 
affective stimulus in memory"^ .^ Arguably, however, the evaluative conditioning task 
combined with the evaluative priming paradigm was successful in eliciting and detecting 
attitudinal shift and so the procedure could be employed to form and detect implicit 
attitudinal changes in the next experiment. Nevertheless, to draw firm conclusion on the 
modality-sensitivity o f evaluative priming task results, the paradigm had to be altered in 
the following study.
This would imply that the basic conditioning effect was most likely the result o f belief 
formation-based prepositional learning (see Jones, Olson, & Fazio, 2010). However, prepositional 
learning is thought to be a function o f contingency awareness and the recognition score was not correlated 
with the pictorial and verbal facilitation scores of the present experiment.
137
Chapter 8
Experiment 3. Modality-specific effect in the evaiuative priming task. 
Altered design and stimuii
The contradictory results of the previous two studies call for further examination of the 
effect of modality-specific cues on implicit attitudes. The findings from the previous 
experiment offer two alternatives: (1) the lack of the modality-specific effect from the 
last study is rooted in a failure to detect an otherwise existing effect or (2 ) the modality 
o f test simply does not have any influence on implicit attitudes. Partly related to this 
issue, the experiment had two major limitations. First, the most critical issue with the 
findings is that the basic conditioning effect was relatively small. Even if  there was a 
modality-specific effect, it is likely to have remained hidden if  the general conditioning 
effect itself is too small. Second, the previous experiment did not examine all CS 
groups: CSs associated with negative pictures and positive words were not selected for 
implicit attitudinal testing. Naturally, it would be desirable to examine the modality- 
specificity of attitudes by testing all groups of CSs, including both ambivalent CS 
groups. Therefore, the present experiment was designed to address these issues by 
changing the experimental design and attempting to improve the power of the test to 
detect modality-specific effect.
Probably, the greatest change compared to the former experiment was the 
alteration of the study design to investigate all four CS groups (CS++, CS+-, CS-+, 
C S-). The previous study used two groups of participants, one of which served as a 
control group and the other as the experimental group. This design was identical to the 
earlier study. However, this meant that CSs conditioned with positive words and 
negative pictures were not selected for the implicit attitude measuring stage. This was 
largely because the previous experiment was aimed at following the design of Study 1, 
since it was intended to be a close conceptual replication of it. However, the present 
study does not need to follow the design of the first experiment closely. Moreover, the
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affective priming task is more flexible than the lAT and allows for investigating more 
than two sets of attitude objects within one block of trials (e.g. Wittenbrink et al., 2001). 
Consequently, the affective priming task renders it possible to investigate all 
combinations of valence (Positive, Negative) and modality (Picture, Word) in a within- 
participant design. Specifically, in the same block of trials, one can examine items 
conditioned with (1) positive words and positive pictures, (2 ) negative words and 
negative pictures, (3) negative words and positive pictures, and the previously untested 
combination of (4) positive words and negative pictures.
This design has some fiirther advantages. Using a within-participant design 
instead of the previous mixed-design to study basic conditioning and modality-specific 
effect allows for easier direct comparisons for the combinations studied and eliminates 
some of the noise caused. Furthermore, the within-participant design means that all of 
the participants provide data for the general conditioning effect (previously the control 
group) and the specific research question (previously the experimental group). This also 
provides the option to test the modality-specific effect on participants for whom the 
basic conditioning effect revealed successful conditioning. In addition, the examination 
of the modality-specific effect can be carried out by not only comparing an 
incongruently conditioned CS groups’ data (e.g. CS-+) across versions of the priming 
task (pictorial, verbal), but also the two incongruently conditioned CS groups’ data 
(CS-+, CS+-) within each priming task version (e.g. verbal priming task).
Additional change in the design was prompted by further considerations o f the 
priming task. An important feature in successful demonstrations of implicit attitudinal 
effects in evaluative priming tasks is the setting of the SOA, which has a large impact on 
how implicit or explicit the priming task is. The SOA in the previous experiment was set 
to 170ms, following Pleyers et al’s (2007) study. In Experiment 3, they showed a 
successful demonstration of conditioning effect in an evaluative priming task with such 
short SOA, which setting is also in line with what is currently considered best practice 
(Wittenbrink, 2007). However, the CSs in Pleyers and his colleagues’ experiment were 
not faces like in ours and a number of previous evaluative priming studies (e.g. Fazio et 
al., 1995; Wittenbrink et al., 2001) found implicit attitudinal effects with facial stimuli at 
longer SOAs. In addition, setting the SOA to a longer interval shifts the task towards
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more explicit, deliberate processing. Therefore, an additional use of longer SOA could 
potentially be to test modality-specificity in a more explicit version of the priming task, 
assuming that a basic conditioning effect is found at a shorter and a longer SOA. To see 
the effect of the SOA setting one participant group completed the pictorial and verbal 
evaluative priming task with the short SOA (170ms) setting of the former study and 
another group with a longer SOA (450ms).
Another important modification compared to the previous study was related to 
attempting to increase the effect o f conditioning stimuli on the attitude object to achieve 
greater implicit attitudinal shift. Increase in the effect size should improve the statistical 
power in the experiment and so make it more likely to be able to detect implicit attitude 
shifts in general, but also modality-specific attitude changes. Therefore, in the present 
experiment, the pictorial US set of the previous experiment was replaced with a set of 
more extremely valenced stimuli. These changes to the pictorial USs should mean that 
the stronger stimuli elicit larger changes in implicit attitudes towards the CSs than the 
previously used US set. In contrast, the standardized set of verbal stimuli is very limited, 
therefore replacing the existing verbal US set with stronger affective words was not 
feasible. However, altering the pictorial USs, while leaving the verbal US set 
unchanged, has one key drawback. It means that the impact of the pictorial USs could be 
greater - or at least different - on the CSs, than in the earlier experiments. Furthermore, 
in the previous study, the verbal USs seemed to have an impact comparable to the 
pictorial USs and the modifications on the pictorial USs may shift the balance towards 
the pictorial USs. However, the design changes made should make it possible to detect if 
the pictorial - or verbal - US set gets too much weight in the conditioning effect.
Another way to obtain more robust conditioning effects was by trying to 
eliminate further the influence of irrelevant factors in the evaluative conditioning task. 
The most straightforward way would be minimizing the variability of evaluations on the 
CS stimuli (i.e. faces). Note that implicit attitude toward a given set of faces is supposed 
to be a function o f the USs, but probably also of the attractiveness of the facial stimuli 
themselves. Yet, improvements on the CS set was difficult to make, because the facial 
photos were chosen carefully so that their attractiveness and other characteristics would
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have as little impact on implicit attitudes as it was possible"^ "^ . Nevertheless, reducing the 
number of CSs to two in each CS group (CS++, CS+-, etc.) could give room for limiting 
the entire CS stimulus set to eight faces, instead o f twelve in the previous study. By this, 
the eight photos with ratings closest to neutral attractiveness were selected. Thus this 
modification may enable the attractiveness of the faces to have less influence on implicit 
attitudinal results in the present experiment. Limiting the CS set naturally also meant 
that a smaller pictorial and verbal US set was needed, giving some opportunity to select 
US stimuli with close mean valence ratings to each other"^ .^
These changes had a necessary impact on the number of trials in the evaluative 
priming task. Testing more groups of CSs (i.e. all four CS sets), but employing fewer CS 
faces per CS group inevitably altered the number of trials in the experiment. Therefore, 
the total number of priming trials decreased considerably, from ninety-six in the former 
study to sixty-four.
The above alterations were made to improve the impact of conditioning and to 
examine all CS groups in the priming task. The alterations made were expected to result 
in a stronger basic conditioning effect and thus a better opportunity to detect the 
modality-specific effect. If  a basic conditioning effect emerges, a pattern of mean 
response latencies should be found similar to the pattern in the previous experiment. 
Faces conditioned with negative pictures and negative words are expected to show 
negative attitudinal results. By contrast, positive attitudes are expected with CSs 
conditioned with positive pictures and positive words"^ .^ Furthermore, since previous 
experiments found implicit attitudes at short and long SOA, we would expect that this 
basic conditioning effect would be found at both SOAs.
In addition, if test-modality had a significant impact on the implicit attitude 
results, one should expect -  just like in the previous experiment -  that when the learnt 
pictorial and verbal associations have opposite valence, the pictorial attitude test results
The attractiveness, familiarity and typicality ratings were obtained from a pre-test. The pre-test 
was conducted with five participants prior to Study Two. The participants o f the pre-test were recruited at 
the Department of Psychology
The mean valence and standard deviation of US stimuli was available with the I APS picture 
collection (Lang et ah, 1997) and ANEW word collection (Bradley & Lang, 1999)
Specifically, positive affective target stimuli should be assigned into their correct category , 
faster when they are preceded by CS++ primes then by C S - prime in the pictorial, as well as, in the verbal 
priming task. The opposite pattern is expected for negative affective target stimuli in both tests.
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would reflect preferentially on the pictorial associations, whereas the verbal test results 
on verbal associations'^ '^^^. One should also expeet that this effeet would be found at 
short, but also at long SOA. If test-modality had no influenee on implieit attitudes, such 
evaluation differenee would not be found. The following experiment was condueted to 
test these modality-specific hypotheses.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight undergraduate students (5 male, 43 female) of the University of Surrey 
participated in the experiment and received one eourse eredit as eompensation. 
Participants were selected randomly into two groups: short SOA and long SOA group. 
The twenty-four participants (3 male, 21 female) of the short SOA group ranged 
between eighteen and thirty-five years of age (M = 20.11, 5!D = 4.16). Participants’ age 
range in the long SOA group was between eighteen and twenty-two (M = 18.90, SD = 
2.26). Partieipants were all native English speakers and had normal or corrected-to- 
normal vision. All partieipants gave informed eonsent.
Design
The eonditioning task -  similar to the previous experiment -  is intended to produce four 
sets of CSs (CS++, CS+-, CS-+, CS--). However, unlike Study Two, all CSs would be 
included in the subsequent implieit attitudinal testing. That is participants complete a 
pictorial and a verbal version of the priming task and all of the four CSs are tested in 
both versions. As a consequenee, the new experiment had a mixed-design with two 
within-subjeet variables: prime (CS++, CS+-, CS-+ and CS—) and target (positive and
If the test modality had any impact on evaluations, then positive affective words should be 
categorized faster when they are preceded by CS+- faces then when they follow CS-+ faces in the verbal 
evaluative priming task. In contrast, negative words should be assigned to the negative category faster 
when it is preceded by CS-+ faces and slower when by CS+- faces. The pattern of results in the pictorial 
test should be the opposite o f the verbal evaluative priming task. Importantly, there should be a significant 
difference between the facilitation scores o f the pictorial and the verbal task, considering the CS+- and 
CS-+ faces.
Please note that this means, unlike the previous experiment, the modality-specific effect can be 
tested by not only comparing results from two different versions o f the priming task about the same 
attitude object. The effect can be also tested within each version of the priming task, by comparing the 
results of two sets of mixed-conditioned attitude objects. This is because in this experiment both mixed- 
conditioned sets o f CSs are included for attitude testing.
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negative). The between-subject factor was SOA (short or long). The dependent variable 
in the experiment was mean response latency.
Materials
Evaluative conditioning
One of the procedural modifications in this experiment was that only eight facial CS 
photographs were sampled, instead of the twelve used in the previous study. The eight 
CS photographs were again selected from the facial photo collection of the Productive 
Aging Laboratory (Minear & Park, 2004) and in fact were a sub-set o f the twelve CSs 
employed in the former of experiment. The CS faces were young white male faces with 
neutral facial expression. They were selected based on their attractiveness rating being 
nearest to the neutral point in a previous pre-test with different participants. The CS 
photographs were again digitally transformed into black-and-white photographs and the 
size of the photographs was set to 10.5 x 11 cm (width x height) with resolution of 300 x 
300 pixels.
In the conditioning phase four positive and four negative words were used as verbal USs 
(Table 2 3 ) .  The verbal USs were displayed in black lowercase letters in Arial Bold font 
with font size of 3 6 .  These words were personal adjectives drawn from the Affective 
Norms for English Words (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1 9 9 9 ) .  The positive and negative 
verbal sets were closely matched for word length ( M p o s  = 6 . 4 7 ,  * S Z ) p o s  =  1 . 3 2 ,  M n e g  =  7 . 0 1 ,  
S D n e g  =  1 . 5 6 )  and word frequency ( M p o s  =  1 9 . 4 7 ,  5 D p o s  =  7.14, Mieg =  1 9 . 0 3 ,  &Dneg = 
6 . 3 8 ) .  The two sets of verbal stimuli did not differ on these two factors, t{6) = - . 4 8 , / ?  = 
. 6 4 8 ,  and / ( 6 )  = 0 . 7 0 ,  p  = . 9 2 0 ,  respectively. However, the evaluative rating of the 
positive words ( M p o s  = 7 . 7 2 ,  5 Z ) p o s  = 0A3) was significantly different from those o f the 
negative words (M»gg = 1 . 9 2 ,  SDneg = 0 . 3 0 ) ,  t{6) = 2 2 . 1 1 ,  p <  . 0 0 1 ,  r = . 9 9 .
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Table 23. Words used in the evaluative conditioning procedure
Positive Words loyal, romantic, gentle, wealthy
Negative Words cruel, depressed, violent, unhappy
In addition to the verbal USs, four positive and four negative colour pictures served as 
pictorial USs (Table 24). The pictures have been chosen from the TAPS (Lang et al., 
1995) standardized affective picture collection. The pictures were displayed in 19.5 x 25 
cm (width x height), while the resolution was 1024x768. The positive and negative 
pictures were closely matched on average affective categorization response latency ( M p o s  
= 725.11, SDpos =129.13, M n e g  = 725.31, SDneg  = 198.04) based on a pre-test with eleven 
participants, who did not take part in the actual experiment. A t-test showed no 
significant difference between the mean latency of the participants in categorizing the 
positive and negative items, t(6) = -.23, p  = .828. In contrast, the average affective LAPS 
rating of positive ( M p o s  = 8.03, SDpos =.027) and negative ( M n e g  = 1.73, SDnog = 0.12) 
pictorial USs was significantly different, t{6) = 42.68, /? < .001, r  =1.00.
Table 24. Pictures used in the evaluative conditioning procedure with their lAPS name and code
Positive Pictures Baby (2070), Beach (5833), Skier (8190),
Seagulls (5831)
Negative Pictures StarvingChild (9040), BumVictim (3100),
DeadMan (9433), Mutilation (3225)
Priming Tasks
In the verbal version of the priming task further eight positive and eight negative 
nouns served as target stimuli (Table 25), sampled from the ANEW (Bradley & Lang, 
1999) affective word list. The font style and size of the target words were identical to 
that of the US words. Again the verbal stimulus sets were selected by matching word 
length ( M p o s  = 6.63, S D p o s  = 1.77, M n e g  = 6.88, S D n e g  =1.81) and word frequency ( M p o s  =  
19.50, S D p o s  = 6.66, M n e g  = 19.88, S D n e g  = 9.17), as much as it was possible. The positive
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and negative verbal target sets differed significantly neither on these two factors, /(14) = 
-0.28,/? = .784, r(14) = 0.09,/? = .927, respectively. The affective rating (ANEW) of the 
positive words ( M p o s  = 8.08, S D p o s  = 0.40), however, was significantly higher then of the 
negative words ( M n e g  = 1.86, SDneg = 0.27), = 34.56,/? < .001, r = .99.
Table 25. Target words in the verbal priming task
Positive Target miracle, glory, affection, luxury, joke, humour, delight.
Words promotion
Negative Target misery, grief, nightmare, despair, rage, disaster, poverty, infection
Words ________ __________ _________________________________ _______________ _
In the pictorial version of the priming task, eight colour photographs (Table 26) selected 
from the LAPS (Lang et al., 1995) affective picture collection were employed as target 
stimuli. None of the target pictures were used as US picture during conditioning. The 
size and resolution of the target pictures were identical to those of the US pictures. The 
positive and negative target pictures were aimed to be matched on average affective 
categorization response latency, which data were received from the above mentioned 
pre-test. The mean latency of the positive pictures ( M p o s  = 846.41, SDpos =187.38) was 
somewhat higher than of the negative pictures, ( M n e g  = 792.40, 5 D n e g  = 121.63). A t-test, 
however, revealed that the difference between the two sets was not significant, 
r(14) = 1.04,/? = .318. Importantly, the LAPS affective rating of the positive ( M p o s  = 7.83, 
SDpos = 0.04) pictures was significantly higher than of the negative ( M n e g  = 2.58, 
» S D n e g =  0.28) pictures,/(14) = 31.23,/? < .001, r  = .99.
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Table 26. Target pictures in the pictorial priming task with their lAPS name and code
Positive Target Kitten (1460), Mountains (5600), Monkies (1811), Fireworks
Pirtwreq (^480), Turkey (7230), Puppies (1710), Bunnies (1750),
IceCream(7330)
Negative Target DucklnOil (9560), RoachOnPizza (7380), Garbage (9340),
Pictures Cigarettes (9830), Ship (9600), Garbage (9290), Bomb (9630),
Smoke (9280)
Recognition Task
Beside the actual CS photographs and US stimuli, four decoy photographs and words 
were displayed during the recognition task (Table 27). The four decoy words were 
sampled again from the ANEW (Bradley & Lang, 1999) verbal stimulus collection, 
while the pictures were selected from the LAPS (Lang et al., 1995) affective picture set. 
The word length and frequency of the positive ( M p o s  = 6.00, SDpos = 2.16, M p o s  = 24.25, 
S D p o s  =9.39, respectively), and negative decoy words ( M n e g  = 6.00, SDneg = 2.45, 
M n e g  = 28.50, S D n e g  = 14.98, respectively) were matched closely and did not differ 
significantly ( t{6) = 0.00,/? = 1.000, t{6) = -0.48, /? = .648, respectively). The positive 
decoy words, however, had significantly higher average affective rating then o f the 
negative decoy words ( M p o s  = 7.62, SDpos = 0.51, M n e g  = 2.35, SDneg = 0.87), 
r(6) = 10.49,/? < .001, r  = .97.
Table 27. Decoy words in the recognition task
Positive Decoy confident, tender, wise, proud 
Words
Negative Decoy terrible, nasty, dreadful, sad 
Words______________________________________________
The four positive decoy pictures (Table 28) also had a considerably higher LAPS 
affective rating ( M p o s  = 7.32, SDpos = 0.62) than of the four negative pictures
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( M n e g  =  2 . 2 6 ,  SDneg  =  0 . 2 6 ) ,  which difference was statistically significant, t{6) = 1 5 . 0 4 ,  
p  < . 0 0 1 ,  r = . 9 9 .
Table 28. Decoy pictures in the recognition task with their lAPS name and code
Positive Decoy 
Pictures
Negative Decoy 
Pictures
Woman ( 2 0 3 0 ) ,  Baby ( 2 0 4 0 ) ,  Astronaut ( 5 4 7 0 ) ,  Watermelon 
( 7 3 2 5 )
Gun ( 2 8 1 1 ) ,  ByeDisease ( 3 1 6 0 ) ,  Suicide ( 6 5 7 0 ) ,  Skinhead 
( 9 8 0 0 )
The CS photographs were presented on the screen in a 7 . 7  x 8 cm (width x height) 
rectangle. The US and decoy words were displayed in a 5 . 6  x 4 . 4  cm (width x height) 
rectangle, so the font size of these verbal stimuli was approximately 16. The US pictures 
and the decoy pictures were presented in identical rectangles.
Explicit Attitude Task
The explicit attitude task was identical to that of the previous experiment, except the 
limited set o f CSs used in the current experiment and therefore in the explicit attitude 
measurement.
■ : )
Hardware and software
The experiment was conducted in a laboratory with three identical booths, IBM- 
compatible computers and CRT monitors. The experiment was conducted in groups of 
one to three volunteers. Participants wore noise cancelling ear muffs. Other procedural 
details were identical to those of the previous study.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted in a computer lab accommodating three computer 
stations in experimental booths. When participants arrived, they were seated in one o f 
the experimental booths and were asked to read the information sheet and the consent 
form. The experiment was again introduced as a categorization task, during which they
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learnt to associate faces with words and pictures, then categorized words and pictures 
under time constraints, finally performed a recognition task. The information sheet 
explained that some of the pictures showed scenes that could be upsetting to look at. 
Afterwards, they were given the opportunity to ask any question from the experimenter. 
The experimenter warned them again to the graphic nature of some of the experimental 
photographs. Similarly to the previous experiment, the study had four main stages: (1) 
evaluative conditioning stage, (2) implicit attitude measurement, (3) a recognition task 
and finally (4) explicit attitude measurement.
Evaluative Conditioning
The key difference to the previous evaluative conditioning experiment was in the 
number of CSs and USs employed. As mentioned above, this time only eight CSs, verbal 
USs and pictorial USs have been used. Each CS has been paired with one particular 
verbal US and one particular pictorial US. Two CSs were in each conditioning class:
- 2 CSs [CS++] -  paired each with one positive verbal and one positive pictorial US
- 2 CSs [CS+-] -  paired each with one positive verbal and one negative pictorial US
- 2 CSs [CS-+] -  paired each with one negative verbal and one positive pictorial US
- 2 CSs [CS—] -  paired each with one negative verbal and one negative pictorial US 
The stimuli for the CS-US pairs have been selected randomly and no US has been used 
with more than one CS. Since the number of CSs-USs has been reduced, thus the 
number of conditioning trials decreased to eighty. No other procedural alterations were 
made in this phase.
Priming Tasks
Each participant completed a verbal and a pictorial version of the affective priming task. 
The order of the tasks was counterbalanced across participants. A crucial difference to 
the previous study was the use of all CSs with all participants in the priming task. That is 
four sets of CSs (four groups of attitude objects) served as primes and displayed for each 
of the participants. In the previous experiment, one group of participants received only 
two sets of CSs (two sets of attitude objects). In the current experiment all four CSs were
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included and therefore the response latencies of all combination CSs-USs could be 
compared.
Pictorial Version. Participants had to categorize the colour target pictures as 
quickly as they could as positive or negative by pressing the left response key or the 
right response key. Category reminders were shown during the task in the left and right 
upper comer of the computer screen, showing the categories assigned to each response 
key, respectively. The categories assigned to the two response keys were randomized 
across participants. Each CS was paired with four positive and four negative target 
pictures during the task. The other four positive and negative target pictures were paired 
with the other CS from the identical class (CS++, CS+-, etc.) o f conditioning. This 
resulted in 64 trials. The CS-target stimulus pairings were randomized across 
participants. The actual priming task was preceded by sixteen practice trials. Each trial 
started with the presentation of a CS photograph. In the short SOA group a CS was 
presented for 120ms, identically to the previous experiment. In contrast, the CSs were 
displayed for 315ms in the long SOA group. The CSs were followed by a blank screen 
shown for 50ms (short SOA group) or 135ms (long SOA group). This gave a stimulus 
onset asynchrony of 170ms in the short SOA group and 450ms in the long SOA group. 
This particular SOA was chosen following Fazio et al’s (1995) evaluative priming study, 
which examined racial attitudes with pictures of Black and White American males. In 
any other respect, the procedural details of the pictorial priming task were identical to 
the same task in the previous experiment.
Verbal Version. The task was almost identical to the pictorial version of the 
priming task, but the target stimuli were eight positive words and eight negative words. 
Again, a CS face was followed by one of four positive or four negative words, while the 
other CS from the same class of conditioning was paired with the four remaining 
positive or negative words.
Recognition Task
The recognition task was identical to the recognition task in the previous experiment, 
only with fewer CS stimuli presented.
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Explicit Attitude Task ,
Again, the feeling thermometer task was the same as the one in the previous experiment, 
only it was conducted with eight CS faces in succession.
Results
Priming Tasks. Trials when participants made an error, were excluded from further 
analysis. In the short SOA group, the percentage of error trials amounted to 6% of the 
verbal version and 6% of the pictorial version priming task trials. Participants in the long 
SOA group made 6% error in the verbal and 5% in the pictorial priming task. In 
addition, trials with shorter than 200ms and longer than 1500ms response latencies were 
excluded. Only very few trials (<1%) needed to be excluded because o f extremely fast 
(<200) reaction times in the short SOA group and in the long SOA group. The 
percentage of responses that exceeded the 1500ms threshold was similarly small (<1%) 
in both groups. The analysis was conducted on the remaining trials (pictorial version 
SOA170- 93%, verbal version s o a iv o ’ 93%; pictorial version s o a 450* 95%, verbal version 
SOA450- 94%).
SOA170. Main Evaluative Conditioning Effect. Before testing the modality-specific 
effect, it was crucial to see if  the conditioning paradigm was successful and both 
versions of the affective priming paradigm produced a basic conditioning effect. As to 
the verbal version of the priming task, the data showed faster responses on trials when 
positive target stimuli were preceded by CS++ primes than by CS— trials (Table 29). 
Furthermore, the affective categorization of negative target words was quicker when 
they followed a CS— prime than when the prime was CS++.
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Table 29. Mean response latencies in the verbal priming task obtained from the SOA170 group
Prime Mean SD
Positive target
CS++
CS--
533.99
558.40
112.05
94.03
Negative target
CS++
cs-
535.19 
, 525.91
90.55
79.38
To see whether the conditioning paradigm produced the expected conditioning 
effect a test of analysis of variance was performed, which included congruently 
conditioned faces (CS++, C S-) only. The analysis was conducted on mean response 
latencies after reciprocal transformation, to make the data normally distributed. The 
three-way 2 {Prime: CS++, CS—) x 2 {Target: positive, negative) x 2 {Order) mixed- 
ANOVA with the repeated measures of Prime and Target, revealed no significant main 
effects. The crucial Prime x Target interaction effect was marginally significant, F(l,22) 
= 2.98,/? = .098, r  = .35.
Table 30. Mean response latencies in congruent and incongruent trials in the verbal and pictorial 
priming tasks obtained from the SOA170 group
Mean SD
Verbal priming task Congruent trials Incongruent trials
529.95
546.80
P/.52 
8/. 67
Pictorial priming task Congruent trials Incongruent trials
531.69
525.88
P5.46
86.49.
This interaction effect indicated that reaction times on affectively congruent 
(CS++/Target+, CS-/Target-) trials were marginally faster than on incongruent 
(CS++/Target-, CS—/Target+) trials (Table 30). A repeated-measure ANOVA was 
performed on the log-transformed mean latencies of congruent and incongruent trials, 
and revealed significant difference between them, F(l,23) = 5.09,/? = .034, r = .43. To 
obtain a facilitation score, mean congruent latencies were subtracted from mean 
incongruent latencies for both positive and negative target trials. These subtracted means
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were then summed and divided by two. This facilitation score indicated a rather 
moderate conditioning effect (M = 16.85, SD = 39.97). More specifically, the facilitation 
scores’ difference from zero was just about reaching significance, r(23)=2.07, /?=.050, r  
= .40.
In the pictorial priming task, categorization response latencies were not in line 
with the hypothesised pattern. For positive target stimuli, trials with CS++ primes had 
similar response latencies to C S - trials, while for negative target stimuli, CS++ trial 
mean response latencies were considerably lower than for CS— trials (Table 31).
Table 31. Mean response latencies in the pictorial priming task obtained from the SOA170 group
- Prime Mean SD
Positive target
CS++ 
C S -
530.29
533.75
106.68
108.77
Negative target
CS++
CS--
518.01
533.10
78.21
94.04
To evaluate the above results further, four mean latencies were created for each 
participant. The four means were calculated from response latencies on trials with the 
four combinations of primes (CS++, CS—) and targets (positive, negative). The mean 
latencies then underwent a reciprocal transformation. In this case, only reciprocal 
transformation succeeded to bring these mean latencies within the standards of normal 
distribution. A three-way 2 {Prime) x 2 {Target) x 2 {Order) mixed-ANOVA, with 
Order being the between-subject factor, showed no significant main effects or 
interaction effects, including the key Prime x Target interaction effect, F{\, 23) = 0.37, 
/? = .551.
Moreover, the log-transformed mean congruent (CS++/Target+, CS-/Target-) 
and incongruent response latencies"^  ^ (CS++/Target-, CS-/Target+) did not differ 
significantly, F (l, 23) = 0.42,/? = .523. These results indicate that the pictorial version 
of the priming task did not detect any attitude shift. The calculated facilitation score
These response latencies were log-transformed to be normally distributed.
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(M = -5.81, SD = 35.95) was not comparable to the facilitation score in the verbal 
version of the priming task.
SOA450. The raw mean latencies o f the verbal priming task trials with CS++ and C S - 
primes did not show the hypothesised pattern which is often observed with positive and 
negative attitude objects in evaluative priming tasks. For positive target words, CS++ 
primes did not facilitate categorization compared to C S - primes (Table 32). By contrast, 
response latencies were faster when negative target words were preceded by affectively 
congruent primes, that is by C S - primes relative to CS++ primes.
Table 32. Mean response latencies in the verbal priming task obtained from the SOA450 group
Prime Mean SD
Positive target
CS++ 534.31 60.85
c s - 533.47 75.91
Negative target
CS++ 573.42 84.53
c s - 560.20 78.26
To further examine the response latencies, the log-transformed mean latencies of the 
four combinations of primes and targets were included in a mixed-ANOVA together 
with the completion order of the priming tasks as the between-subject variable. The 
2 (Prime) x 2 (Target) x 2 (Order) ANOVA results showed a main effect for Target, 
F (l, 22) = 7.06,/? = .014, r = .49, indicating that positive target words were categorized 
faster than negative target words. Crucially, the Prime n  Target two-way interaction 
effect did not reach significance, F (\, 22) = 0.30, /? = .588. In fact, no other main or 
interaction effect emerged. _
For further analysis, the raw individual mean latencies (Table 33) on congruent 
trials (CS++/Positive, CS-/Negative) and on incongruent trials (CS—/Positive, 
CS++/Negative) were log-transformed. The 2 (Congruence) x 2 (Order) mixed-ANOVA 
showed no significant difference between congruent trial latencies and incongruent trial 
latencies, F(l,23) = 0.35, /? = .561. The two way interaction effect of Congruence x 
Order was also not significant, F(l,23) = 0.26,/? = .616.
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Table 33. Mean response latencies in congruent and incongruent trials in the verbal and pictorial
priming tasks obtained from the SOA450 group
Mean SD
Verbal priming task Congruent trials Incongruent trials
547.26
553.45
60.99
70.50
Pictorial priming task Congruent trials Incongruent trials
537.31
547.59
69.55
79.62
When the mean congruent latencies were subtracted from mean incongruent latencies, 
the resultant facilitation score (M = 6.19, SD = 45.73J demonstrated an effect 
considerably smaller than in the short SOA group.
In the pictorial priming task, categorization of positive pictures was faster with 
CS++ primes preceding the target than with CS—primes (Table 34). However, CS— 
primes failed to facilitate categorization of negative target pictures compared to CS++ 
primes.
Table 34. Mean response latencies in the verbal priming task obtained from the SOA450 group
Prime Mean SD
Positive target
CS++ 536.03 67.24
cs- 558.54 99.59
Negative target
CS++ 536.65 70.78
C S - 538.60 92.22
To perform a Prime x Target x Order three factor mixed-ANOVA, the mean latencies of 
each participant’s responses were calculated for each combination of CS++/CS— prime 
and positive/negative target. These mean latencies underwent a reciprocal 
transformation. This time reciprocal transformation was employed, because this was the 
only way to make our data meet the standards of normal distribution. The ANOVA 
revealed a marginally significant two-way Prime x Order interaction, F{\,22) = 3.12, 
/? = .091, r  = .35. Apart from this theoretically irrelevant effect, no other main or 
interaction effect was found significant. Importantly, the Prime x Target two-way 
interaction proved to be non-significant too, F{\,22) = 1.22,p  -  .282.
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In the next step o f the analysis, the mean congruent and incongruent latencies 
were calculated for each participant in the same way as in the verbal task. The mean 
congruent and incongruent trial reaction times again were log-transformed for further 
analysis. The 2 (Congruence) x 2 (DrJer) mixed-ANOVA results were similar to those 
o f the verbal priming task in this long SOA group. Mean reaction time difference 
between congruent and incongruent trials was not significant, F(\,22) = 1.07,/? = .313. 
Nor was the Congruence x Order interaction effect, F(\,22) = 1.18, /? = .288. The 
calculated facilitation score (M = 10.28, SD = 41.99) was again somewhat larger than in 
the verbal version, but still was not quite as large as the facilitation score in the verbal 
version at short SOA. In conclusion, neither the verbal nor the pictorial priming task 
detected a significant conditioning effect at the longer SOA.
Modality-specific effect. Due to the lack of basic conditioning effect in the pictorial 
version of the priming task in the short SOA group, and in both priming tasks o f the long 
SOA group, the influence of modality-specificity on response latencies was examined 
only on responses obtained from the verbal version of the priming task in the short SOA 
group. The data (Table 35) showed that mean latencies on CS-+ trials were faster than 
CS+- trials, irrespective of the target type (positive, negative).
Table 35. Mean response latencies in the verbal priming task obtained from the SOA170 group
Prime Mean SD
Positive target
CS+-
CS-+
544.87
534.23
88.14
83.04
Negative target
CS+-
CS-+
550.98
539.20
117.97
111.44
To analyze the data only mixed conditioned CSs (CS+-, CS-+) were included in 
the test and data were reciprocally transformed to meet the criteria of normal 
distribution. A three-way 2 (Prime) x 2 (Target) x 2 (Order) mixed analysis of variance 
test showed no significant main effect or interaction effect. The Prime x Target
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interaction was non-significant, F (l, 22) = 0.17, /? = .680, just like the Prime x Target x 
Orûfer interaction, D(l, 22) = 0.926,/? = .346.
A similar analysis was performed only with participants whose basic conditioning effect 
index was larger than zero {N =  15), to test the modality-specific effect with supposedly 
successfully conditioned participants. A two-way^® 2 (Prime) x 2 (Target) repeated 
measures analysis of variance revealed only a significant main effect of Prime, F(l, 14) 
= 6.08, /? = .027, r = .55, but no significant Prime x Target interaction F(\, 15) = 0.45, 
/? = .513.
Feeling Thermometer
SOA170. On the feeling thermometer, CS++ faces were evaluated more positively than 
C S - faces (Figure 1 4 ) .  In addition, the explicit attitude towards CS+- and CS-+ faces 
fell between CS++ and CS— faces. A t-test revealed that explicit attitude toward CS++ 
faces was significantly different from the neutral score ( 5 ) ,  f(23) =  4 . 7 7 ,  / ?  < . 0 0 1 ,  
r = . 7 1 ,  and indicated clearly positive evaluation of these faces. A similar one-sample 
t-test showed negative explicit attitudes toward C S - faces, r(23) = - 8 . 1 9 ,  /? < . 0 0 1 ,  
r = .86. However, feeling thermometer scores of CS+- and CS-+ did not differ 
significantly from the neutral point, 7 ( 2 3 )  =  - 1 . 6 2 ,  /? = . 1 1 9 ,  7 ( 2 3 )  = 0 . 1 8 ,  / ?  =  . 8 5 9 ,  
respectively.
Order was not included to increase cell sizes and thus power.
156
Figure 14. Mean feeling thermometer scores of CS++, CS+-, CS-+ and CS— faces in the short SOA 
group. Lines in each bar denote the 95% confidence interval.
A repeated-measures ANOVA with all four sets of CSs revealed that the explicit 
attitudes towards the faces were significantly affected by the positive and negative 
information associated during the evaluative conditioning task, F{3, 69) = 22.71, 
p  < .001, = . 35. Examining the contrasts demonstrated that the explicit attitude
towards CS++ faces was significantly more positive than towards CS+- faces, 
F(l,23) = 16.62, p < .001, r = .65. Moreover, feeling thermometer scores of C S - faces 
were significantly lower than of CS-+ faces, F(l,23) = 28.42, p  < .001, r = .74. By 
contrast, explicit attitudes towards CS+- and CS-+ faces did not differ significantly, 
F(l,23) = 1.74,/? = .201. Furthermore, a difference score was created fi*om the feeling 
thermometer score of CS++ and C S - faces. This feeling thermometer difference score 
correlated significantly neither with the calculated verbal facilitation score, r = .06, p  = 
.785, nor with the pictorial facilitation score, r = -.07,/? = .730.
SOA450. In the long SOA group, the feeling thermometer scores demonstrated that 
explicit attitudes were most positive towards CS++ faces, while most negative towards 
CS— faces (Figure 15). The other two sets of CS faces, which were conditioned with 
affectively incongruent USs were evaluated in between CS++ and CS— faces.
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Figure 15. Mean feeling thermometer scores of CS++, CS+-, CS-+ and CS - faces in the long SOA 
group. Lines in each bar denote the 95% confidence interval.
The mean feeling thermometer score of the CS++ faces was significantly higher than the 
neutral value (5) of the 9-point scale, 7(23) = 3.92,/? = .001, r = .63, indicating positive 
explicit attitudes toward this set of faces. In addition, the evaluation of CS— faces 
suggested strongly negative attitudes, 7(23) = 8.01,/? < .001, r  = .86. The difference in 
attitudes towards CS++ and C S - faces was highly significant, 7(23) = 10.56, /? < .001, 
r = .91, and the effect size suggests that a considerable basic evaluative conditioning 
effect was obtained.
Contrary to CS++ and CS— faces, the explicit attitudes toward CS+- and CS-+ 
faces was not significantly different from the neutral value (5), 7(23) = 0.38, /? = .705, 
7(23) = -0.67, /? = .510, respectively. Therefore the explicit attitudes towards the 
incongruently conditioned faces (CS+-, CS-+) should be considered as neutral.
The feeling thermometer scores of all four sets of CSs were further analysed by 
performing a repeated-measures ANOVA. The test revealed that the evaluation of the 
CSs was influenced by the type of the CS, which indicates that the affective information 
learnt in the evaluative conditioning task had significant impact on the explicit attitudes 
towards these faces, F(3, 69) = 19.21,/? < .001, u?^  = . 41. In addition, contrasts indicated 
that CS++ faces were evaluated only marginally significantly more positively than CS+- 
faces, F(l, 23) = 3.36,/? = .080, r = .36. Moreover, the feeling thermometer scores o f the
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two incongruently conditioned sets of faces (CS+-, CS-+) were not significantly 
different, F{\, 23) = 0.47, p  = .499. However, CS— faces were evaluated strongly 
negatively compared to CS-+ faces, F{\, 23) = 25.08,/? < .001, r = .72.
Recognition Performance.
SOA170. The recognition task results showed high contingency awareness: the mean 
recognition rate was above 80% for both verbal and pictorial USs {M  = 84%, 
5!D = 23. 20, M =  84%, S D  = 21.97, respectively). The verbal (Mdn = 94%) and pictorial 
US recognition rate {Mdn = 88%) did not differ significantly^\ z = 0.14, /? = .887, 
showing that the recognition rate was highly similar between the two measures. 
Furthermore, the correlation analysis showed positive relationship between the two 
recognition scores, r = .45, p  = .029.
The overall recognition score (the sum of the mean recognition rate for verbal 
USs and pictorial USs, divided by two) demonstrated no correlation between the 
recognition performance of the participants and the facilitation score on the verbal 
priming task {r=  -0.02, p  = .925) or the pictorial priming task (r  ^ = -0.23, p  = .282). 
Finally, the explicit attitude measure scores also had no significant correlation with the 
recognition task score, r^  = 0.24, p  = .259. These results suggest that participants’ 
awareness of which CS had been paired with which US did not correlate with their 
implicit or explicit attitudes.
SOA450. The recognition rate in the long SOA group was again very high, but the 
pictorial USs had higher recognition rate than the verbal USs ( M =  82%, S D  = 14.61, 
M =  74%, S D  = 21.43, respectively). The conducted t-test confirmed that pictorial USs 
were significantly better recognised than verbal USs, 7(23) = 2.37, p  = .027, r = .44. 
Even though the mean recognition rate of the two sets of USs differed significantly, they 
also had a significant correlation among them, r  = .59,/? = .002.
The recognition scores did not meet the criteria of normal distribution. Therefore, a non- 
parametric test (Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test) was conducted to test the difference between the pictorial 
and verbal US recognition rates.
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To test the effect of contingency awareness on the basic conditioning effect, the overall 
recognition score was correlated with the implicit facilitation score obtained from the 
verbal priming task. However, there was no correlation between the two measures, 
r = -.15, p  = .472. Finally, the overall recognition score did not correlate with the 
explicit basic conditioning effect score, r = -.23,/? = .291, showing that explicit attitudes 
and contingency awareness did not correlate.
Discussion
The results of the experiment indicated that the alterations made did not improve the 
basic conditioning effect and that the basic conditioning effects were found at short but 
not at long SOAs. Moreover, modality-specific effect was not found in the verbal 
version of the priming task at the short SOA, where the test of the modality-specific 
effect was carried out.
A small, but significant basic conditioning effect was found in the verbal priming 
task in the short SOA group, which indicated that the conditioning paradigm 
successfully influenced implicit attitudes towards the CS faces. By contrast, a basic 
conditioning effect was not found in the pictorial version of the priming task in the same 
short SOA group. These results imply that the implicit attitude effect detected remained 
very weak in the verbal version and completely disappeared in the pictorial version of 
the priming task. Thus, the alterations made to the previous experiment clearly did not 
produce the desired result that is the strengthening of the implicit attitude effect in both 
versions of the priming task. It is not possible to draw a firm conclusion as to why the 
basic conditioning effect was not found in the pictorial priming task. Perhaps for some 
reasons the changes eliminated the conditioning effect or the attitude effect was too 
weak to be detected. Given that the basic conditioning effect was already only 
marginally significant in the pictorial priming task of the previous experiment, the lack 
of similar effect in the current experiment may be due to the pictorial priming task being 
somewhat less capable of detecting attitudinal effects, than the verbal version of the task. 
However, again it is very difficult to tell why the effect was not found in the pictorial 
priming task and one of the goals of the experiment was certainly not achieved. While
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the conclusions on the findings of the basic conditioning effect of the short SOA group 
are not entirely definite, the results of the long SOA group are very straightforward.
Testing the basic conditioning effect at a longer SOA resulted in attitudinal 
effects neither in the verbal nor in the pictorial priming task. These findings clearly 
demonstrated that setting the SOA to a longer interval does not improve the chance of 
detecting conditioning effects. These findings together with the results fi*om the short 
SOA group showed a general problem with the attitudinal effect in the implicit attitude 
tests. This could imply that there was a problem with creating attitudes through the 
conditioning procedure employed, with detecting implicit attitudinal effect in the 
priming task or both. The problem with the basic conditioning effect in the implicit 
attitude measure imposes strong limitations on examining the particular issue of this 
research, the modality-specificity of implicit attitudes.
The sensitivity of implicit attitudinal results to modality-specific test cues was 
assessed in the previous two studies by comparing attitude shifts in the pictorial and the 
verbal version of the implicit measure. Since only the verbal evaluative priming task at 
short SOA produced significant basic conditioning effect in the present study, the 
modality-specificity of the priming task results could not be evaluated in the same way 
as in the previous experiments. Nevertheless, the modified design made it possible to 
evaluate the modality-specific effect not only between versions of the priming task, but 
also within each version. For significant basic conditioning effect was found in the 
verbal priming task at short SOA, the modality-specific effect could be assessed within 
this task. The analysis of the results, however, revealed no modality-specific effect. If 
. the modality of test had any impact on the implicit attitudes towards the CSs, one would 
have expected that the CS+- and CS-+ faces would have been evaluated differently in 
the verbal evaluative priming task. After all, one was associated with negative, while the 
other with positive verbal information. The lack of this kind of effect suggests that 
implicit attitudinal results were not influenced by test modality in the priming task. 
However, these negative results need to be interpreted with caution, as they are 
associated with an already weak basic conditioning effect. Nevertheless they were also 
in line with the findings of the previous experiment and so they both indicate that the 
priming task results are not affected by test modality cues.
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As a final note, it is worth mentioning the recognition rate of the CS-US pairs 
and the lack of correlation between the implicit attitude scores and these recognition 
scores. On the one hand, the latter implies that contingency awareness does not have any 
significant impact on the implicit attitude effect in the priming task. On the other hand, 
the null findings in the pictorial priming task and the only weak effect in the verbal 
priming task, coupled with very high recognition rate suggest that the formation of 
implicit attitudes again may require further processes in the particular evaluative 
conditioning procedure to merely associating pairs of stimuli in memory. This finding 
again is in harmony with similar conclusions drawn from the results of the previous 
experiment.
In sum, the experiment was only partly successful in the creation of implicit 
attitudes. However, despite problems with finding basic conditioning effects in all but 
one condition, the results on modality-specificity and so the independent context 
sensitivity of implicit attitudes confirmed the findings of the previous experiment. They 
seem to indicate that implicit attitudes in the priming task are not sensitive to test 
modality. Whereas the findings from the priming tasks of the present and the previous 
experiment both point to the above conclusion, they are also at odds with the first 
experiment, which employed the lAT as a measure of implicit attitudes. The question 
necessarily arises, if the lack of a modality-specific effect indicates that test modality 
does not influence implicit attitudes and that the results of the first experiment were the 
product of some theoretically irrelevant factors. Alternatively, one could argue that the 
effect in the first experiment could have reflected on genuine modality-specific changes 
when examined with the lAT, but this effect did not influence the results when using the 
evaluative priming task. The next experiment was designed to examine these two 
alternatives.
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Chapters
Experiment 4. Modality-specific effect in the I AT
The three previous experiments produced mixed findings as to whether test modality can 
affect implicit attitudes. In this respect, the results of the first experiment were in sharp 
contrast to those of the second and third experiments. The former indicated that test 
modality can have a significant impact on implicit attitudes, whereas the latter two 
suggested the opposite. The next study was aimed at testing whether the results of the 
first experiment were merely due to extra-attitudinal factors in the lAT.
There are two extra-attitudinal factors, which could account for the modality- 
specific results in the first experiment. First, the target concept category labels were 
changed between the verbal and the pictorial versions of the lAT and they could have 
had an unwanted impact on the findings. Namely, verbal or pictorial labels of smoking - 
and non-smoking - may carry considerably different meanings. Accordingly, one could 
suggest that the modality-specific effect could have emerged as a consequence of the 
different meaning of the labels in different versions of the lAT and not because of a 
genuine independent contextual effect. Second, the effect may have emerged simply by 
chance. However small its probability, but the modality-specific effect may merely be a 
type I error. The fourth experiment was designed to investigate whether these two 
factors could account for the modality-specific results of the first experiment.
To examine whether the labels or chance could be responsible for the modality- 
specific effect in Study 1, the present experiment was an attempt to conceptually 
replicate the first and the second studies. On the one hand, unlike the second experiment, 
but similarly to the first study, the implicit attitude measure employed was the lAT. On 
the other hand, similarly to the second study, but unlike the first experiment, the attitude 
objects were novel faces and the acquisition of attitudes was strictly controlled via a 
conditioning task. Nevertheless, coupling evaluative conditioning with the LAT is not 
without a significant problem.
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To perform an lAT, two sets of valenced target concept stimuli (e.g. names of 
fruits and insects) have to be sorted into two target categories (e.g. fruit, insect). 
Employing novel stimuli means that the target concept stimuli can be associated with a 
certain evaluative valence in the evaluative conditioning task, but they often have no 
apparent target concept category to be categorized into. For instance, a group of facial 
stimuli, which stimuli are randomly assigned to two groups, does not form two target 
concept categories naturally. Thus the fact that the lAT operates with two sets of target 
concepts, as well as two target concept categories, forms a considerable obstacle to use it 
to assess implicit attitudes towards novel objects conditioned with positive and negative 
stimuli. I am only aware of two studies published in recent years (Mitchell, Anderson, & 
Lovibond, 2003; Olson & Fazio, 2001), in which the evaluative conditioning effect on 
novel attitude objects was assessed by the lAT. In these studies the categorization took 
place based on learning the names during conditioning of the two CSs employed, or on 
the positive and negative nature of the items^^. In the present study a different route was 
followed by creating two target concept categories into which the novel target stimuli 
were sorted^^.
To create target concept categories from the facial stimuli, the evaluative 
conditioning task was followed by a category learning task, before conducting the lAT 
with the faces and learnt target concept categories. In the category learning task, 
participants were told to learn which of two companies the people on the facial photos 
worked for. The two companies served as target concept categories in the lATs. Thus,
In Mitchell et ai’s (2002) study CSs (target concept stimuli) were categorized as positive and 
negative, whereas the attribute target stimuli as pleasant and unpleasant.
One could argue that a potential alternative could have been using the Single Category lAT 
(SC-IAT; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), which assesses only one target concept (e.g. Fruit). With the SC­
IAT, the attitude object(s) could be evaluated in itself and not only in combination with another target 
concept (e.g. Fruit, Insect). This is a considerable advantage o f this measure over the conventional lAT, 
however, a number o f further issues need to be also considered. Firstly, the psychometric properties o f the 
SC-IAT are much less examined than of the lAT (but see Bluemke & Friese, 2008) and hence the 
conventional IÀT could be considered as a somewhat better established measure. Secondly, even though 
the SC-IAT assesses only one target concept, it still requires that the concept stimuli be sorted into a target 
concept category. This target concept is not available after the evaluative learning task and thus using the 
SC-IAT in Study 4 does not resolve the issue of needing a target concept category. Thirdly, Study 4 was 
designed to be a conceptual replication of Study I and therefore it was desirable to keep the implicit 
attitude measure as similar to that o f Study 1 as it was possible. Particularly to this latter reason, 
employing the conventional lAT of Study I in Study 4 is preferred to assessing implicit attitudes in the 
experiment with the SC-IAT.
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together with the categorization task employed presumably any two sets of novel stimuli 
could serve as target stimuli in the lAT. The faces were associated with the names and 
the logos of the two companies. The names and the logos served as category reminders 
in the verbal and the pictorial lAT, respectively. Naturally, the two sets of faces were 
also differently conditioned in the evaluative conditioning task. In sum, the present 
experiment can conceptually replicate the first study, but controlling the evaluative 
information associated with each target stimulus and also controlling the learning of the 
target concept categories. This design makes it possible to examine the modality- 
specificity of implicit attitudes in the lAT with novel objects.
Furthermore, the formation of two novel target concept categories makes it 
unlikely that changing the target concept category reminders between the pictorial and 
the verbal lATs has any unwanted effect on the implicit attitudinal results. It is because 
the logos and the names of the companies are again novel stimuli and the opportunities 
for them to acquire meaning or valence in a non-controlled fashion are minimized, as 
they appear only in the categorization task and the lAT. Therefore despite that the 
category reminders change between the two versions of the lATs, this leaves little room 
for it to have unwanted impact on the data.
While the category learning task distinguished the experiment from any of the 
previous studies, the conditioning task and the stimuli used in the conditioning task were 
identical to those of the second experiment. In addition, the procedure of the implicit 
measure (i.e. lAT) in the current experiment and the first study were also identical. 
Finally, the implicit measurement stage has a similar experimental design to both of 
these studies, as participants will be assigned into a basic-conditioning group and a 
modality specific group. The former will be tested on their implicit attitudes towards 
CS++ and CS~ faces, while the latter group on CS++ and CS-+ faces. By these changes, 
the experiment should conceptually replicate the first experiment, but with novel attitude 
object, as well as replicate the second experiment, but employing the lAT as a measure 
of implicit attitudes.
If the tasks lead to successful basic-conditioning effect in the lATs, one would 
expect to find more positive implicit attitudes towards faces conditioned with positive 
pictures and positive words (CS++) than towards faces conditioned with negative
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pictures and negative words (CS-)^^. Furthermore, if test-modality influenced the lAT 
results one would assume that faces associated with positive pictures and negative words 
(CS-+) would be evaluated more positively in the pictorial than in the verbal lAT. It is 
because the positive pictorial associations would have primary impact in the pictorial 
lAT, but the negative verbal associations would have primary influence in the verbal 
lAT. By contrast, if  lAT scores were unaffected by test modality manipulation, similar 
attitudes should be found towards these faces in the pictorial and the verbal versions of 
the lAT.
If the present experiment provides successful basic conditioning effect, but no 
modality-specific effect, it would indicate that the results of the first experiment were 
not replicated when more experimental control was asserted on the attitude acquisition. 
This would suggest that test modality influence implicit attitudinal results neither in the 
lAT nor in the priming task. By contrast, if  a modality-specific effect was to be found, 
one should conclude that the test-modality and thus independent context has an impact 
on the lAT, but not on the evaluative priming task results.
Method
Participants
Six male and fifty-eight female students (M^ gg = 21.20, = 3.52) of the University of
Surrey volunteered to take part in the study in exchange of course credits or £5 payment. 
Participants were assigned randomly to one of two groups: basic conditioning group 
(M^ ge = 21.50, 5Dggg = 4.16) and modality-specific group (A4gg = 20.91, = 2.78).
The number of male and female participants in the two groups was as follows: two male 
and thirty female in the basic conditioning group and four male and twenty-eight female 
in the modality-specific group.
To be precise, it was hypothesised that the I AT scores (i.e. d-scores) would reveal more 
positive implicit attitudes toward CS++ faces than towards C S - faces in both versions of the lAT in the 
basic conditioning group. That is reaction times were expected to be faster in blocks, where CS++ faces 
and positive stimuli were assigned to one response key and C S - faces and negative stimuli to the other 
(congruent block), than in blocks when CS++ and negative stimuli were assigned to one key and CS— and 
positive stimuli to the other (incongruent block).
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Design
The experiment began with an evaluative conditioning task, in which four sets of 
attitude objeets were created (CS++, CS+-, CS-+ and CS—). However, only a sub-set of 
CSs was selected for the following categorization task, in which participants learnt to 
sort the CSs into two categories (i.e. two fictitious companies). One group of 
participants (i.e. basic-conditioning group) learnt to categorize CS++ and CS—faees. The 
other group (i.e. modality-speeifie group) learnt to categorize CS++ and CS-+ faces. 
These particular CSs were further tested in eaeh participant group in the subsequent 
implicit attitude testing stage. This stage comprised of the completion of a pictorial and a 
verbal lAT. As a result, the experiment had a 2 (participant group) x 2 (type of test) 
mixed design with group being the between-subject factor, while test type the within- 
subject factor. The dependent variable was the same as in the first experiment: d-score 
calculated for each participant from their response latencies.
Materials
Evaluative Conditioning
The materials used in this experiment were identical to the pictures and words used in 
Study Two.
Category Learning
The CS pictures were paired with the logos and names of two fictitious companies 
(Frulse, Kribes). The name of these eompanies was created by a random word generator 
(“StartNet Word Generator”, 2006). Several random words were put in a seareh engine, 
and two were ehosen whieh had no match and nor had the close variants o f the selected 
words. The logos were created by MS Windows Paint software.
Implicit Association Test
The verbal and pictorial target lAT stimuli were those that were employed in the verbal 
and pictorial versions of the evaluative priming tasks of Study Two, respeetively. 
However, the category labels differed in this experiment. In the verbal lAT task the
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category reminders presented in the upper left and right comers were, “Positive” and 
“Negative”, as well as, the two fictitious company names “Frulse” and “Kribes”. In the 
pictorial lAT, the words “Positive” and “Negative” were replaced with the signs “+” and 
and company logos appeared instead of name of the companies. The affective 
categories were presented in blue (“Negative”) and red (Positive”), while the company 
names were shown in black.
Recognition task
The words and pictures, including decoy stimuli, as well as, their presentation were the 
same as in Study Two. All stimuli were presented in front of a light grey baekground in 
the recognition and the subsequent explicit attitude task.
Explicit attitude task
The explicit attitude task materials were again identical to those in Study Two.
Hardware and software
The experiment was performed on a Compaq EVO Evo N1020v laptop. The first three 
tasks (evaluative eonditioning, category learning and lAT) were eondueted with the 
Inquisit 2.0 program of the Millisecond Software. The recognition and explicit attitude 
tasks were earried out with the Microsoft Excel 2003 software.
Procedure
The experiment was eondueted by testing each participant individually in the same 
experimental room. Upon arrival participants were welcomed and seated in front of the 
computer. As in the previous experiments, participants were told that they were about to 
complete a eategorization learning and categorization study. The experiment consisted 
of five separate phases: (1) evaluative conditioning, (2) category learning, (3) implieit 
attitude measurement, (4) recognition task and (5) explicit attitude measure.
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Evaluative conditioning
The evaluative conditioning task of this experiment was an exact replication of the 
acquisition phase in Study Two.
Category learning
The main objective o f the category learning task was to create two conceptual categories 
for the lATs. The faces in the evaluative conditioning task did not form any obvious 
conceptual category. Conducting lATs, however, relies on categorizing target concept 
stimuli into two target concept categories as well as attribute target stimuli into two 
attribute target categories. Attribute target stimuli can naturally be categorized as 
positive (pleasant) and negative (unpleasant). Moreover, in conventional lAT studies, 
target concept stimuli can be categorized into two target categories. However, CS faces 
do not form natural categories, which could serve as target concept categories in the 
lAT. For instance. Black and White American faces can be categorized as Black and 
White, or exemplars of flowers and insects as Flowers and Inseets, respectively. 
However, the CS faces of the present study could not be assigned into any such 
category. Therefore the category learning task was implemented to create two 
categories, which could be used for target concept categories in the lAT. These target 
concept eategories in this case were two fictitious companies.
On completion of the evaluative conditioning stage, participants moved on to the 
category learning task. Six faces were selected from the twelve CSs of the evaluative 
conditioning stage and participants had to learn which of two fictitious companies 
(Frulse, Kribes) each person worked for. The basic conditioning group was given CS++ 
and C S - facial photographs that is three CSs that had been paired with positive pictures 
and positive words (CS++) and three CSs with negative pictures and negative words 
(CS-). By contrast, the modality-specific group was given CS++ and CS-+ faces, 
meaning that three of the CSs had been paired with positive pictures and positive words 
(CS++) during the previous evaluative conditioning stage, while three of them were 
conditioned with positive pictures and negative words (CS-+). Only the selected six CS 
faces of the category learning task were used in the implicit measurement later on.
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In the category learning task participants learnt to sort one set of three faces to 
one company and the other to another company by trial and error. They learnt to sort 
each face by the logo of the company as well as by its name. One selected group of CSs 
was assigned to be working for one company, while the other group for the other 
company. The company associated with a set of CS was randomized across participants. 
In addition, the name and the logo of the eompanies were separately and randomly 
assigned for each participant. On a learning trial a CS face was displayed on the right 
side of the screen. At the same time, on the left side five squares forming a cross shape 
were presented. The central box was reserved for only displaying feedback at the end of 
a learning trial. In two randomly selected squares of the four that were unreserved for 
feedback, the logos and/or the name of the two companies were shown. The squares in 
which the logos and names were displayed were selected randomly on each trial. By 
clicking with the mouse on one of these two squares, participants chose one o f the 
companies, which they thought the person of the CS photograph worked for. On giving a 
correct response, a correct sign (V ) appeared in the central square, while an incorrect 
sign (x) was displayed in the same square, if  the response was incorrect. Responses were 
not subject to time limit. During the presentation of feedback, the CS photograph and 
company name/logo were removed from the screen. The incorrect and correct signs were 
displayed for 200ms. After the presentation of the incorrect/correct sign the task 
continued automatically with the next trial.
RESPONSE
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Figure 16. Sample category learning task trials (first set of trials)
The task was composed o f four sets of trials. In the first set o f trials, both the 
name of the companies and their corresponding logo were shown in the two selected 
squares (Figure 16). Participants started off with randomly choosing one company or the 
other, as they had no previous information on which company each CS person worked 
for. In this first set of trials, they had to provide two correct responses in succession to 
continue with the next face. So, each of the six selected CS face was displayed at least 
twice, resulting in a minimum of twelve trials. Once each CS face was sorted correctly 
twice, the task moved onto the next set of trials in a seemingly continuous fashion. In 
these next set of trials, each CS face had to be assigned to one company correctly only 
once, before carrying on with the next CS face. The second set, therefore, was composed 
of at least six trials. After the eompletion of the first two sets, the task changed slightly, 
as only the name or the logo of a company was displayed, but not both. This was so that 
participants learnt to sort the CS faces by both the name and the logo of the companies. 
Between the second and third set o f trials, partieipants could take a break and were 
informed about the ehanges in their task. By the completion of the third set of trials each 
CS face was presented with all four eombinations of company logos and names: .
(1) Correet company name in one square and the name of the other company in 
another square
(2) Correct company name in one square and the logo of the other company in 
another square
(3) Correct company logo in one square and the name of the other company in 
another square
(4) Correct company logo in one square and the logo of the other eompany in 
another square
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RESPONSE
200ms
RESPONSE
Figure 17. Sample category learning task trials (fourth set of trials)
A CS needed to be sorted into the correct category (company) twice in 
succession in each of the above combination of company names and logos. Therefore, 
this third set consisted of a minimum of forty-eight trials (6 CSs x 4 combinations of 
logos/names x 2 successful categorization). With no break between trials the task 
continued with the fourth set of category learning trials after the completion of the third 
set. The fourth set was almost identical to the third set (Figure 17). That is all CSs were 
displayed with all combinations of company logos/names, but only one successful 
categorization was needed this time. As a consequence, the minimum number of trials in 
the fourth set was twenty-four (6 CSs x 4 combinations of logos/names x 1 successful 
categorization).
Implicit Association Test
The implicit attitude tasks were two versions o f the lAT: a verbal and a pictorial LAT. 
One set of the target stimuli was identical through both lATs: the selected CS faces. As 
mentioned above, the basic conditioning group received CS++ (conditioned with 
positive pictures and positive words) and CS— faces (conditioned with negative pictures 
and negative words). The modality-specific group obtained CS++ and CS-+ faces 
(conditioned with positive pictures and negative words).
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Each participant completed the two traditional seven-block lATs in sequential 
order. The implicit testing stage thus was composed of fourteen blocks. The order of the 
lATs was counterbalanced across participants. The lATs started with a twenty-trial 
practice block, in which only the CS faces were sorted into two of the conceptual 
categories, that is into one of the companies, the persons on the photographs were 
thought to be working for. The conceptual target practice blocks in the verbal and the 
pictorial lATs were almost entirely identical. On a practice trial, a CS face appeared in 
the centre of the screen and participants had to categorize the face, according to which 
company the person worked for. They sorted the faces by pressing the key ‘d’ or ‘k ’ on 
the keyboard. Each key was associated with a company and the category reminder 
associated with the key ‘d’ was displayed in the upper left comer of the screen, while the 
category reminder associated with the key ‘k ’ was shown in the upper right corner. 
These reminders remained on the screen throughout the first block. The practice blocks 
of the verbal and the pictorial lATs differed only in these category reminders, which 
were logos of the companies in the pictorial lAT and the names in the verbal lAT. The 
location of the reminders was counterbalanced across participants for each lATs 
separately. Having pressed a key, if the response was correct the experiment continued 
with the next practice trial. If  participants made an incorrect response an error sign (red 
‘x ’) was displayed for 200ms in the place of the target stimulus.
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Table 36. The block structure of the verbal lAT employed in the present experiment
Target stimuli
Categories 
associated with 
the left response 
key
Categories 
associated with 
the right response 
key
Block 1
Target concept block 
(practice)
C5++faces 
C S - faces
frulse kribes
Block 2
Attribute target block 
(practice)
positive words 
negative words
positive negative
C5++faces
Block 3 Combined block (practice)
C S-faces 
positive words 
negative words
frulse + positive kribes + negative
CS++faces
Block 4 Combined block (test)
CS— faces 
positive words 
negative words)
frulse + positive kribes + negative
Block 5
Reversed target concept 
block (practice)
CS++faces 
CS—faces
kribes frulse
C.S++faces
Block 6
Reversed combined block 
(practice)
CS—faces 
positive words 
negative words)
kribes + positive frulse + negative
CS++faces
Block 7
Reversed combined block 
(test)
CS— faces 
positive words 
negative words
kribes + positive frulse + negative
The target concept practice block was followed by another practice block of 
twenty trials. In this series of practice trials participants sorted the attribute target stimuli 
into their corresponding categories (Positive, Negative). In the verbal lAT, the attribute 
target stimuli were eight positive and eight negative words, while in the pictorial lAT 
eight positive and eight negative pictures. On each trial, an attribute target stimulus was 
presented in the middle of the screen and remained there until a valid response was 
given. The affective stimuli were sorted out into positive and negative categories by.
The key assignment is only for illustration purposes, because the categories assigned to each 
key was counterbalanced across partieipants.
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again, pressing the ‘d’ or the ‘k ’ key on the keyboard. The corresponding categories 
were displayed in the upper left (key ‘d’) and right (key ‘k ’) comers. The category 
reminders slightly differed between the verbal and the pictorial lATs, as the words 
‘Positive’ and ‘Negative’ were shown in the former, while the signs ‘+’ and ‘-‘ in the 
latter. The word ‘Positive’ and the sign ’+’ were presented in the colour o f red, while the 
word ‘Negative’ and the sign’-‘ in blue. Identical to the previous practice block, when 
correct response was given the experiment automatically continued with the next trial. If 
an incorrect response was made an error sign was displayed in the middle of the screen 
for 200ms, before the next trial started. When all twenty trials were completed, a new 
practice block was introduced.
This third block was composed of twenty-four trials, in which both the CSs and 
the attribute target stimuli had to be categorized. Each block began with a CS face 
presented in the centre of screen and needed to be sorted into one of two companies by 
pressing the ‘d’ or ‘k’ key. On the subsequent trial an attribute target stimulus (word in 
the verbal lAT and picture in the pictorial lAT) was displayed in the middle of the 
screen and had to be categorized by the participants as positive or negative by using the 
keys ‘d’ or ‘k ’. The target concept and also the attribute target categories associated with 
the key ‘d’ were presented in the left upper comer, while the categories associated with 
the key ‘k ’ were in the upper left comer of the screen. The target concept category 
reminders were always presented on top of the affective category reminders. The 
reminders were displayed continuously during the block. The categories associated with 
each key were identical to those of the first two blocks. The target concept and attribute 
target stimuli were altemated throughout the twenty-four trials. As the third block was 
another practice block, if incorrect response was received, an incorrect sign appeared in 
the centre of the screen, before the beginning o f the next trial.
After the third block, the experiment continued with a test block. This fourth 
block had forty trials and was nearly identical to the previous practice trial. The 
exception was that no error sign was displayed after incorrect response was given by 
participants (Figure 18, Figure 19).
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Figure 18. Sample verbal lAT trials
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Figure 19. Sample pictorial lAT trials
On completion of the fourth task, the target concept categories got assigned to 
the opposite response key than previously. So, if a company had been associated with
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the key ‘d’ before, then it was associated with the key ‘k’ the fifth block onwards. The 
subsequent twenty trials of the fifth block was another set of practice trials for target 
concept categories only, but with opposite allocation of companies associated with the 
left (‘d’) and right (‘k ’) response keys. The category reminders of the target concept 
categories also swapped places.
The experiment then continued with the sixth block, in which the CS faces again 
had to be sorted into their corresponding categories in line with the key and reminder 
allocation of the fifth block. In addition attribute target stimuli were categorized in an 
alternating order. This practice block was comprised of twenty-four trials, in which error 
signs were displayed shortly on incorrect responses.
The last block of forty trials was another test block, during which CS faces and 
attribute target stimuli were sorted into their corresponding categories in alternating 
sequential order. No incorrect sign was displayed on obtaining incorrect response.
Recognition Task and Explicit Attitude Task
The procedural details of the recognition and explicit attitude tasks were identical to the 
procedure of Study Two.
Results
Responses on 8% of the trials in the verbal lAT and 8% in the pictorial lAT were 
incorrect. In addition, 3% of the responses were over 3000ms and 0% were less than 
300ms in the verbal lAT. These values were identical in the pictorial lAT. The mean 
error rate in the verbal lAT test block was 7% and 8% in the pictorial lAT. The 
difference in the error rate on the test trials between the two lATs was not significant, 
^(31) — -1.46, — .154.
Data treatment. The data treatment procedure before the data analysis was identical to 
that in Study One.
Main Evaluative Conditioning Effect. To test whether the lATs detected any 
conditioning effect, the first part of the analysis was conducted on data received from
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only the thirty-two participants of the basic conditioning group. The mean latencies in 
the blocks of the verbal lAT when CS++ faces and positive words were assigned to one 
key and CS— faces and negative words to the other response key were lower than in the 
blocks when the opposite combination (CS++/negative and CS-/positive) took place 
(Table 37). The results therefore showed that responses in congruent blocks were faster 
than in incongruent blocks (see Figure 20).
Table 37. Mean response latencies in congruent and incongruent blocks in the verbal and pictorial 
lATs obtained in the basic-conditioning group
Mean SD
Verbal I AT Congruent blocks Incongruent blocks
797.76
845.47
237.7'^
207.8;^
Pictorial lAT
Congruent blocks >734.61 75^ .^ 76
Incongruent blocks 786.67 757.23
Paired samples t-test analysis of the verbal lAT d-scores confirmed the above results and 
revealed a small, but marginally significant conditioning effect, /(31) = 1.81, p = .080, 
r  = .31. It suggests that CS++ faces were evaluated slightly more positively than C S - 
faces.
In the pictorial version o f the lAT, the mean response latencies in the congruent 
block (CS++/positive and CS—/negative) were faster than in the incongruent test block 
(CS++/negative and CS—/positive). The analysis of the calculated d-score demonstrated 
that stimulus categorization in congruent pictorial lAT blocks was in fact significantly 
faster then in incongruent blocks, r(31) = 2.42, p  = .022, r = .40.
To see whether the obtained d-score values were different between the two 
versions of the lATs, an ANOVA was performed. As in the previous experiments, the 
order of the completed lATs (verbal first, pictorial second vs. pictorial first, verbal 
isecond) was also included in the analysis. The resulting 2 (Test) x 2 {Order) mixed- 
ANOVA revealed no significant d-score effect difference, F{\, 30)= 0.00, p  = .953, or 
two-way Testii. Order interaction effect, F{1, 30) = 2.61,/? = .117. These results suggest 
that the d-scores obtained from the verbal and pictorial lATs did not differ significantly.
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In addition, the correlation between the two scores was positive and significant, r = .53,
p  =  .0 0 2 .
80
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Figure 20. Mean response latency difference between congruent and incongruent blocks
Modality-specific effect. For testing the modality-specificity of the lAT-scores, the data 
received from the lATs of the modality-specific group will be analysed. However, two 
participants made an excessive number of errors on test trials and particularly in the 
pictorial lAT test blocks (46% and 41%), well over three standard deviations (4.20 and 
3.63) away from the mean error rate. Therefore, the two participants’ data were excluded 
from further analysis. The exclusion did not considerably alter the results.
In the modality-specific group, there were no congruent and incongruent blocks 
in the lATs. Let us call CS++/Positive blocks those blocks in which CS++ faces and 
positive attribute target stimuli are assigned to one key, whereas CS-+ faces and 
negative stimuli to the other response key. In contrast, CS++/Negative blocks will be the 
reversed blocks in which the target concept stimuli (CS++ and CS-+) are assigned to the 
opposite key and as a result they share response key with the opposite attribute target 
concept stimuli (CS++/Negative and CS-+/Positive).
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According to the mean response latencies in the verbal version o f the LAT, 
categorization performance was quicker in the CS++/Positive block than in the 
CS++/Negative blocks (Table 38, see also Figure 20).
Table 38. Mean response latencies in congruent and incongruent blocks in the verbal and pictorial 
lATs obtained in the basic-conditioning group
Mean SD
Verbal lAT CS-H-/Positive and CS-+/Negative blocks CS-H-/Negative and CS-+/Fositive blocks
691.90
780.32
7^79.00
20&69
Pictorial lAT CS-H-/Positive and CS-+/Negative blocks CS-H-/Negative and CS-+/Positive blocks
713.26
733.48
7^78.85
775.70
Importantly, the d-score was significantly different from zero, 7(29) = -2.19, p  = .036, 
r  = .38, indicating that categorization in the CS++/Positive blocks was faster than in the 
CS-H-/Negative blocks. This implies that implicit attitudes towards CS-H- faces were 
significantly more positive than towards CS-+ faces in the verbal version of the lAT.
Furthermore, the mean latency in the CS++/Positive block of the pictorial 
version of the lAT was again lower than in the CS++/Negative block, but the calculated 
d-score did not differ significantly from zero, 7(29) = -0.38, p  = .706. The results 
therefore suggest that unlike the verbal version, CS++ and CS-+ faces were similarly 
evaluated in the pictorial version of the lAT.
For further testing the modality-specificity of the LAT scores a 2 {Test) x 2 
{Order) mixed-ANOVA was performed on the data of the modality-specific group. The 
ANOVA results showed a crucial main effect for test type, F{1, 28) = 6.07, p  = .020, 
r = .42. The interaction effect of Test x Order was not significant, F (l, 28) = 0.84, 
p  = .367, indicating that the between-subject factor Order, had no significant impact on 
the effeet. The ANOVA results thus demonstrated a significant difference between the 
d-scores of the verbal and the pictorial lATs and the previous analysis showed that 
CS++ faces were evaluated more positively than CS-+ faces in the verbal lAT, but there 
was no difference in the evaluation in the pictorial lATs. These results are in coneert 
with the modality-specific hypothesis outlined previously, suggesting that test-modality
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can influence the measurement outcome of implicit attitude testing, when implicit 
attitudes are examined with the lAT.
Feeling Thermometer
The analysis o f the feeling thermometer score in the basic conditioning group (Table 39) 
showed positive explicit attitudes towards CS++ faces, as the mean evaluation was 
signiflcantly higher than neutral (5), 7(31) = 2.82, /? = .008, r = .45. The explicit attitudes 
towards C S - faces in the same group were, on the other hand, rather negative, as the 
score was significantly lower than the neutral value (5), 7(31) = -2.51, p  = .015, r  = .42.
Table 39. Mean feeling thermometer score in the basic conditioning group
Mean 8D
CS++ 5.91 1.82
c s ~ 4.15 1.87
In addition, the explicit attitudes towards CS++ and CS— faces differed signiflcantly, 
7(31) = 3.10, 7? = .004, r = .49, and so indicated that the evaluative conditioning stage 
resulted in a shift in explicit attitudes towards CS faces. Importantly, the explicit basic 
conditioning effect score created from the difference of the evaluation of CS++ and CS— 
faces, correlated signiflcantly with the verbal d-scores (Table 40). That is the larger the 
explicit basic conditioning effect the greater the verbal d-score was. Moreover, the 
explicit conditioning effect showed a similar positive relationship with the pictorial lAT 
d-scores, but in this case the correlation was only marginally significant.
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Table 40. Correlations between implicit and explicit measures
Feeling thermometer 
score
verbal lAT pictorial lAT
Basic conditioning 
group .50*
.33**
Modality-specific
group .51* .43*
* 7?<.05
**^<.01
The modality-specific group’s data revealed that explicit attitudes towards CS-+ 
faces and interestingly towards CS++ faces did not differ from neutral, 7(31) = 0.31, 
p  = .763, 7(31) = 1.16, 7? = .257, respectively. The results of this group suggest that 
explicit attitudes towards CS++ and CS-+ faces should be considered as neutral. In 
particular, in the case of CS++ faces, this means that despite the positive-only 
associations learnt, participants’ explicit attitudes were neutral.
Table 41. Mean feeling thermometer score in the basic conditioning group
Mean 87)
CS++ 5.33 1.87
c s - .5.07 1.35
The explicit conditioning effect in the modality-specific group too correlated 
significantly with the verbal d-scores and with the pictorial d-scores (Table 40), 
suggesting a considerable relationship between the explicit and implicit attitudes.
Recognition Performance.
The mean recognition rate for each participant was calculated for only those six pictorial 
and verbal USs, which were later selected for the categorization task and the two lATs. 
This mean recognition rate was identical between verbal (M =  0.71, SD = 0.27) and 
pictorial USs (M = 0.71, SD=  0.28), 7(63) = 0 .00 , 7? = 1-000. Eighteen participants (28%) 
recognized all six verbal US-CS pairs correctly, while twenty-two (34%) participants
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had perfect recognition performance with the pictorial US-CS pairs. The verbal and 
pictorial recognition rate of each participant had a significant correlation, r  = .61,
p  < .0 0 1 .
To examine the influence of contingency awareness on the implicit and explicit 
attitude results a series of correlations was conducted first on the data of the basic- 
conditioning group. The overall recognition score had a positive relationship with the 
verbal lAT d-score, r = .50,7? ^  -004, which implied that the higher the recognition rate 
the larger was the basic-conditioning effect. While contingency awareness was 
correlated with verbal d-scores, there was no sign of any correlation between the overall 
recognition score and the pictorial lAT d-score, r = .04,7? = .831. Finally, the explicit 
conditioning effect was also significantly correlated with the overall recognition score, 
r =  .59 , 7? < .0 0 1 .
When the same series o f correlations was performed on the data of the entire 
sample, the positive relationship between overall recognition score and verbal lAT 
d-score was found to be only marginally significant, r  = .21, 7? = .096. The pictorial 
d-score again did not correlate with the recognition score, r = .02 , 7? = .868 , but the 
explicit conditioning score did have a positive correlation, r = .43,7? < .001.
Discussion
The central finding of this study is that the implicit attitude measure detected a 
signifieant basic conditioning effect. The result indicates that the evaluative 
conditioning paradigm was successful in eliciting a significant attitude shift towards the 
CSs and the category learning task proved to be an adequate task in the creation o f two 
categories from two randomly created stimulus sets. Most importantly, the implicit 
attitude measure also revealed a significant modality-specificity effect, suggesting that 
test modality and so independent contextual cues can have significant impact on the lAT 
results.
The attitude acquisition stage in the present study certainly led to the formation 
of implicit - and explicit - attitudes. However, yet again the basic conditioning effects in 
the lATs were rather small and the effect proved to be only marginally signifieant in the
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verbal lAT. All these results show that while the conditioning paradigm was successful 
in the creation of implicit attitudes, the effect achieved was not robust. While these 
findings could be cause for some concern, the category learning task fully achieved its 
objective.
The category learning task was introduced so that the set of novel facial stimuli 
could form two separate categories. Thus the task was designed to produce two target 
categories for the lATs, but at the same time it was not supposed to eliminate the 
attitudinal effect of the evaluative conditioning task. The error rate in the lATs of the 
present experiment was comparable to that in Study 1 and so the task successfully 
produced the two categories needed. In fact, the comparable error rate suggests that the 
novel categories created functioned similarly to existing well-established conceptual 
categories. In addition, the basic conditioning effect found showed that despite the extra 
task between the evaluative conditioning task and the implicit measurement stage, 
implicit attitudes towards the novel attitude objects remained detectable. Therefore, 
using the particular category learning task overcame the problem of categorizing novel 
stimuli into two categories in the lAT and produced a way to use practically any kind of 
novel conditioned stimuli to be assessed by the lAT.
Crucially, however, the results of the modality-specific group revealed a 
significant modality-specific effect in the lAT. The results showed that faces which had 
been previously conditioned with positive pictures, but negative words were evaluated 
significantly more positively in the pictorial than in the verbal lAT. Therefore, it implies 
that the evaluation of the faces was affected by the similarity between test modality and 
the modality of learnt evaluative information. The pictorial test results seem to be 
affected more by the learnt pictorial evaluative information, while the verbal test by the 
learnt verbal evaluative information. That is the experiment indicates that test modality 
and so independent context can influence the implicit attitudinal results of the lAT. 
These findings are in concert with the results of Study I, but are at odds with those of 
Study 2 and Study 3.
It must be also mentioned that the verbal lAT results were also significantly 
influenced by participants’ contingency awareness and thus whether they could 
recognize the CS-US pairs or not. As a consequence, contingency awareness was an
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important factor in the verbal lAT, but not in the pictorial lAT. That is unlike any other 
implicit attitude measures in the current research project, recognition of learnt stimuli 
and implicit attitudes were correlated in the verbal version of the lAT. One could 
speculate that the two versions of the lATs may reflect on different informational 
sources, one that requires conscious recognition o f earlier learnt evaluative association 
and one that does not. However, the findings do not permit a firm conclusion on this 
issue.
In sum. Study 4 replicated the modality-specific findings of Study I, indicating 
that the results of the latter were due neither to the category reminder changes nor to 
type I error. The implicit attitudes in the lAT were shown to be influenced by test 
modality cues and so by independent contextual-cues.
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Chapter 10
General discussion
The context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes has been in the focus of social cognition 
research, as it has significant theoretical implications for our understanding of implicit 
attitudes. Much of the theoretical debate over the context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes 
has concentrated on the implications of the issue for implicit attitude representation. 
However, I argued that from a theoretical point of view, it is crucial to distinguish 
between two kinds of contexts, one which influences the encoding of the attitude object 
and one that does not (see also Fazio, 2007). This distinction was made following 
Baddeley’s (2001) argument on interactive and independent context, respectively. I 
argued that most of the representational arguments on context-sensitivity of implicit 
attitude are related to the issue o f independent context, whereas most o f the empirical 
evidence comes from investigating the effect of interactive context. Therefore, most of 
the available empirical evidence does not allow for the drawing of any conclusions about 
the issue of implicit attitude representation. Furthermore, I also showed that examining 
independent context sensitivity may not only be related to the representation of implicit 
attitudes, but also to the underlying memory system. Thus the introduction of the 
concepts of independent and interactive context-sensitivity into the investigation of 
implieit attitudes could contribute to clarifying relations between empirical results and 
attitude models. In addition, empirically examining independent context sensitivity gives 
us the opportunity to relate findings to implicit attitude models, most notably 
representation and memory system models.
When this research project was started, to my knowledge no empirical findings 
had been published that would have clearly qualified as an examination of the 
independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes. Therefore, the aim of the present 
research was to explore whether independent contextual cues could indeed influence 
implicit attitudes. The independent contextual cue in this project was the pictorial or
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verbal nature of test modality. The employment of this rather subtle contextual cue was 
thought to be unlikely to influence encoding of the attitude objects and hence it suited to 
the goal of the research. One could argue that a single way of testing the effect of 
independent context on implicit attitudes (i.e. test-modality) may result in only limited 
conclusions about the issue. Furthermore, employing a wider range of context cues (e.g. 
environmental setting), not only test-modality, could produce more definitive answers 
on the potential effect of independent context on implicit attitudes. However, the 
experiments conducted revealed somewhat complex findings and understanding these 
results correctly was crucial, before other contextual manipulations could have been 
investigated. Thus the research was aimed at examining independent context sensitivity 
o f implicit attitudes by understanding the effect of modality-specific cues in depth. That 
is the question was whether the manipulating the test-modality could elicit implicit 
attitudinal changes. The answer fi*om the four experiments is both yes and no.
Main findings
The findings of the present research are mixed. Two studies showed that implicit 
attitudinal results were sensitive to a test modality manipulation, whereas another two 
studies revealed that they were not. In Study I, the modality-specificity of pre-existing 
attitudes (i.e. smoking) was examined by administering a pictorial and a verbal version 
of the lAT. The implicit attitudinal results were found to be sensitive to the modality of 
the test, but a number of issues needed to be addressed to draw any conclusion about the 
modality-specificity of implicit attitudes. As a consequence, Study 2 was designed to 
conceptually replicate the previous experiment, but using a different implicit attitude 
measure, the evaluative priming task. The experiment also controlled for the learnt 
evaluative information associated with novel attitude objects. That is implicit attitudes 
were in this case created first and then measured. The results however were at odds with 
those of Study I and showed no modality-specific effect. Nevertheless, these negative 
findings on modality-specificity were found when the basic conditioning effect was 
relatively weak. It could have been that the null findings on test modality were found, 
because the implieit attitude measure simply could not detect the effect. To address this
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problem, Study 3 attempted to examine the issue again by trying to achieve more robust 
basic conditioning effect and setting the SOA to a longer interval in one group of 
participants. These alterations, however, did not lead to any improvement on the basic 
conditioning effect. In fact, the basic conditioning effect vanished in the pictorial version 
of the priming task and in the long SOA group. When the modality-specific effect was 
examined on the data of the verbal version of the evaluative priming task, no sign of 
modality-specific effect was found. After the lack of a modality-specific effect in the last 
two studies, the question necessarily arose as to whether the modality-specific findings 
in Study 1 were due to experimental artefacts or merely chance? Study 4 sought to 
answer this question with the similarly controlled attitude formation as the previous 
studies, but unlike them employing the lAT as implicit attitude measure. The findings 
demonstrated a modality-specific effect in concert with that of Study I. The findings 
also indicated that the modality-specific effect was the consequence of the similarity 
between study-test modality. Therefore they suggested that in the pictorial LAT, implicit 
attitudes were preferentially driven by pictorial associations, whereas in the verbal LAT 
by verbal associations. In sum, two experiments conducted with the lAT found 
independent contextual effects, while another two experiments with the evaluative 
priming task did not. The main question is whether this discrepancy follows from using 
different measures indeed or something else?
There were a number of factors that could have accounted for the found 
modality-specific effect in Study I. Most notably, changing the conceptual labels across 
the versions of the lAT may have influenced the results, causing a seemingly modality- 
specific effect. In addition, given the small effect size, the effect could have been caused 
by chance. Moreover, the foundations of the, modality-specific effect were partly rooted 
in some speculative assumptions presuming that evaluations based on verbal and non­
verbal information sets associated with smoking among smokers were considerably 
different. However, results of Study 4 provided evidence that changing the eategory 
reminders does not necessarily infiuenee the outcome of the experiment. In addition, 
even though the modality-specific effect was small in both Study 1 and Study 4, the two 
separate experiments had identieal results and so it is rather unlikely that the effect had 
emerged merely by chance. Finally, by employing an evaluative eonditioning task to
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create implicit attitude towards novel stimuli in Study 4, the modality and valence of the 
associated evaluative information was kept under control. As a consequence, the 
hypothesised effect on modality-specificity was no longer rooted merely in assumptions 
between learnt verbal and non-verbal information, but in experimentally manipulated 
learnt information in a learning task. Thus, the inference that implicit attitudinal results 
in the lAT can be preferentially influenced by modality-similar evaluations seems to 
stand on an ample foundation. Yet, Study 2 and Study 3 have very dissimilar 
implications based on similarly sufficient foundation.
The two evaluative priming studies did not always reveal basic conditioning 
effects, but when they did no modality-specific effect emerged. This would suggest that 
the modality-specific effect was absent when attitudinal shift was measured by 
evaluative priming. Nevertheless, the absence o f the effect in the data could have been 
either because of lack of power to detect the effect or because the effect was not there to 
be detected. This argument cannot be completely resolved, but it needs to be pointed out 
that two separate experiments with considerably different design and partially different 
stimuli arrived at the same conclusion. In neither of these experiments was there any 
indication of the effect. Thus it is not impossible, but rather unlikely that the absence of 
a modality-specific effect was merely the result of an inability to detect it. In addition, it 
must be mentioned that the recognition rate was high in these two experiments. Thus, 
the null-findings on modality-specificity were certainly not due to participants’ failure to 
learn the CS-US pairings or not recognizing these pairings. Therefore, the lack of 
modality-specific effect in the priming experiments was most likely caused by the 
absence of the effect. Thus the priming experiments have the opposite implications for 
the modality-specificity of implicit attitudes, than in the case of the two lAT 
experiments. The obvious difference between the two sets of studies is in the measures 
employed, but there is also another factor to consider.
The priming experiments and lAT experiments certainly employed different 
implicit attitude measures, but they also had other procedural differences. For instance, 
unlike any other experiments in this research. Study 1 examined pre-existing implicit 
attitudes and so there was no conditioning task before the attitude measurement stage. In 
the other lAT experiment, in Study 4, the evaluative conditioning task was present, but it
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was followed by a categorization task and not directly by implicit measurement, as was 
the case in the priming experiments. Therefore, the two experiments that employed the 
lAT as the implicit attitude measure also differed in many other respects of the 
procedure. Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that procedurally there were also 
considerable differences between the two lAT studies and also between the two priming 
experiments. In fact. Study 1 and Study 4 shared only the lAT procedure in common. In 
addition, the priming experiments differed considerably in the design of the priming 
tasks. Finally, not only did the priming experiments or the lAT experiments have many 
procedurally dissimilar features, but also with the exception of the category-learning 
task employed Study 4 replicated Study 2 as much as it was possible. Thus most of these 
arguments imply that the most likely candidates for the discrepancy between the two sets 
of experiments can be attributed to the measures. Two different measures two different 
results. One suggests that implicit attitudes can be sensitive to test modality cues, while 
the other that they are not.
Our findings, previous empirical results and attitude models
To interpret these findings, it is important to see how they fit with the data of other 
published studies and also with attitude models discussed earlier. Two studies are 
particularly relevant from the perspective o f the independent context sensitivity of the 
priming task and the lAT results. Especially so, because both revealed opposite findings 
to ours: one in which the evaluative priming task results proved to be sensitive to 
independent contextual manipulation and another in which the lAT was insensitive to 
contextual cues. Notably, the experiment of Rydell and Gawronski (2009) found that the 
background colour behind facial photos influenced the priming results, when the face 
was previously associated with negative information in front of one background colour 
and positive information another colour. This finding is not in concert with Study 2 and 
Study 3 in the present research, as it shows that evaluative priming task results can be 
independent context sensitive. Unfortunately, many of the procedural details (e.g. 
materials) of the Rydell and Gawronski’s experiment are not explained and so it is 
difficult to see what the procedural similarities and dissimilarities are between their
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experiment and the two priming studies of the present research. Nevertheless, as 
mentioned before, the experiment may have not assessed independent context 
sensitivity, as the attitude objects could have been encoded in a holistic fashion together 
with the background. As a consequence, it is questionable whether their results have 
implications for the interactive or independent context sensitivity of evaluative priming 
tasks.
Similarly to Rydell and Gawronski (2009), another previously discussed study 
(Sherman et al., 2003) suggested that the evaluative priming task results are sensitive to 
contextual manipulation. In particular, priming results on smoking were influenced for 
example by emphasizing the sensory or cost/health aspects of smoking. This study also 
showed that the lAT results were not sensitive to the same contextual manipulations. 
These results are incompatible with those of the present research, which showed the 
opposite pattern. However, there may only be a seeming conflict between the two sets of 
studies, as Sherman et al’s experiments are more likely to have assessed interactive 
context and so they have no implications for the independent context sensitivity of 
priming or lAT results. Therefore, the conflict in the findings between our and two other 
studies on context-sensitivity of the results in these measures may have been illusory in 
a sense that they could have assessed simply different types of contexts. However, it 
would need further investigation to fully understand the difference between these 
experimental results.
While the findings from the four experiments have a curious relationship to 
previous empirical findings, they also have a somewhat complex relationship with 
existing attitude models. The evaluative priming task results revealing no modality- 
specific effect in Study 2 and Study 3 are consistent with Fazio’s (2007) single-summary 
evaluation model and Petty et al’s (2007) Meta-Cognitive Model. These attitude models, 
as we saw earlier, assume that implicit attitudes are rooted in the activation of stored 
summary evaluations, therefore they attribute no role to the modality of learnt 
association in the activation of implicit attitudes. For the same reason, these models are 
also incompatible with the results obtained from the lAT experiments. Study 1 and 
Study 4. From the perspective of the single-summary evaluation model and the MCM, 
the modality-specific findings must be the product of extra-attitudinal factors that is of
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factors that have no role in the representation and storage of implicit attitudinal 
evaluations. Thus these models may imply that the lAT results can be contaminated by 
presumably perceptual extra-attitudinal factors. By contrast, other models could accept 
the modality-specific lAT results as further evidence for the context-sensitivity of 
implicit attitudes.
Online-evaluation models (Schwarz, 2007) and the Multiple Memory Systems 
model (Amodio, 2008) could support the claim that implicit attitudes can be sensitive to 
independent context manipulations and specifically, test modality manipulations. The 
reasons behind the support are different in the two models. According to online- 
evaluation models, implicit attitudes are inherently context-sensitive and so presumably 
this context-sensitivity is manifested in the modality-specific results. The pictorial test 
led to the preferential activation of pictorial evaluative information or the evaluation of 
associated pictorial information. Similarly, the verbal lAT preferentially tapped into 
verbal evaluative information or the evaluation o f associated verbal information linked 
to the attitude object. In addition, the Multiple Memory Systems model is also in line 
with modality-specific findings in the lAT, as the pictorial and verbal lATs can 
preferentially test affective and semantic attitudinal associations, respectively. Naturally, 
both models can assume that if a contextual cue is not strong enough then it is likely that 
the implicit attitude test will show some sort o f summary evaluations due to activating 
not only contextual memories, but also memories unrelated to the specific context. 
Therefore, the lack of modality-specific findings in the evaluative priming task could be 
explained by assuming that the modality-specific cues were strong enough in the lAT, 
but were not strong enough in the priming task to access contextual associations only. 
This may indicate the general failure of the evaluative priming task to be sensitive to the 
attitudinally otherwise relevant contextual cues or it simply suggests that the particular 
priming experiments were not successful in detecting contextual effects.
To sum it up, the results from the experiments of the current research project are 
not in line with other published findings on context-sensitivity, but also can be 
interpreted very differently from the point of view of the various attitude models. Some 
attitude models would suggest that the modality-specific findings in the lAT must be 
extra-attitudinal, while others suggest quite the opposite. Either way, the extra-attitudinal
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factors that could have potentially influenced the lAT and the priming task need to be 
examined and discussed further.
Possible extra-attitudinal factors contaminating the results of the 
employed implicit measures
Because of the contradictory findings, one can only conclude that the implicit attitudinal 
results were found to be modality-specific in the lAT, but modality-insensitive in the 
evaluative priming task. This conclusion addresses independent context sensitivity on 
the level of the implicit attitude measurement (i.e. evaluative priming, lAT), but not on 
the level of the construct (i.e. implicit attitudes). Since the two measures are supposed to 
tap into the same construct, the divergent findings need to be further examined on the 
level of the measures. To understand the issue better, one should look into what factors - 
other than features of the construct (implicit attitude) - could make the lAT sensitive to 
independent context and/or what factors could make the evaluative priming insensitive 
to it.
There is a considerable research on what the lAT measures and as Greenwald 
and Nosek (2001) suggested the task is a measure of association strength between 
concepts. Therefore, when the lAT is applied to assess implicit attitudes, it measures the 
association strength between a pair of target concepts (e.g. fruits, insects) and the 
concepts of positive and negative. Yet, as it was previously shown, the lAT has been 
repeatedly suggested to be influenced by not only attitudinal associations (when it is 
used for testing implicit attitudes), but also by other factors, such as extrapersonal - or 
cultural - associations (Olson & Fazio, 2004; Han, Olson, & Fazio, 2006; Karpinski & 
Hilton, 2001), salience asymmetry (Rothermund & Wentura, 2004) and general 
similarity (De Houwer et al., 2005). The common thread in these claims is that the lAT 
results can be driven by non-attitudinal features of stimuli and that these features are 
virtually irrelevant from the perspective of implicit attitudes. That is the extra-attitudinal 
features are supposed to have no role in either the representation or the storage of 
implicit attitudes. However, these assumptions of what the lAT measures cannot account 
for the modality-specific effect obtained in Study 4.
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The extrapersonal view is primarily concerned with distinguishing knowledge 
about others’ attitudes towards an object and one’s personally supported attitudes. If the 
USs in the conditioning task had been only extrapersonal associations and not personal 
attitudinal associations, the argument could suggest that the lAT effect obtained is not 
attitudinal. Thus it may have implications for the basic conditioning effect obtained in 
the lAT, but not on the modality-specificity of the effect. In addition, the same 
conditioning paradigm led to a basic conditioning effect in the evaluative priming tasks 
of Study 2 and Study 3 and so discarding the basic conditioning lAT effect in Study 4 as 
extra-attitudinal is also against the findings from the priming tasks. In contrast, 
Rothermund and Wentura’s (2004) and also De Houwer et al’s (2005) argument may 
suggest that the modality-specific effect in the lAT observed is due to the change in 
salience of the faces across the pictorial and the verbal version of the task. However, 
because the faces were randomized across participants, change in salience cannot be 
rooted in the faces themselves, but from the associated evaluative information. More 
precisely, similarity between both the modality and the valence of learnt evaluative 
information to affective target stimuli in the lAT can account for the results. However in 
this case, change in salience asymmetry is linked to changes in evaluative valence and so 
it cannot be considered as extra-attitudinal. Therefore, these models do not offer any 
obvious extra-attitudinal factor that could account for the found modality-specific effect 
in the lAT.
Nonetheless, one could also suggest that just like the lAT’s potential sensitivity 
to extra-attitudinal factors making it sensitive to changes in modality, extra-attitudinal 
factors could make the evaluative priming task insensitive to manipulations of modality. 
However, I am not aware of arguments in the social cognition literature that would have 
such implications for the modality-specific findings in the priming experiments of the 
present research project. Hence, arguments about the construct validity neither of the 
evaluative priming task nor of the lAT suggest obvious extra-attitudinal factors that 
could account for the findings. Yet, other issues about the level of measures could 
provide support for the notion that the difference between the results reflect on extra- 
attitudinal factors influencing either or both of the measures.
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Probably one of the most important issues to discuss is the difference between 
picture and word processing in the priming task and the lAT. For instance, pictures are 
thought to have privileged access to semantic memories compared to words (Glaser & 
Glaser, 1989). In addition, pictures and words were also assumed to be stored in 
different memory systems (Thompson-Schill, Aguirre, D ’Esposito, & Farah, 1999; 
Beauvois, 1982; Paivio, 1986; cf. Caramazza, 2000). The differences between pictures 
and words were examined in the priming tasks (Spruyt et al., 2002) and it was found that 
modality-similar primes and targets (picture-picture, word-word) resulted in stronger 
attitudinal effects than modality-dissimilar (word-picture, picture-word) prime-target 
pairs in the naming task. Moreover, Greenwald (2004) suggested that when both 
attribute target stimuli and target concept stimuli are words, the attitudinal effect in the 
lAT tends to be stronger than when the target concept stimuli are pictures. Nonetheless, 
differences in the processing of words and pictures may imply a diminished general 
attitudinal effect in one or the other version of the lAT or the priming task, but it cannot 
account for modality-specific change in the effect, when the general attitudinal effect 
shows no difference between the two versions of any of these tasks. General differences 
between picture-word processing therefore do not provide an explanation for the 
observed pattern of results in Study 1 and Study 4, but pictures and words may differ in 
another unwanted manner.
One could suggest that the results of Study 4 are partially the consequence o f not 
that CS-+ faces were associated with negative words and positive pictures, but that only 
verbal USs had any conditioning effect and pictorial USs had none. However, even if  it 
was the case, this in itself cannot explain the difference between the results of the 
pictorial and the verbal lATs in the modality-specific group. One also has to assume that 
the negative verbal associations were reflected in the verbal LAT score and the lack of 
conditioning effect in the pictorial lAT score. This effectively means a modality-specific 
effect that is an independent contextual effect in the lAT. In sum, the modality-specific 
effect observed cannot be discounted on the grounds of picture-word processing 
differences. Nevertheless, the effect may also be a result o f processes in the LAT 
unrelated to picture-word processing.
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In Chapter 5, it was suggested that the evaluative priming task and the lAT may 
also differ in their implicitness. For no implicit attitude measure is thought to be driven 
exclusively by implicit processes, the modality-specific effect in the lAT may be a 
consequence of contamination from explicit processes. This issue is difficult to resolve, 
since as De Houwer et al. (2009a) noted we do not fully understand what criteria of 
automaticity are met by the lAT. In addition. Study 3 attempted to investigate the effect 
of longer SO A and so presumably more explicit process involvement in the priming 
task, but since no general conditioning effect was obtained, the modality-specificity of 
the results could not be examined. Thus the question remains open as to whether the 
modality-specific effect in Study 4 was the by-product of explicit processes. 
Nevertheless, it must be also said that this is a purely speculative argument and relies on 
neither empirical nor theoretical foundations.
Another potential difference between the two tasks could be in the cognitive 
resources they require. De Houwer et al. (2009a) concluded that this issue was not well- 
understood and more empirical research was needed on this topic. Intuitively, most 
people would probably argue that the lAT feels far more taxing than the evaluative 
priming task. This could open up the possibility that the modality-specific effect 
observed in our lAT experiments could be a result of the task being cognitively more 
taxing than the evaluative priming task. For instance, one could argue that the latter is a 
purely semantic task, whereas the lAT - being cognitively more demanding - may let 
perceptual processes to influence the results. Nevertheless, this argument is probably 
even more speculative than the previous one which assumed that explicit processes may 
contaminate lAT results.
Finally, there might be other potential extra-attitudinal factors that may stand 
behind the discrepancy between the lAT and evaluative priming results. One that I have 
mentioned previously is the lack of power in the priming task or simply chance in the 
lAT. Again, the fact that two separate experiments suggested the same conclusion on 
both sides, makes this scenario somewhat unlikely. Yet, further research is needed to 
exclude this option and replicate the results of these experiments.
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Context-sensitivity of the construct or the measure?
The discussion above showed that no clear extra-attitudinal factor can be considered to 
be responsible for the differences in the findings of the studies. In theory, the context- 
insensitivity of the evaluative priming task results could occur as a consequence of it 
being a reflection on the insensitivity of the construct (i.e. implicit attitudes). This 
indirectly suggests that the modality-specific findings obtained from the lAT are due to 
extra-attitudinal factors. Yet equally, another potential argument could be that the lAT’s 
independent context sensitivity is rooted in the sensitivity of the construct and the 
insensitivity of the priming task is due to some extra-attitudinal factors. The empirical 
results presented do not favour one argument over the other and as the above discussion 
showed, no obvious extra-attitudinal factor could account for the results. Nevertheless, it 
might be relevant to look at what combinations of assumptions on the measure and 
construct could account for our data.
Following Fazio’s single-summary evaluation model (2007) one could suggest 
that implicit attitudes based on equally strong positive and negative associations are 
inherently weak. The associations between the pieces of evaluative information and the 
attitude object might be strong, but the attitudes created fi-om them are very weak or 
should be considered as non-attitudes (Fazio et al., 1986). If one assumes that the lAT is 
a measure of associations - and not only attitudes - and also that the lAT can be sensitive 
to both the semantic and modality-specific features of learnt associations, a modality- 
specific effect might be expected in the lAT. In contrast, the evaluative priming 
paradigm might be less sensitive to factors contaminating the lAT, because the priming 
task is a measure of object-evaluation associations and not associations in general. As a 
consequence, with such weak attitudes no attitudinal and modality-specific effect ought 
to be found with a priming task. However this argument is built upon a series of 
debatable assumptions, including that implicit attitudes are personal (but see, Gawronski 
& Bodenhausen, 2007; Petty et al., 2007), semantic (but see Amodio, 2008; Ferrand et 
al., 2006), summary evaluations (but see Conrey & Smith, 2007; Schwarz, 2007), 
associated with an object. In addition, one could argue that it is not that the lAT can be 
contaminated by extra-attitudinal factors, but that the priming task is insensitive to
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features which are otherwise important in attitude representation or in the storage of 
attitudinal information in the underlying memory system.
The assumption that the priming task results are insensitive to modality-specific 
manipulations, whilst the underlying construct accommodates modality-specific 
features, would suggest that important features are lost for implicit attitudinal judgments 
in evaluative priming tasks. This scenario implies that contextual features of an 
evaluative learning episode are stored, but remain largely unutilized in the priming 
paradigm. From the perspective of online-evaluation models, this reflects on the 
property of the priming task, but not the implicit attitude construct. Online-evaluation 
models claim that implicit attitudes and attitudes in general, are inherently context- 
specific. Therefore, presumably only when contextual features are not present, or too 
many contextual cues are present or contextual cues remain unprocessed, implicit 
attitude become context-insensitive. In the evaluative priming paradigm employed, the 
contextual cues are present and the number of contextual cues is very limited. Hence, it 
means that most likely that contextual cues were not processed in the priming task for 
some reason. Unfortunately, online-evaluation models have no implications for why a 
contextual cue would not be processed in the priming task. So, following these models, 
it is difficult to draw any further conclusions about the construct and the measures. By 
contrast, the Multiple Memory Systems model (Amodio, 2008) has clear suggestions for 
explaining our findings at both the construct and measurement level.
According to this approach, implicit attitudes can be a compound o f associations 
activated in multiple memory systems (e.g. semantic, affective). If  attitudinal 
associations were stored in multiple separate memory systems (e.g. affective and 
semantic systems) and the priming task could access only one of them (e.g. semantic), 
its results necessarily become insensitive to modality manipulations. In sharp contrast to 
the evaluative priming task, the different versions of the LAT can tap into different 
memory systems. The pictorial lAT can assess affective associations, whereas the verbal 
LAT taps into semantic associations. Nevertheless, the model does not have any clear 
explanations for why the evaluative priming task is inherently a semantic task, while the 
lAT is more flexible in this respect. In addition, it also relies on disputed assumptions, 
including that implicit attitudes are rooted in at least two separate memory systems (but
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see Bower, 1991) and that the lack of modality-specific effect in the evaluative priming 
task might be because the task taps mostly into semantic associations (but see Ferrand et 
al., 2006). Furthermore, one could argue for a different approach of the data.
The notion that the priming task may not utilize stored contextual features of 
learnt information could also be viable, if attitudinal and perceptual features of learnt 
information were represented separately and the evaluative priming task probed only one 
system, whereas the lAT probed both. Elements of the conceptual level of this view may 
be found in distinct areas. For instance. De Houwer and Randell’s (2004) study in which 
they argued that the valence of evaluative information is stored in the semantic memory 
system. Furthermore, the modality of learnt information is primarily a perceptual feature 
and these features are often thought to be stored separately ftom semantic memories 
(e.g. Schacter, 1992). In this postulation, implicit attitudes can be a result of associations 
activated in the semantic system (context-free) or as a compound of perceptual and 
semantic associations (context-dependent) activated in the corresponding systems. A 
further assumption is that the evaluative priming task is fundamentally a semantic 
categorization task, which assesses semantic associations. However, the versions of the 
lAT employed assessed semantic and perceptual associations.
One may wonder why would the lAT assess different associations from the 
priming task? A possible explanation is that the category learning task in Study 4, which 
was designed to make two conceptual categories, in fact created two categories 
originating from perceptual, instead of semantic learning. That is the faces were learnt to 
be categorized by making perceptual associations between faces and company 
names/logos. As a consequence, the lATs became a task in which semantic 
categorization (positive/negative) and perceptual categorization (two companies) 
alternated. The inclusion of perceptual categorization may have led to the preferential 
activation of modality-similar associations and so to the observed modality-specific 
effect. For instance, verbal cues resulted in implicit attitudes towards an object, based 
only on verbal information associated with the object. This has the important implication 
that the modality-specific effect may require the activation of both semantic and 
perceptual features of learnt information. That is both semantic and perceptual 
processing are essential for modality-specific effects to occur and only semantic
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processing is likely to lead to context-independent attitudinal results. Nonetheless, this 
alternative view gives no explanation for the results obtained from Study 1, as the 
conceptual categories o f smoking/non-smoking should be considered as semantic 
categories and not perceptual categories. In addition, this notion is again founded on 
debated assumptions, such as that valence of evaluative information is stored in the 
semantic system, which is separate from the perceptual memory system and that the 
priming task primarily taps into the semantic system, leaving perceptual information 
unutilized.
In sum, the above arguments imply that the evaluative priming task might have 
been incapable of being responsive to independent contextual cues, which can be an 
inherent part of implicit attitude representation or storage. Alternatively as previous 
arguments showed, the lAT may be sensitive to extra-attitudinal features, when those 
features are external and irrelevant for implicit attitude representation or storage. None 
of these arguments can be refuted here, because data obtained from our experiments can 
be compatible with both of these arguments. However, a key point in both arguments 
would be the assumption that independent contextual features influenced the lAT, but 
not the evaluative priming task. The difference is that according to the latter argument 
these contextual associations are extra-attitudinal, while according to the former they are 
part of implicit attitude representation or storage and thus context-sensitivity is inherent 
feature of implicit attitudes. To distinguish between the two alternatives, it would be 
important to examine whether modality-specific and so independent contextual changes 
can lead to observable dissociation in attitudinal behaviour and/or in neural pattern 
behind attitudinal processing. ,
Limitations
The above interpretation of the findings indicates that the independent context sensitivity 
of the lAT results, but insensitivity of the evaluative priming task could have important 
implications for attitude models. However, these interpretations rely on weak modality- 
specific results in the lAT and weak basic conditioning effects in the lAT and evaluative 
conditioning tasks. This presents a major limitation of the findings. First of all, given the
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very weak basic conditioning effect,; one could question whether the attitudes created 
were any more than highly volatile evaluation shifts. That is one could argue that these 
basic conditioning effects are more at the nonattitude end of the attitude strength 
continuum. Furthermore, these evaluation shifts may only be temporary, lasting only for 
minutes, maybe hours at most. These suggestions deserve more research. However, even 
if these assumptions were true, it would still not mean that the weak implicit attitudes 
created are inconsequential. After all, the underlying processing mechanisms of weak 
and strong attitudes might be identical and therefore gaining insight into weak attitudes 
may provide information about the processing of strong attitudes too. In addition, weak 
attitudes may be less likely to drive behaviour, but because of the potentially large 
volume of such attitudes, they could still have an impact on everyday life. Again these 
questions need further examination.
Moreover, it is not at all clear whether the weak basic conditioning effect was an 
outcome of the weak implicit attitudes created or of the problems with the implicit 
attitude test measures. Again, this question cannot be answered here, because it is known 
that the reliability of, and effect sizes in, implicit attitude measures and especially the 
evaluative priming task are somewhat problematic (Wittenbrink, 2007). It is also known 
that the evaluative conditioning paradigm often produces elusive attitude effects (e.g. 
Rozin et al., 1998).
Furthermore, it is important to note that the attitudinal effects were rather weak 
in our experiments despite the high overall recognition rate among participants. This 
also suggests that implicit attitude formation may require additional processing beyond 
merely associating a pair of stimuli. Furthermore, besides the effect sizes achieved, the 
conditioning paradigm and implicit measures put limitations on our conclusions for an 
additional reason.
The effect sizes achieved have also posed a substantial challenge in testing the 
modality-specificity of implicit attitudes and limit the conclusions that can be drawn 
from the data. The contradictory results might be due to effect size issues, but again it 
would need further research to draw a strong conclusion about this issue.
Another limitation is that both, the conditioning paradigm employed and the 
implicit attitude measures used are based on a particular procedure. For instance, the
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evaluative conditioning task required from the participants to learn the CS-US pairs. 
This made it an explicit learning task. Since, the conditioning paradigm was almost 
identical in all three o f the relevant experiments, our conclusions about implicit 
attitudinal effects should be understood as a result of explicit learning. However, 
implicit or incidental learning tasks may have produced different results regarding the 
modality-specificity of the lAT and evaluative priming data. Similarly, our measures 
(lAT, evaluative priming task) followed a certain procedure, which changed relatively 
little across experiments. Therefore, it is possible that with an alternative procedure, the 
results would have been different. For example, our priming tasks were supraliminal, but 
it might be that subliminal priming tasks would have resulted in very different findings. 
Moreover, other implicit measures (e.g. approach-avoidance tasks) could have given 
interesting further insights into the independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes.
A related issue to using different implicit measures of attitudes is employing a 
personalized version of the lAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004). Presuming that this version of 
the lAT taps indeed into more personal attitudes than conventional lATs (but see Nosek 
& Hansen, 2008a, 2008b), assessing the modality-specific effect with it may have 
significant implications. Let us assume that the modality-specific effect found in Study 4 
is merely the product of the lAT being just a measure of associations and not necessarily 
attitudes. By contrast, let us further assume that priming tasks assess personally held 
attitudes and the lack of modality-specific effect in Study 2 and Study 3 reflects on the 
insensitivity of implicit attitudes to manipulations o f modality. In this case, one would 
expect to find no modality-specific effect if  Study 4 was replicated with a personalized 
version of the lAT. However, if  the lack of modality-specific results in Study 2 and 
Study 3 reflected that the evaluative priming task had failed to detect the otherwise 
attitudinally relevant modality-specific effect, then by replicating Study 4 with a 
personalized lAT, the results should demonstrate this modality-specific effect. That is 
the results should be similar to those of Study 4. As a consequence, one can argue that 
replicating Study 4 with a personalized lAT could resolve the most intriguing questions 
in this research project and could give a considerable help in understanding the pattern 
of results found. O f course, as we saw earlier, there is some controversy around the 
personalized lAT, but even so further research including the latter measure could add
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considerably to our understanding of the presented results of this research and of the 
independent context sensitivity o f implicit attitudes.
In addition, even though the present research project aimed to assess the effect of 
independent context on implicit attitudes, the effect was tested only by manipulating the 
modality of associated information and implicit attitude measures. Therefore, it is 
impossible to tell whether other potential independent context manipulations would have 
produced similar results. Of course, a wider range of independent context manipulation 
could give more thorough insight into the context-sensitivity of implicit attitudes. 
Moreover, I believe the distinction between independent and interactive context is 
fundamental, but it does not necessarily mean that these types of contexts cannot be 
further divided into similarly relevant sub-categories, which could have different impact 
on implicit attitudes. Thus, a larger variety of independent contextual manipulation is 
essential to understand the independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes.
In relation to this latter point, it is worth considering whether manipulating the 
modality of stimuli during learning and test is a good way of examining the effect of 
independent context on implicit attitudes. Most importantly, the modality-specific 
context manipulation is likely to leave the meaning of the stimuli presented at study and 
test unaltered. As a consequence the modality of stimuli could be considered as 
independent contextual manipulation and this was a crucial requirement in the present 
research. To examine the implication of representational and memory system models of 
attitudes, it was essential that changes of context presumably did not modify the 
meaning of stimuli and thus provided independent contextual manipulation in the 
conducted experiments. Furthermore, modality-specific contextual manipulations made 
it possible to examine the implications of memory system models and representational 
models of implicit attitudes at the same time. The pictorial/verbal nature of stimuli had 
significant theoretical consequences on attitudinal stimulus processing from the point of 
view of both kinds of models and therefore the applied method of testing the 
independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes was in line with a very wide range of 
models.
Nevertheless, examining the independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes 
through studying modality-specificity also had some considerable disadvantages. First
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and foremost, this method of context-manipulation is very subtle and thus it could result 
in only very small modality-specific effects at best, even if  implicit attitudes are 
influenced by the similarity between study and test modality of stimuli. In addition, the 
distinction between picture and word processing is peculiar in many ways and further 
research would be needed to see if  the modality-specific effect found in Study 1 and 
Study 4 extends to other kinds o f independent contextual effect or is restricted 
exclusively to picture-word stimulus processing.
Moreover, one could argue that other forms of contextual manipulations not only 
could have extended our understanding o f the independent context sensitivity of implicit 
attitudes, but in fact could have provided better alternatives for testing this effect with 
manipulating stimulus modality. Naturally this issue cannot be closed definitively. 
Nonetheless, I would like to point out that many of the potential alternative contextual 
manipulations also have some substantial drawbacks, including the independent 
contextual nature of the context being questionable or only being appropriate for testing 
the implications of representational or memory system models, but not of both. For 
instance, as mentioned previously, context-manipulation in the form of stimulus 
background colour may not be regarded as independent context, if a given stimulus 
becomes stored together with the background colour in a holistic manner. In addition, a 
green background is not related more to either of the memory systems than a red or any 
other background. Therefore the background colour in itself cannot be used for testing 
the implications of the Multiple Memory Systems model. These points also apply to 
examining the context-effect of implicit attitudes by manipulating for instance the 
environmental setting (e.g. room) or the mood of the participants. Furthermore, 
providing a contextual manipulation for example in the form of the voice of the stimulus 
presenter or of the font style of the words presented are similarly subtle manipulation of 
the context, but at the same time the Multiple Memory System model’s implications 
could not be tested. In general, it is likely that independent contextual manipulations 
would offer only subtle context manipulations, but test the implications o f either 
representational models only or memory system models only. Nevertheless, further 
research is needed to see if alternative contextual manipulations could be employed 
more successfully.
204
Beyond the previously mentioned issues, a considerable limitation of the present 
research is related to differences between the implicit attitude measures employed. I 
tried to address previously what factors could be behind the contradictory modality- 
specific findings between the experiments with the lAT and the evaluative priming 
paradigm. However, further research would be needed to understand what factors 
differentiates lATs from evaluative priming tasks.
A further issue that needs to be mentioned is the ambivalence o f the attitudes in 
the present research. The attitudes in the reported studies were often ambivalent in the 
sense that the objects were associated with incongruent information that is with both 
positive and negative information. However, one can wonder how these attitudes relate 
to the ambivalence of these attitudes assessed if they were measured by conventional 
explicit measures of ambivalence. For instance, did participants feel any conflict when 
evaluating the attitude object? In the present research, no explicit attitude measures were 
employed with the exception of Study 1. Hence, it is impossible to tell whether 
participants’ explicit attitudes were ambivalent or not. In most studies the attitude 
objects were often associated with affectively incongruent information, which certainly 
made explicit attitudinal ambivalence theoretically possible. However, it remains an 
open question whether the incongruent information learnt in the specific procedure 
results in ambivalent explicit attitudes. A related issue is that in what conditions the 
incongruent information associated to an attitude object transform into ambivalent 
explicit attitudes. Nevertheless, these issues can be resolved only with further research 
on the topic.
Finally, it is important to recognise that the studies lacked an examination of the 
link between the implicit attitudes created and any real attitude-relevant behaviour. That 
is it remains to be seen whether the implicit attitudes created had any influence either on 
verbal or non-verbal attitudinal behaviour. Nevertheless, this issue again would need 
further research to a draw firm conclusion.
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Final notes
This research project was an attempt to further our understanding of the context- 
sensitivity of implicit attitudes, by focusing on one particular type of context: context 
which does not influence the encoding of the attitude object. The four experiments 
conducted revealed a curious pattern of results. The lAT results proved to be sensitive to 
the independent contextual manipulation, but the evaluative priming task results did not. 
The theoretical implications of these results are necessarily inconclusive and they call 
for further research to understand the independent context sensitivity of implicit 
attitudes. For instance, instead of using pictures and words in the conditioning and 
implicit attitude testing tasks, one could use the voice of different people as the 
independent context manipulation (K.C. Klauer, personal communication, September, 
2010). Such context-sensitivity may have strong implications for the representation 
models of implicit attitudes. In general, examining the independent context sensitivity of 
implicit attitudes with a wider range of independent contextual manipulation would be 
very relevant. Furthermore, comparing the effect of independent and interactive context 
on implicit attitudes could have further implication on implicit attitude models. In 
addition, one could test the independent context sensitivity of implicit attitudes with 
different measures, such as the Approach-Avoidance Task (Chen & Bargh, 1999), which 
may tap into the instrumental memory system suggested by Amodio and Ratner (2011). 
Similarly, employing a personalized version of the lAT in examining the issue of 
context-sensitivity could provide interesting and highly relevant results. It would also be 
highly relevant to see whether findings about independent context sensitivity are 
affected by how affective information is learnt about an attitude object (i.e. explicit, 
involuntary or implicit learning). In addition, the time-course of independent context 
sensitivity results may also be highly important. That is testing context-sensitivity o f 
newly-formed attitudes immediately after learning versus a day later may produce 
considerably different results. Finally, further examinations of the boundary conditions 
of evaluative conditioning, evaluative priming and attitudinal effect in the lAT should be 
very relevant for future research on implicit attitudes.
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The data from the present experiments may have not given straightforward 
answer to the research question, but I believe this research has demonstrated the 
importance of distinguishing conceptually between independent and interactive context 
in the study of implicit attitudes. I also believe that including memory system models in 
the investigation of the issue is crucial and can produce exciting research hypotheses. 
Furthermore, to understand the representation and storage of implicit attitudes, 
evaluative conditioning and other implicit attitude formation paradigms may offer a 
unique opportunity. Moreover, the experiments added to the small existing set of 
published experiments, generating an evaluation shift with evaluative conditioning and 
testing it with evaluative priming task and in particular with the lAT. For the latter, a 
category learning task was introduced, which proved to be effective in creating target 
concept categories for the lAT. In addition, the findings regarding the modality- 
specificity of implicit attitudes may have interesting implications for attitude models. 
Nevertheless, the modality-specific findings in the lAT certainly showed that very small 
changes to materials in the implicit attitude test may make the test to act as context, 
which influences the implicit attitudinal results.
Finally, I think, independent context sensitivity may hold the key to understand 
implicit attitude representation and the memory systems involved in such attitudinal 
judgement. By better understanding these issues we would further our knowledge about 
the processing of likes and dislikes and consequently on human behaviour.
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Appendix A. Sample information sheet
Project T*gk; Conceptual CatCjKirization
ln% MtK4*0M: Tamas Minarik. Pmf Chris Filc'Schw
You arc being asked to take part in a computer-based study that will examine how people 
make category-related cvduations and bow they carry out categorization tasks. Your 
participation in this study will provide Airthcr insight into this and thus help our 
understanding o f what tactors may inOuence cogniti\-e mechanisms of catcgori^ng 
processes.
Procedure
You will be asked to sit in Iront of a computer monitor and wear some headphones. The 
entire i^udy will run on the computer screetL You will ha\e to complete various tasks. 
Instructions for each task will be presented on the screen. If there is any^ing uncle» 
concerning what you are supposed to do please ask the cxpcrimimter. Next you will find a 
sWft description o f the stinfy and your ta ^
Tk; *udy is cmnpriscd o f four sepanue parts. Dunng the Grst pan you w HI see laces, 
pictures and words appearing on the screen. The only thing you need to do is to watch 
these it«ns and try to remember, which face is followed by which pictim: and werd. This 
p»t will take fw  about 12 minutes. The second part is another, bm sornewbm miwr 
complex task, involving the same facial pk^os and pichnes and words. This second part 
takes about 15 minutes. In the tWrd part o f the study, you will be asked to complete a 
recognition task. Finally, you will be asked to rcqxmd to some questions on the 
computer. .
There will be i hott break between the sepaiatc parts aid your pardctpaHmi in this Audy 
will last for apjnoxunalcly forty minutes.
At any time in the study, you may decide to withdraw fmm the study. If you withdraw no 
more information will be collected from you. When you indicate you wish to withthaw 
the investigator will ask if the materials already collected in the study can be used. You 
maysay'no'ifyoudonmwaothimmkcepthRScdata.
Criteria. .
The research assumes that you can read English fluently and tkd )vur vision is normal or 
corrected to normal If you do not consider yourself fluent in English, or if your vision is 
not normal or convcled to normal, ask the experimenter now whether or not you should
c o n t i n u e .
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During the second task, (lashing images will appear on the screen. In participants with 
[Aotoscnsitiw; epilepsy, these (lashing im ^cs may trigger seizures. If you have epilepsy, 
please inlbrm the experimenter and the study will end now.
Some o f  Üte photographs in the first part o f  the study can be upsetting. These will be 
pictures o f  Aings like iniured people and animals. If you wish to stop, just tell the 
experimenter that you are not able to continue. Again, you can withdraw any time. If any 
emotional discomfort appears later, you should contact Tamas MinariL or the principal 
investigator Prof Chris Pife-Schaw. Also the Student Coun ilm g Centre can be 
contacted at +44 (0)14 8368 9498.
i)ata 6om this research are to he kept for 5 years. All infbnnation we collect from \o u  
m il be anonymous and only used in aggrcgne form in statistical analyses.
You will recmve IS (or your participation in this research study. It will be paid when you 
completed the study. If you withdraw from the study, you will be paid (or the potdons 
diot you completed.
Particmants' Rights;
Participation Is entirely voluntar}' and you arc free to withdmw at any time without giving 
any reason. On your request, all ramrAxI data will be deleted immediately. You arc free 
to choose not to answier particular questions if  you do not want to.
Contact Persons;
If you hovT any questions about this study you may contact Tamas Minorik by phtmc on 
01483 682910 or b)' e-mail at t.minarik'S surreyjac.uk or alternatively Prof Chris File- 
Schaw by p4ione on 01483 686873 or by omall at c,fi le-schaw;g:mnoY4K.ti^ Your 
questions about your rights as a porddpant or should you have any comphunt concerning 
the experiment can be reported to the Ethics Committee via email at 
c ashbee<8surrevÆc.uk o f via phone a: 01483 68904L
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Appendix B. Sample consent form
CONSENT FORM
1. I agree (o take part in the above study
2. I confinn that I have read and understand the above information and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions and haw understood (he advice and mfbrmation given as a result.
3. 1 have been given a full explanation o f  the nature, purpose and likely duration o f  the study, and 
ofvdun I will be expected to do.
4. I agree to comply with instruction given to me during the study and to co-operatc fully with the 
mwsdgi^rs.
5. 1 confirm that
a. I am aged between eighteen and thirty-five
b. my mother tongue is English,
c. my vision is normal or corrected to normal
d i  hove no reading difHculdes
e. I am not aware o f  mffêring ûom  epilepsy.
6. I understand that all personal data telodng to volunteers is held and processed in the strictest 
confidence, and in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). I agree that 1 will not seek 
to restrict the use o f  the results o f  the study on the tmdostandmg that my anonymity is 
preserved. .. ,
7. I understand that 1 am free to withdraw from the study at any time without needing to justify my 
decision and without pngudice.
8. I acknowledge that in consideration for completing (he study I shall receive the sum o f  £5. 1 
recognise that the sum or die course credit would be less, arid at Ac discretion o f  the Principal 
Investigator, if  1 withdraw before completion o f the study.
9. I confirm that I have read and uruierstood the above and freely consent to participating in this 
study. I have been ^ven adequate time (o consider my participation and agree to comply with 
the instructions and restrictions of the study.
Name ofperson obtaining consent,. Date. Signature o f  person obtaming cornent
228
Appendix C. Sample pictorial recognition task trial
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Appendix D. Sample verbal recognition task trial
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Appendix E. Sample feeling thermometer trial
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